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Introduction
Fingerprints have provided a valuable method of personal identification in forensic science and 
criminal investigations for more than 100 years.1 Fingerprints left at crime scenes generally are 
latent prints—unintentional reproductions of the arrangement of ridges on the skin made by the 
transfer of materials (such as amino acids, proteins, polypeptides, and salts) to a surface. Palms 
and the soles of feet also have friction ridge skin that can leave latent prints. The examination of 
a latent print consists of a series of steps involving a comparison of the latent print to a known 
(or exemplar) print. Courts have accepted latent print evidence for the past century.2 However, 
several high-profile cases in the United States and abroad have highlighted the fact that human 
errors can occur,3 and litigation and expressions of concern over the evidentiary reliability of 
latent print examinations and other forensic identification procedures has increased in the last 
decade.4
“Human factors” issues can arise in any experience- and judgment-based analytical process such 
as latent print examination. Inadequate training, extraneous knowledge about the suspects in the 
case or other matters, poor judgment, health problems, limitations of vision, complex technology, 
and stress are but a few factors that can contribute to errors. A lack of standards or quality 
control, poor management, insufficient resources, and substandard working conditions constitute 
other potentially contributing factors.
In addition to reaching correct conclusions in the matching process, latent print examiners 
are expected to produce records of the examination and, in some cases, to present their 
conclusions and the reasoning behind them in the courtroom. Human factors issues related to the 
documentation and communication of an examiner’s work and findings therefore merit attention 
as well.
The study of human factors focuses on the interaction between humans and products, decisions, 
procedures, workspaces, and the overall environment encountered at work and in daily living.5 
Human factors analysis can advance our understanding of the nature of errors in complex work 
settings. Most preventable, adverse events are not just the result of isolated or idiosyncratic 
behavior but are in part caused by systemic factors.6 The forensic science community can benefit 
from the application of human factors research to enhance quality and productivity in friction
vi Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis
7 Office of Management and Budget. Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review. Office of Management and 
Budget, December 15, 2004.
ridge examinations and to reduce the likelihood and consequences of human error at various 
stages in the interpretation of evidence.
To further this effort, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Office of Investigative and 
Forensic Sciences (OFIS) within the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology’s (NIST’s) Law Enforcement Standards Office (OLES) sponsored 
the work of this expert panel to examine human factors in latent print analysis and to develop 
recommendations to reduce the risk of error and improve the practice of latent print analysis.
1.  The Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis
The Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis was convened in 
December 2008 and charged with conducting a scientific assessment of the effects of human 
factors on forensic latent print analysis. A scientific assessment, as defined by the Office of 
Management and Budget, “is an evaluation of a body of scientific or technical knowledge which 
typically synthesizes multiple factual inputs, data, models, and assumptions, and/or applies best 
professional judgment to bridge uncertainties in the available information.”7
The Working Group was charged with:
• Developing an understanding of the role of human factors and their contributions to 
errors in latent print analysis through an evidence-based review of literature, case studies, 
and previous analyses;
• Evaluating approaches to reducing errors in terms of their efficacy, appropriateness in 
different settings and circumstances, cost, scientific basis, feasibility, institutional barriers 
to implementation, associated risks, and the quality of evidence supporting the approach;
• Providing guidance to the latent print analysis community on the practical, scientific, 
and policy outcomes of its work through peer-reviewed publications, presentations at 
conferences and meetings, and government-sponsored publications;
• Providing guidance to policy-makers and government agencies in promoting a national 
agenda for error reduction in latent print analysis;
• Attempting to develop credible estimates of the incidence, severity, and costs of errors; 
and
• Making recommendations for future research.
Working Group members were selected because of their expertise in the forensic sciences or 
another relevant field and the ability to balance scientific rigor with practical and regulatory 
constraints. The Working Group consisted of experts from forensic disciplines, statisticians, 
psychologists, engineers, other scientific experts, legal scholars, and representatives of 
professional organizations.
The Working Group met 9 times over the course of 2 1/2 years and heard presentations from 
experts in human factors, vision science, laboratory design, latent print identification, and 
interpretation in forensic science. Each chapter in this report was developed by a subgroup of the
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Working Group, reviewed by the entire Working Group, edited by a committee within the 
group, and reviewed again by a set of independent experts. The report was developed through 
a consensus process in which each Working Group member had an opportunity to influence the 
recommendations and writing. Despite the diversity of backgrounds and views, the Working 
Group was able to reach substantial agreement on many important issues, not limited to the 
formal recommendations. On some matters, however, an irreducible range of opinions remained, 
and particular chapters indicate those issues.
2.  About the Sponsors
NIJ is the research, development, and evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of Justice and 
is dedicated to researching crime control and justice issues. NIJ provides objective, independent, 
evidence-based knowledge and tools to meet the challenges of crime and justice. The Office of 
Investigative and Forensic Sciences (OIFS) is the federal government’s lead agency for forensic 
science research and development as well as for the administration of programs that provide 
direct support to crime laboratories and law enforcement agencies to increase their capacity 
to process high-volume cases, to provide needed training in new technologies, and to provide 
support to reduce backlogs. Forensic science program areas include Research and Development 
in Basic and Applied Forensic Sciences, Coverdell Forensic Science Improvement Grants, DNA 
Backlog Reduction, Solving Cold Cases with DNA, Postconviction DNA Testing Assistance, 
National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs), and Forensic Science Training 
Development and Delivery.
NIST’s mission is to advance measurement science, standards, and technology. It accomplishes 
these actions for the forensic science community through the OLES Forensic Science Program. 
The OLES Forensic Science Program directs research efforts to develop performance standards, 
measurement tools, operating procedures, guidelines, and reports that will advance the field 
of forensic science. OLES also serves the broader public safety community through the 
promulgation of standards in the areas of protective systems; detection, enforcement, and 
inspection technologies; public safety communication; and counterterrorism and response 
technologies.
3.  Organization of This Report
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification 
(ACE-V) process for the examination of latent prints. The chapter also explains certain 
terminology used throughout the report.
Chapter 2 outlines the general ideas behind human factors and organizational theory. It also 
addresses the nature of errors in latent print analysis, the reasons for identifying them or 
measuring their prevalence, and possible ways to estimate accuracy and error rates.
Chapter 3 describes, defines, and clarifies the interpretative stages of latent print comparisons. 
In addition, it describes the current state of knowledge, based upon published research, and 
discusses what this research suggests about potential concerns and pitfalls in the interpretive 
process.
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Chapter 4 surveys new and forthcoming methods, technologies, and techniques. It examines 
research needs and ways to improve existing technologies for recording and storing exemplars, 
for utilizing automated searches to locate exemplars for further comparison, and for conducting 
latent print examinations.
Chapter 5 addresses written reports that summarize and document the results of friction skin 
impression examinations. Best practices in report writing and documentation increase the 
likelihood that the evidence is scientifically accurate and will be used appropriately in the 
administration of criminal justice. The chapter describes the purposes and value of reporting 
and documenting examinations and makes suggestions regarding the content of these materials. 
Appendices provide examples of sample reports.
Chapter 6 discusses trial and pretrial communications from the expert to lawyers, judges, and 
juries. It reviews the more important legal rules and principles that apply to these activities and 
surveys the types of testimony that might be provided at trial.
Chapter 7 focuses on the conditions under which latent print work is performed that can affect 
quality in the latent print examination process. It considers issues such as scheduling, lighting, 
workstations, interruptions, and workplace design.
Chapter 8 reviews the current status of education and training for latent print examiners, 
requirements and evaluation criteria, and curricula. It makes recommendations for training and 
educational programs to improve quality and accuracy in latent print analysis and reporting.
Chapter 9 focuses on the role of management in developing and maintaining the system for 
producing high-quality results. It reviews the components of a quality organization focused 
on latent print analysis. These include management, personnel, accreditation, certification, 
proficiency testing, and a systems approach to error identification and mitigation. It recommends 
actions that managers and the latent print community should take to create or maintain quality 
latent print units.
Chapter 10 summarizes the most important parts of the preceding chapters. It draws the 
recommendations from Chapters 3 through 9 into categories that may be helpful for latent print 
examiners, managers, research funding agencies, researchers, policymakers, and jurists. An 
appendix lists all formal recommendations in order of their appearance in this report.
Although this report explicitly addresses only the procedures for performing a latent 
fingerprint examination and communicating the results, much of the analysis and many of 
the recommendations are applicable to other forensic science disciplines. Issues of cognitive 
bias, standardization of procedures, documentation of examinations, working conditions, 
error detection and correction, and accuracy in testimony—among many others—cut across 
the forensic sciences. By identifying and managing the human factors issues relevant to latent 
print analysis, the latent print community not only can enhance the quality and accuracy of its 
contributions to the justice system but also can set an example for other forensic disciplines. The 
Working Group hopes that this report will assist in this effort.
 ix     Introduction 
4.  Contributors to This Report
The Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis
The Working Group relied upon the contributions of many individuals. The opinions presented 
over the course of the Working Group’s deliberation reflect personal experiences and research. 
The views in this report do not express the official positions of the institutions with which the 
members are affiliated.
David H. Kaye, JD, MS, (Editor in Chief) Distinguished Professor and Weiss Family Scholar, 
Dickinson School of Law and Graduate Faculty Member, Forensic Science Program, Eberly 
College of Science, Pennsylvania State University
Thomas Busey, PhD, (Editorial Committee) Professor, Department of Psychological and Brain 
Sciences, Indiana University
Melissa R. Gische, MFS, (Editorial Committee) Physical Scientist/Forensic Examiner, Latent 
Print Operations Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory
Gerry LaPorte, (Editorial Committee) Forensic Policy Program Manager, National Institute of 
Justice
Colin Aitken, PhD, Professor of Forensic Statistics, School of Mathematics, University of 
Edinburgh
Susan Ballou, MS, Law Enforcement Standards Office, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology
Leonard Butt, Chair, Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and 
Technology
Christophe Champod, PhD, Professor, Institut de Police Scientifique, École des Sciences 
Criminelles, Université de Lausanne
David Charlton, PhD, Surrey and Sussex Police Forensic Services, UK
Itiel E. Dror, PhD, University College London and Cognitive Consultants International
Jules Epstein, JD, Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law
Robert J. Garrett, Past President and Chairman of the Board, International Association for 
Identification
Max M. Houck, PhD, Co-Chair and Principal Analyst, Anser
Edward J. Imwinkelried, JD, Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, Director of Trial 
Advocacy, University of California, Davis
Ralph Keaton, Executive Director, American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory 
Accreditation Board
Glenn Langenburg, MS, Forensic Scientist, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
Deborah A. Leben, MS, Lead Fingerprint Specialist, United States Secret Service, Department 
of Homeland Security
Alice Maceo, Forensic Lab Manager, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Forensic 
Laboratory
Kenneth F. Martin, Detective Lieutenant (Retired), Crime Scene Services Section, 
Massachusetts State Police
Jennifer L. Mnookin, JD, PhD, Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles
x Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis
Cedric Neumann, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Statistics and Forensic Science 
Program, Eberly College of Science, Pennsylvania State University
Joe Polski, Forensics Committee Member, International Association of Chiefs of Police
Maria Antonia Roberts, MS, Research Program Manager, Latent Print Support Unit, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Laboratory
Scott A. Shappell, PhD, Professor, Department of Industrial Engineering, Clemson University
Lyle Shaver, Forensic Scientist Supervisor, Virginia Department of Forensic Science
Sargur N. Srihari, PhD, SUNY Distinguished Professor, Department of Computer Science and 
Engineering, State University of New York at Buffalo
Hal S. Stern, PhD, Professor, Department of Statistics, University of California, Irvine
David Stoney, PhD, Chief Scientist, Stoney Forensic, Inc.
Anjali Swienton, MFS, JD, Director of Outreach, National Clearinghouse for Science, 
Technology and the Law (NCSTL), Stetson University College of Law
Mary Theofanos, MS, Computer Scientist, Information Access Division, Information 
Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology
Robert M. Thompson, Program Manager, Forensic Data Systems, Law Enforcement Standards 
Office, National Institute of Standards and Technology
John Vanderkolk, Laboratory Manager, Indiana State Police Laboratory
Maria Weir, MA, Supervising Forensic Identification Specialist, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department
Kasey Wertheim, MBA, Co-Chair, President, and CEO, Complete Consultants Worldwide, LLC
Staff
Melissa Taylor, Study Director, Law Enforcement Standards Office, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology
Mark D. Stolorow, Director, Law Enforcement Standards Office, National Institute of Standards 
and Technology
Jennifer L. Smither, Lead Editor, Science Applications International Corporation
Kathi E. Hanna, PhD, Consultant Writer and Editor
Shannan Williams, MPP, Program Assistant, Booz Allen Hamilton
Acknowledgements
The Working Group gratefully acknowledges the following individuals for their contributions to 
the development of this document.
Bruce Budowle, PhD, Executive Director, Institute of Applied Genetics, Professor, Department 
of Forensic and Investigative Genetics, University of North Texas Health Science Center
Mike Campbell, Training Coordinator, Ron Smith and Associates, Inc.
Yee-Yin Choong, PhD, Industrial Engineer, Information Technology Laboratory, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology
Sarah Chu, Innocence Project
 xi     Introduction 
Gislin Dagnelie, PhD, Associate Professor of Ophthalmology, Johns Hopkins University School 
of Medicine 
Susanne M. Furman, PhD, Cognitive Scientist, Information Technology Laboratory, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology 
Danny Greathouse, Former Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Marc Green, PhD, Visual Expert Human Factors, Marc Green, Phd and Associates 
Austin Hicklin, Noblis
James Johnson, Forensic Consultant, Contracted to United States Secret Service 
Philip J. Kellman, PhD, Professor, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los 
Angeles
Jonathan J. Koehler, PhD, Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of 
Law 
Kevin Lothridge, Chief Executive Officer, National Forensic Science Technology Center 
Tamas Makany, PhD, Cognitive Psychologist 
Stephen B. Meagher, Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory (Retired)
Ross J. Michaels, PhD, Supervisory Computer Scientist, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology 
Ken Mohr, Senior Forensic Programmer/Planner, Crime Lab Design
Keith Morris, PhD, Associate Professor/Director, Ming Hsieh Distinguished Professor, Forensic 
and Investigative Science, West Virginia University 
Kamran Nouri, Senior Consultant, ABS Consulting 
Ron Smith, President, Ron Smith and Associates, Inc. 
Brian Stanton, MS, Cognitive Scientist, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute 
of Standards and Technology 
Lois Tully, Former Deputy Director, Office of Investigative and Forensic Sciences, National 
Institute of Justice
Lee N. Vanden Heuvel, Manager, Incident Investigation and Root Cause Analysis Services, 
ABS Consulting 
Douglas A. Wiegmann, University of Wisconsin-Madison
David D. Woods, PhD, Professor, The Ohio State University
Reviewers
Individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise reviewed this report in
draft form and provided constructive suggestions. These reviewers were not asked to approve or
endorse any conclusions or recommendations in the draft report, nor did they review this 
final version before its release. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests with the 
members of the Working Group.
John P. Black, Senior Consultant, Ron Smith and Associates, Inc. 
Deborah A. Boehm-Davis, PhD, George Mason University 
David L. Grieve, Illinois State Police (Retired) 
Austin Hicklin, Noblis
Kevin Lothridge, Chief Executive Officer, National Forensic Science Technology Center
xii Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis
Jennifer S. Mihalovich, F-ABC, Criminalist III, Oakland Police Department Criminalistics 
Division
Roger C. Park, James Edgar Hervey Distinguished Professor of Law, U.C. Hastings College of 
Law, San Francisco
Peter Peterson, PhD, Physical Scientist/Forensic Examiner, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Laura Tierney, Certified Latent Print Examiner
Mark L. Weiss, PhD, Division Director, Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences, National Science 
Foundation
Sandy Zabell, Professor of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwestern University
 xiii     Introduction 
Chapter 1: The Latent Print Examination Process and Terminology
Introduction
The conventional procedure for associating impressions of friction ridge skin by a latent print 
examiner involves four phases known as Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification 
(ACE-V). This chapter describes the ACE-V process, notes some of its limitations, identifies 
areas where human factors should be considered, and defines certain terms used throughout this 
report. 
Box 1.1: Terminology
ACE-V: An acronym for Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification. The ACE-V process is 
described in section 1.1.
Bias and error: Defined and discussed in section 1.2.
Exemplar or known prints: Prints deliberately collected from an individual, usually fingerprints. 
Exemplar prints can be collected electronically or by using ink on paper cards. Exemplars may be 
called ten-prints when impressions of all ten fingers are taken. Exemplar prints collected during 
criminal arrests normally include one rolled (from one side of the nail to the other) print of each finger 
pad and a plain or slap impression of each finger.
Focal point: A small region containing distinguishing features within a print.
Forensic service provider: A laboratory or unit that examines physical evidence in criminal matters 
and provides testimony and reports about the examination findings. In this report, the term is used 
interchangeably with agency.
Latent print: Unintentional reproduction of the arrangement of ridges on the skin on the underside of 
the hands or feet made by the transfer of materials from the skin to a surface. This report uses the term 
print or latent print to denote impressions from all regions of friction ridge skin unless a more specific 
term such as “fingerprint” or “palm print” is used.
Latent print examination: The study of latent and exemplar prints to help determine the source of the 
latent print. Because prints come from the friction ridge area of the skin on the hands or feet, latent 
print analysis is sometimes referred to as friction ridge analysis. As discussed below, “Analysis” and 
“Comparison” also have specialized meanings in “ACE-V;” therefore, this report generally uses the 
term “examination” rather than “analysis” or “comparison” when referring to the totality of work of 
latent print examiners.
Latent print examiner: The individual who conducts the latent print examination, also called latent 
print analyst.
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8 Images adapted from Champod, C. Reconnaissance Automatique et Analyse Statistique des Minuties sur les 
Empreintes Digitales. PhD Thesis. Institut de Police Scientifique et de Criminologie, Université de Lausanne, 
Lausanne, Suisse, 1996.
1.1 The ACE-V Process
In broad strokes, a latent print examination using the ACE-V process proceeds as follows: 
Analysis refers to an initial information-gathering phase in which the examiner studies the 
unknown print to assess the quality and quantity of discriminating detail present. The examiner 
considers information such as substrate, development method, various levels of ridge detail, 
and pressure distortions. A separate analysis then occurs with the exemplar print. Comparison 
is the side-by-side observation of the friction ridge detail in the two prints to determine the 
agreement or disagreement in the details. In the Evaluation phase, the examiner assesses the 
agreement or disagreement of the information observed during Analysis and Comparison and 
forms a conclusion. Verification in some agencies is a review of an examiner’s conclusions with 
knowledge of those conclusions; in other agencies, it is an independent re-examination by a 
second examiner who does not know the outcome of the first examination.
Figure 1.1, developed by members of the Working Group, describes the steps of the ACE-V 
process as currently practiced by the latent print examination community. The Latent Print 
Examination Process Map’s purpose is to facilitate discussion about key decision points in the 
ACE-V process. This chapter briefly describes each step in ACE-V, although the sequence of 
some of the steps may vary in practice.
Minutiae: Events along a ridge path, including bifurcations (points at which one friction ridge 
divides into two friction ridges), dots (isolated friction ridge units that have lengths similar 
their widths), and ridge endings (the abrupt end of ridges), as illustrated in Table 1.1.
Bifurcation Dot Ridge Ending
  
Table 1.1: Illustrations of some friction ridge minutiae8
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9 Ashbaugh, D. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced 
Ridgeology. CRC Press, 1999.
10 Ibid.
1.1.1 Analysis
Analysis refers to the initial examination of a friction ridge impression. By inspecting the latent
print, the examiner gathers information needed to decide whether it is useful for comparison.
Figure 1.2: Analysis phase of ACE-V
To determine the print’s value, the examiner considers three levels of detail in the impression.
Level 1 Detail (L1D) is defined as “ridge flow.”9 Ridge flow often translates to a pattern type in
a finger or palm, such as a loop, whorl, or arch formation (see Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3); ridge 
flow also includes other information such as relative curvature. Pattern types are class
characteristics shared by many individuals. Level 2 Detail (L2D) is defined as “ridge path.”10
L2D includes, but is not limited to, minutiae, such as ridge endings, bifurcations, or dots. Even
the absence of minutiae in an area (called an “open field”) can be significant and highly 
discriminating. Level 3 Detail (L3D) is defined as “ridge shapes.” Ridge shapes include the 
edges of ridges (which may appear indented or protruded) and pores (the location of the center of 
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the pore, not the size or shape, which can be highly variable within a source).11 Chapter 3, which
discusses interpreting information in latent prints, provides additional information on the three 
levels of detail and their use in the Analysis phase. 
After considering the details and the distortion, the examiner judges whether the impression is
suitable for a comparison. If the examiner concludes that the print lacks sufficient detail for a 
comparison, then the examination ends with the determination that the latent print is not suitable 
for a comparison. Otherwise, the examination moves into the Comparison phase. 
1.1.2 Comparison 
In the Comparison phase, the examiner compares the latent print to one or more exemplar prints.
Information gathered in the earlier analysis of the latent print provides a starting point. A
comparison of L1D might take only a split second, as when a whorl is present in the latent, but
an arch is apparent in the exemplar. If there is no exclusion based upon L1D, then the examiner
continues the comparison. If the examiner finds disagreement with respect to the target group
that is too extensive to be the result of the distortion noted in the Analysis phase, the examiner
will exclude the source of the exemplar as the source of the latent.
Figure 1.3: Comparison phase of ACE-V
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If the initial target group is not found, alternative target groups may be selected. If the examiner 
locates a comparable set of L1D features in the known exemplar, the examiner proceeds to a 
detailed, side-by-side comparison of L2D and possibly L3D. If the examiner concludes that 
the extent of agreement between the two prints satisfies his or her threshold, then the examiner 
proceeds to the Evaluation phase.
Figure 1.4 displays a latent print (in the middle) and two very similar exemplar prints from 
monozygotic (identical) twins. One twin is the source of the latent print. These images were used 
in an unusually difficult inter-laboratory comparison in 1995. 
Figure 1.4: A latent print and exemplar prints12
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1.1.3 Evaluation
Figure 1.5: Evaluation phase of ACE-V
In the Evaluation phase, the examiner makes the ultimate decision regarding source attribution.
Traditionally, three possible findings have been available. First, the examiner can make an
“individualization” or “identification.” Section 1.2 defines these terms and describes another
type of source attribution. Second, the examiner can categorically exclude the latent print by 
determining that the exemplar print and the latent do not match and cannot share a common
source. Finally, the examiner can determine that the information available is inadequate to
warrant a conclusion. In that event, the examiner would state that the comparison was
“inconclusive” and would provide no additional information about the chances that the two
prints share a common source. 
The thresholds for these decisions can vary among examiners and among forensic service 
providers. Some examiners state that they report identification if they find a particular number of 
relatively rare concurring features, for instance, eight or twelve. Others do not use any fixed
numerical standard. Some examiners discount seemingly different details as long as there are 
enough similarities between the two prints. Other examiners practice the one-dissimilarity rule,
excluding a print if a single dissimilarity not attributable to perceptible distortion exists. If the 
examiner decides that the degree of similarity falls short of satisfying the standard, the examiner
can report an inconclusive outcome. If the conclusion is that the degree of similarity satisfies the
standard, the examiner reports an identification.
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1.1.4	 Verification
Figure 1.6: Verification phase of ACE-V
In the ACE-V acronym, V stands for Verification. Verification procedures vary among forensic
service providers. At one extreme, the verifier, presented with the first examiner’s work, assesses
the original conclusion. At the other extreme, the verifier, blinded to the initial examination,
performs an independent examination.
 
1.1.5 Limitations and Concerns about ACE-V
At every step in the ACE-V process, human factors can affect the outcome. Latent print 
examiners rely heavily on their training and experience to make the required judgments.
Subjectivity is an inextricable part of the process. In the Analysis phase, for example, accurate
identification of the characteristics that make prints of value depends on the examiner’s
knowledge, training, and experience. Likewise, in the Comparison phase, variable factors, such
as the elasticity of skin and uneven pressure, mean that there will never be perfect congruence 
between two prints, even if they originate from the same source. The examiner must resolve the 
question of whether there is sufficient agreement “within tolerance.” As Chapter 3 points out, the
examiner at least implicitly relies on a sufficiency threshold to resolve that question, and in
setting this threshold, the examiner draws on professional knowledge and experience. There is
little research at present that provides objective metrics for determining these tolerances. 
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Of course, the mere existence of subjective elements does not make the process unreliable 
or invalid. Humans can perform many tasks involving subjective judgments quite accurately 
and consistently. For example, by holding a heavy book and a much lighter one in each hand, 
most people can subjectively—but correctly—tell which is heavier. Thus, the mere presence of 
subjectivity is not a valid criticism of the technique, but it does mean that issues related to human 
factors can be especially salient to the outcome.
Although ACE-V is a systematic process, meaning that the examination proceeds in an 
orderly and logical fashion, this does not, by itself, demonstrate that the results are accurate 
and reproducible. In 2009, a committee of the National Research Council (NRC) stated that 
ACE-V is “a broadly stated framework for conducting friction ridge analyses. However, this 
framework is not specific enough to qualify as a validated method for this type of analysis. 
… Merely following the steps of ACE-V does not imply that one is proceeding in a scientific 
manner or producing reliable results.”13 Additional study is required to ascertain precisely how 
well examiners using the process perform under either controlled conditions or in casework, and 
Chapter 2 describes several possible approaches to developing such information.
Although many in the latent print community describe the ACE-V process as a scientific 
method (see Chapter 6), the issue is not the label that can or should be attached to the process 
with respect to human factors. ACE-V is a systematic, skill-based, and widely used process 
for determining whether two impressions have a common origin. ACE-V designates a logical 
sequence for a complex process of judgment, but ACE-V itself does not provide substantive 
guidance about standards to be applied within this sequence. Therefore, even though two 
examiners might both assert (correctly) that they are using ACE-V, they may be employing 
different cognitive processes. Those differences create opportunities for human factors to come 
into play.
1.2 The Meanings of “Bias” and “Error”
The issues of bias and error are critical to assessing the role of human factors in latent print 
analysis. Those terms are described in detail here, and they are referred to throughout this report.
1.2.1 Bias
The term “bias” has many meanings. This report discusses the term as it is used in three 
disciplines. In law, “bias” refers to a witness’s partiality toward one party (or against another) 
as a result of financial, emotional, or other interests or attitudes. The law of evidence does not 
expect all witnesses to be unbiased. Rather, it relies on the disclosure of the biasing interests or 
attitudes through cross-examination, a procedure that is effective primarily in exposing gross 
motivational biases (see Chapter 6).
In statistics, “bias” refers to the extent to which an average statistic departs from the parameter 
it is estimating or to the extent to which measurements on individual units systematically depart 
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(1998): 175.
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19 Nickerson, op. cit., p. 176.
20 See Miller, L. “Procedural Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human Hair.” Law and Human Behavior, 
11, no. 2 (June 1987): 157; Nickerson, op cit.; and Risinger, D., M. Saks, W. Thompson, et al. “The Daubert/Kumho 
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Law Review, 90, no. 1 (January 2002).
21 See, e.g., Saks, M., D. Risinger, R. Rosenthal, et al. “Context Effects in Forensic Science: A Review and 
Application of the Science of Science to Crime Laboratory Practice in the United States.” Science and Justice, 43, 
no. 2 (April – June 2003): 77.
from the true values. Errors from chance will cancel each other out in the long run; those from 
bias will not (see Chapter 2).
In psychology, “cognitive bias,” which is addressed throughout this report, is a general term 
for “many observer effects in the human mind, some of which can lead to perceptual distortion, 
inaccurate judgment, or illogical interpretation.”14 Social and cognitive psychologists have 
identified many sources of cognitive bias, including “information-processing shortcuts 
(heuristics), motivational factors, and social influence.”15
One type of cognitive bias, called confirmation bias, “is perhaps the best known and most 
widely accepted notion of inferential error to come out of the literature on human reasoning.”16 
Confirmation bias “connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial 
to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”17 It is “a proclivity to search for or 
interpret additional information to confirm beliefs and to steer clear of information that may 
disagree with those prior beliefs.”18 “One may be selective in seeking or interpreting evidence 
that pertains to a belief without being deliberately so, or even necessarily being aware of the 
selectivity.”19
Observers’ expectations have been shown to influence judgment in a broad range of tasks.20
Especially when confronted with ambiguous stimuli, people tend to see what they hope or 
expect to see. Thus, in a clinical trial of an experimental drug, the failure to blind the clinicians 
evaluating the health of the patients as to whether each patient received the experimental drug or 
the placebo would be regarded as a serious methodological flaw. This knowledge would create 
a bias toward a finding of efficacy. Recognition of this cognitive bias in no way impeaches the 
researcher’s integrity and dedication to learning the truth. It simply means that, on average, the 
measurements the researcher makes could well be shifted systematically from the true values, 
creating a statistical bias.
As explained in Chapter 3, some information about the origin of a latent print can facilitate 
accurate results, but other contextual information can produce confirmation bias.21 Extraneous 
information can influence people acting in good faith and attempting to be fair interpreters of the 
evidence. For example, radiographers may read X-rays differently if they know the patient’s
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and Cognition, 3 (1975): 519; and Lee, L., S. Frederick, and D. Ariely. “Try It, You’ll Like It: The Influence of 
Expectation, Consumption, and Revelation on Preferences for Beer.” Psychological Science, 17 (2006): 1054.
30 Budowle, Bottrell, Bunch, et al., op. cit., p. 803.
clinical history;27 doctors may 
assess a patient differently in a 
drug trial if they know whether 
the patient is receiving the 
experimental drug or a placebo;28 
and a consumer may express 
different taste preferences 
in response to food labels or 
knowledge of the ingredients 
included.29 “Contextual bias” 
occurs when “the forensic 
scientist uses other evidence to 
believe that the specific evidence 
being analyzed is related to a 
particular reference sample(s)”30 
and when the contextual 
information prompts a biased 
selection or weighting of the 
features in the samples.
In short, “bias” can be a loaded 
term, as when people speak of 
personal bias, racial bias, gender 
Box 1.2: Misconceptions about “Bias” in Science
Cognitive scientists and psychologists have observed 
cognitive bias in hundreds of scientific studies across dozens 
of domains.22 Research has also demonstrated its existence in 
latent print examination such as when one examiner, presented 
with consistent evidence in different biasing contexts, has 
been shown to reach different conclusions.23 Much of the 
work in latent print examination depends on judgment and 
decision-making. In many scientific fields, such judgments are 
recognized as subjective and vulnerable to contextual biases.
Within the forensic science community, some people still lack 
an understanding of what bias is and how best to address it.24 
Often, cognitive bias is treated as an ethical issue or as an 
issue that will resolve once someone is aware of the problem. 
However, the cognitive process used when gaining experience 
(e.g., using schemas, chunking information, automaticity, and 
more reliance on top-down information) in itself opens the 
practitioner to vulnerabilities, including bias, tunnel vision, lack 
of flexibility, and selective attention.25 Cognitive bias results 
from computational trade-offs carried out in the brain and is not 
a conscious act or an act that can be avoided at will.26
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bias, cultural bias, media bias, political bias, and so on. However, this is not the type of bias with 
which this report is concerned. Although there have been occasional cases of conscious bias—
indeed, outright fraud—in forensic science31 (as in all sciences and professions), cognitive bias is 
far more subtle and usually unknown to the observer. Just how often such bias produces incorrect 
findings is difficult to say,32 but “the possibility of biases influencing the decision-making process 
of examiners” cannot be dismissed.33
The issue of cognitive bias is therefore one important topic in the study of human factors 
in friction ridge impression examination. Research on expectancy effects in latent print 
identification is limited.34 However, being consistent with widely accepted psychological 
phenomena, this research has prompted proposals for blinding forensic examiners to the origin 
of samples being compared with each other35 and for using multiple exemplars in comparisons.36 
Likewise, blind verification shields the verifying examiner from contextual bias that might 
otherwise affect the outcome in difficult cases. The Noblis-FBI experiment, discussed in Chapter 
2, indicated “that blind verification of exclusions could greatly reduce false negative errors.”37 
Taking the human factors perspective, an agency might wish to adopt one or more of these 
systemic changes rather than simply warning examiners to do their best not to be influenced by 
potentially biasing information.38
1.2.2 Error
Like “bias,” the word “error” has a multitude of possible meanings. This report addresses the 
relationship between human factors and the two concepts of error outlined in Chapter 2—
procedural error and outcome error. Procedural error refers to departures from a prescribed 
procedure. The failure of a technician to calibrate an instrument for measuring breath alcohol 
concentration as frequently as regulations prescribe, for example, is a procedural error. It 
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increases the risk of an error in the actual measurements,39 but this risk might not be realized; the 
instrument could remain correctly calibrated during the period in question and thus be no more 
likely to err than it would have if the technician had followed the proper calibration schedule.
Whether or not the measuring instrument is calibrated in the prescribed manner, it is unlikely to 
give perfectly accurate results. Some measurements will be above the true value, some below it. 
For nominal variables (involving categories, such as the ABO types of blood), measurement error 
usually is called misclassification or classification error.40
When human beings make comparisons, they also engage in a form of measurement. Visually 
determining that one source of light is bright and another dim, or that one object is large and 
another small, are examples of classifications by a human system for sensory measurement. 
Likewise, the human examiner following the ACE-V process acts as a measuring instrument, and 
the examination of two friction ridge skin impressions is a form of categorical measurement or 
decision-making. An examiner who reaches a conclusion that two impressions of friction ridge 
skin do or do not match is making a binary classification, and it might be a misclassification or 
outcome error. If the exclusion or inclusion corresponds to the true state of affairs, there is no 
such outcome error. A judgment of an exclusion when the two impressions come from the same 
individual’s skin is a false exclusion (a false negative). A declaration of a match when the two 
impressions come from different individuals is a false inclusion (a false positive). Chapter 3 
develops these ideas further.
1.2.3	 Identification:	Inclusions	and	Exclusions
Forensic scientists are sensitive to the breadth of the word “identification.” It can mean placing 
an item in a large class, as in “I identified this automobile as a red Buick.”41 It also can mean 
associating a trace with a single possible source, as when a latent print examiner reports, “I 
identified the latent print as having been made by the right ring finger of the defendant.”42
Examinations of features for the purpose of identification can lead to inclusions (for example, 
the suspect’s red Buick is included in the set of automobiles that might have been used by the 
robbers) or exclusions (for example, the suspect’s green Lincoln is excluded as the one used 
in the robbery). As these examples indicate, an inclusion increases the probability that a trace 
originated from a particular source within that set, and an exclusion decreases this probability to 
essentially zero. In short, in forensic science and law generally, identifying information makes 
an association between a source and a trace either more probable or less probable. If the shifted 
probability is large enough, it can justify a source attribution.
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Latent print examiners often use the word “identification” more narrowly, to denote the finding 
of an association at the conclusion of the process known as ACE-V.43 In this more specialized 
vocabulary, an identification is sometimes also referred to as an individualization.44 In general, 
however, forensic “identification” encompasses observations that could narrow the set of 
possible sources of a trace and thus change the probability that the trace originated from a 
particular source within that set, even when there is more than one remaining possible source. 
Whether and when it is appropriate to conclude that the identification procedure establishes 
that the set of possible sources consists of one and only one individual is discussed below in 
connection with the term “individualization.”
1.2.4 Individualization 
As the discriminating power of the latent print features used to make an identification increases, 
so does the probability that the matching individual is the source. When every possible source 
has different features, and when these differences are detectable, a match in the feature set can 
establish that a specific individual is the source. In this limiting case, when the features in the 
samples have been accurately ascertained, compared, and found to match, the probability that the 
individual in question is the source is one. The identification then has such specificity that it has 
become an “individualization.” 
The classical theory of latent print identification is that individualization is possible regardless 
of how many people could be considered as possible sources. This theory holds that in the 
population of the entire world (both in the distant past and the far future): (1) every finger has 
a unique pattern of ridges and other features that is maintained throughout a person’s lifetime,45 
and (2) a well-trained examiner can ascertain when any impression from a finger displays 
enough features to distinguish it from every sufficiently complete and clear impression of every 
other finger. This is a theory of “universal individualization” based on a premise of “general 
uniqueness.”46 
In practice, a universal individualization means that the examiner is confident that if impressions 
from everyone else who ever lived and ever will live could be compared with the latent print, 
then not one would match.47 The individualizing examiner effectively sets the size of the
43 E.g., Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Standards for Conclusions.
Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, September 2003. 
44 E.g., Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Standard Terminology 
of Friction Ridge Examination (To Replace: Glossary, Version 2.0). Version 3. Scientific Working Group on 
Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, February 11, 2011. This terminology defines “identification” 
as “individualization” and notes that in other forensic disciplines “this term denotes the similarity of class 
characteristics.”
45 E.g., Peterson, P., C. Dreyfus, M. Gische, et al. “Latent Prints: A Perspective on the State of the Science.”  
Forensic Science Communications, 11, no. 4 (October 2009); Stoney, D. “Measurement of Fingerprint 
Individuality.” In Advances in Fingerprint Technology, edited by Henry C. Lee and R.E. Gaensslen, 327–87. 2nd ed. 
CRC Press, 2001.
46 Kaye, D., D. Bernstein, and J. Mnookin. The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence. 2nd ed. 
Aspen Publishers, 2011. “General uniqueness” means that every element of a set is distinguishable from every other 
element. “Special uniqueness” means that a particular element is distinguishable from all others even if not all of the 
remaining elements are each distinguishable. Kaye, D. “Identification, Individualization and Uniqueness: What’s the 
Difference?” Law, Probability & Risk, 8 (2009): 85.
47 Stoney, 2001, op. cit., p. 332.
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population of possible sources to its maximum (the entire population of the earth) regardless of 
the specific circumstances of the case. The individualization process moves from this maximum 
initial population to a decision.48 At the end of the examination process, the quantity of features 
observed in agreement between two objects (without significant discrepancies) is perceived as 
so impressive that the examiner has ruled out the possibility of a coincidental match, whatever 
initial population of sources was involved. This has been described as a “leap of faith.”49  
It means that the identification of the source is to the exclusion of all other sources. 
In recent years, the classical theory of universal individualization has come under attack in court 
and in the academic literature (see Chapter 6). Some critics of individualization dismiss the first 
premise of global, general uniqueness as unscientific and metaphysical.50 In principle, however, 
belief in uniqueness is compatible with scientific and statistical reasoning.51 Nonetheless, the 
fact that the surfaces of every individual’s fingers are unique (at a sufficient level of detail) is 
not, in itself, a persuasive argument for universal individualization.52 In a sense, the uniqueness 
argument proves too much, for just as every three-dimensional surface of every finger 
presumably is unique, so is every latent print left on two-dimensional surfaces, even those from 
the same skin.53 Consequently,
uniqueness does not guarantee that prints from two different people are always 
sufficiently different that they cannot be confused, or that two impressions made 
by the same finger will also be sufficiently similar to be discerned as coming 
from the same source. The impression left by a given finger will differ every time, 
because of inevitable variations in pressure, which change the degree of contact 
between each part of the ridge structure and the impression medium.54
This takes us to the second proposition underlying the claim of universal individualization. How 
can we know that a skilled examiner can consistently discriminate between pairs of prints that 
come from the same source and pairs that come from different sources when there is substantial 
variation in both types of pairs? The question of the variability of multiple impressions from 
the same source versus inter-source variability is not special to latent print analysis. It is 
fundamental to the recognition of individual sources across the forensic sciences and to signal-
detection problems in engineering and psychology. In 1979, it prompted an NRC committee to 
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question the ability of spectrographic analysis to provide voiceprints that can be associated with 
one and only one individual.55 Similarly, the 2009 NRC report asks for “studies [that] would 
accumulate data about the intra-individual variability (e.g., how much one finger’s impressions 
vary from impression to impression, or how much one toolmark or signature varies from 
instance to instance) and the inter-individual variability (e.g., how much the impressions of many 
fingerprints vary across a population and in what ways)” to validate the ACE-V process and “to 
attach confidence limits to individualization determinations.”56 To be sure, “examiners are trained 
to recognize the factors that may affect the translation of information [from three dimensions to 
two];”57 yet the fact remains that “none of these variabilities—of features across a population of 
fingers or of repeated impressions left by the same finger—has been characterized, quantified, or 
compared.”58
Despite such misgivings, many fingerprint experts believe that every latent print (of sufficient 
quality, as judged by a human examiner with no predefined, articulable standard for ascertaining 
sufficiency) from a single finger has a degree of similarity to a rolled or plain print that is 
measurably greater than its similarity to every other finger on Earth. To appreciate just how 
ambitious this claim is, suppose that the chance of two latent fingerprints (from two different 
individuals) appearing so similar as to be declared a match is a mere one in one trillion. Because 
the Earth’s population is approximately seven billion people, it might seem that no pair of fingers 
from different individuals now living would match. After all, one in one trillion is two orders 
of magnitude smaller than one in seven billion. However, seven billion individuals give rise to 
immensely more pairs of prints that, by coincidence, could match. All told, there are nearly 25 
× 1018 distinct pairs of individuals to be considered. Individual 1 can be paired with Individuals 
2 through 7,000,000,000 (for seven billion comparisons). Individual 2 can be paired not only 
with Individual 1 but also with Individuals 3 through 7,000,000,000 (for another seven billion 
comparisons).Statistically, the expected number of indistinguishable pairs from different sources 
is the number of possible comparisons times the probability of a match for each comparison. 
This expected number of matching pairs is 25 × 1018 × 10–12 = 25 million.
Of course, this particular number is hypothetical. Perhaps some prints are so distinctive that the 
probability of confusing them with any print from any other finger is less than one in one trillion. 
The computation could be refined to handle heterogeneity in random-match probabilities, but 
the purpose here is not to estimate any particular number of matching pairs that might exist. 
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It is merely to underscore the nearly inconceivable number of pairs of prints that have to be 
considered to establish the premise of universal individualization.59
Given these difficulties, there has been some movement toward using the term 
“individualization” to mean any definitive identification of a single individual as the source of a 
latent print, even one that falls short of universality. The Scientific Working Group on Friction 
Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology has eliminated the global “exclusion of all others” 
language in its glossary60 and plans to do the same in its standards.61 A draft guideline defines 
individualization as “the decision by an examiner that there are sufficient features in agreement 
to conclude that two areas of friction ridge impressions originated from the same source.”62 As 
to how this decision is made, the next sentence adds, “Individualization of an impression to one 
source is the decision that the likelihood the impression was made by another (different) source 
is so remote that it is considered as a practical impossibility.”63
To some extent, however, the new definition begs the question of how the examiner knows 
that the probability that the “impression was made by another (different) source” is practically 
zero. Is the rationale that individualization is still universal, applying as a “practical” matter to 
astronomical numbers of possible pairs? If the “practical” judgment remains based upon the 
classical theory of universal individualization, then an individualization is still a statement that 
the examiner has excluded everyone else in the world as the source of the latent print.
Perhaps the new form of “individualization” is simply a source attribution based upon an 
examiner’s training and experience with two sets of paired latent and exemplars in which 
the origin of the prints is known. One set consists of all pairs of latent and exemplar prints 
known to the examiner to have come from the same fingers (mates). The other set consists of 
all pairs known to the examiner to have come from different fingers (nonmates). An examiner 
might conclude that the prints being compared are more similar than any pair of nonmates 
ever encountered, and that they are comparable in similarity to the known mates previously 
experienced. If so, this examiner would regard the pair as originating from the same individual. 
We can designate this approach as the mate-nonmate theory of source attribution.64 It assumes 
that the difficulty of classifications in the previously experienced sets of mated and nonmated 
prints are comparable to all those that ever will be encountered in casework.65
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Another possible route to identification that also does not rest on the theory of universal 
individualization has been called “local individualization” because it only claims that the source 
is very probably unique within a particular population that is much smaller than the entire human 
race.66 Local individualization is the assertion that a particular individual within a set of 
plausible suspects is the source of a latent print. This set might be enumerated (a “closed” list of 
suspects); alternatively, it might not be subject to explicit enumeration (the list is “open” even 
though it might be limited by geography or other factors). For example, the relevant population 
might be every resident of a dormitory who was in the dormitory on a given night (“closed”), or 
it might be everyone in a city (“open”). In a local individualization, the examiner concludes that 
the latent print came from one source even if he has not examined the prints of everyone else in 
this local population.
In Chapter 3, the Working Group recommends against presenting a latent print identification 
as meaning that the source of the exemplar is the source of the latent print to the exclusion of 
all other individuals in the world. However, the members of the Working Group have varying 
opinions as to whether the practice of making source attributions based on the mate-nonmate 
theory or the local-individualization theory is appropriate. Chapter 6 therefore describes 
alternatives to source-attribution testimony without endorsing any of them.
In sum, the term “identification” is not necessarily synonymous with “individualization.” As a 
general matter, “identification” refers to the association, to some degree of probability, of a trace 
to a source. (The operation of probability theory in this context is explained in the next section.) 
One type of identification is the attribution of a trace to a single source (a source attribution). 
In latent print work, source attributions have traditionally rested on a theory of universal 
individualization. In this framework, an individualization is a statement that a single individual 
must be the source of the trace because no other individual in the world could have produced 
such a trace. Source attributions also can rest on less extreme theories of why the identified 
individual is, very probably, the source, and evidence that does not warrant a source attribution 
also can be useful in investigations and prosecutions.
1.3 Probability
In describing the nature of error (Chapter 2), the interpretive process of ACE-V (Chapter 3), 
emerging technologies (Chapter 4), and courtroom testimony (Chapter 6), this report uses terms 
and concepts from the theory of probability. Indeed, the previous section describes a source 
attribution as a statement that a particular object or individual is “very probably” the source of a 
trace. This section provides definitions of several of the terms used in theory of probability and 
indicates more fully how source attribution relates to probabilities.67
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Probability is a number between zero and one. A probability of zero means that a proposition is 
definitely false. A probability of one means that a proposition is certainly true. In the empirical 
sciences, absolute certainty in unattainable, although some propositions, such as the claim that 
the Earth orbits the Sun, have probabilities very close to one.
Probability often is expressed as a percentage. Thus, a 60% probability and a 0.6 probability 
are the same thing. Another way to describe uncertainty is with odds. If the probability that a 
particular baseball team will win the World Series is 60%, the odds are 60 to 40 (or, equivalently, 
1.5 to 1).
To place the findings and inferences of forensic scientists in a probabilistic framework, it is 
necessary to distinguish between data or observations on the one hand, and hypotheses on the 
other. That a specific finger is the source of an impression is a hypothesis. The observed features 
in a pair of fingerprints are data. The data can make the hypothesis more probable or less 
probable than it otherwise would be. The probability before obtaining particular data is known 
as the prior probability. The probability after considering the data is known as the posterior 
probability.
The precise relationship between the prior and posterior probability is given by a formula known 
as Bayes’s rule. The rule tells us how to update the prior probability in light of the data. When 
there are only two possible hypotheses to consider—such as the hypothesis that two impressions 
come from the same fingers and the competing hypothesis that they come from different 
fingers—the increase or decrease in the probability depends on a single factor, called the 
likelihood ratio. Specifically, the posterior odds are the prior odds multiplied by the likelihood 
ratio (see Box 1.3 for examples). The likelihood ratio thus measures the strength of the evidence. 
A large likelihood ratio means that the evidence is powerful: it raises the odds by a large factor.
The likelihood ratio is just the probability of the data when one hypothesis is true compared to 
(divided by) the probability of the data when the competing hypothesis is true. For example, 
when the features in a latent print and an exemplar are ten thousand times more probable for 
mates than nonmates, the likelihood ratio is ten thousand. Observing these features boosts 
the prior odds for identity (whatever they may be) by a factor of ten thousand. In principle, at 
least, an examiner could estimate the likelihood ratio subjectively or could compute it using a 
statistical model (see Chapters 3, 4, and 6).
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1.4 Summary
This chapter defines various terms and concepts that are central to the assessment of latent 
print evidence. In particular, it describes the steps of the ACE-V process as currently practiced 
and understood by the latent print examination community and discusses how exclusions and 
identifications are fundamentally statements of probabilities. Because humans conduct the 
process, human factors can influence the outcome of an examination. Bias and error can occur 
in any process for making comparisons and drawing inferences. In the context of latent print 
examination, they can play a role in the final decision made by an examiner. Many other human 
factors are at play in the latent print work environment, as addressed in the chapters that follow.
Box 1.3: Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Individualization
The term “individualization” can be given various probabilistic interpretations. The traditional notion 
of universal individualization means that the probability of finding another matching exemplar (if 
exemplars existed for everyone in the world) is essentially zero. However, probability theory shows 
how evidence that is not individualizing in this traditional sense still can be extremely powerful.
As indicated in the text, probabilities can be assigned to two different hypotheses: (1) that two 
impressions come from the same finger (s), and (2) that they come from different fingers (d). If Pe|s 
denotes the probability of the observations (the evidence from the latent print examination) when 
the prints are from the same source, and Pe|d represents the probability when they are from different 
sources, then a simple measure of the extent to which the observations support the former hypothesis 
over the latter is the likelihood ratio, LR = Pe|s / Pe|d.
According to Bayes’s rule, posterior odds = LR × prior odds. Suppose the likelihood ratio is one 
million, meaning that an apparent match is one million times more probable if the prints come from the 
same source than if they come from different sources. Although this likelihood ratio seems extremely 
high, if we assume for the sake of argument that all residents of New York City were equally likely to 
have made an impression, then the odds of s to d change from one to eight million (before considering 
the evidence) to one to eight (after considering the evidence).
For suspect populations of various sizes, the posterior odds of identity for evidence with this likelihood 
ratio are as follows:
Population 
size
Posterior odds of probability 
(LR = 1,000,000)
The world (~7,000,000,000) 1:7,000
United States (~300,000,000) 1:300
New York City (~8,000,000) 1:8
Colorado Springs (~400,000) 2.5:1
Walla Walla (~30,000) 33:1
A college dormitory (~200) 5,025:1
Table 1.2: Posterior odds of identity for evidence with a likelihood ratio of 1,000,000 in populations 
in which everyone has the same prior odds on being the source of a latent print 
An examiner who makes a source attribution is giving an opinion that the posterior probability is 
practically 1 (100%).
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Chapter 2: Human Factors and Errors
Human beings, in all lines of work, make errors. Errors can be prevented by 
designing systems that make it hard for people to do the wrong thing and easy 
for people to do the right thing. Cars are designed so that drivers cannot start 
them while in reverse because that prevents accidents. Work schedules for pilots 
are designed so they don’t fly too many consecutive hours without rest because 
alertness and performance are compromised.
 —To Err Is Human: Building A Safer Health System68
Introduction and Scope
One goal of this chapter on human factors and errors in latent print examination is to explain 
the systems view of human factors. What is true of drivers and pilots—not to mention judges, 
police officers, lawyers, soldiers, and scholars—is also true of forensic scientists and technicians. 
All of us make errors. This report makes no effort to hide this fact. To the contrary, the Working 
Group agrees that the “culture of blame must be broken down, [and] we must systematically 
design safety into processes.”69 Later chapters apply these ideas to matters such as the training 
and working environment of examiners as well as their performance in interpreting evidence and 
reporting and testifying about their findings.
The other major goal of this chapter is to describe methods for quantifying the risk of errors 
in latent print examinations. Measuring the incidence of errors serves three functions. First, 
studying error is an integral part of science. A basic tenet of experimental science is that “errors 
and uncertainties exist that must be reduced by improved experimental techniques and repeated 
measurements, and those errors remaining must always be estimated to establish the validity of 
our results.”70 What applies to physics and chemistry applies to all of forensic science: “A key 
task … for the analyst applying a scientific method is to conduct a particular analysis to identify 
as many sources of error as possible, to control or eliminate as many as possible, and to estimate 
the magnitude of remaining errors so that the conclusions drawn from the study are valid.”71 In 
other words, errors should, to the extent possible, be identified and quantified.
Second, measuring and tracking error rates is part of a comprehensive quality control and 
assurance system. This idea is not new. In the field of medicine, it has been called the “error 
movement,” and it has firm roots in industrial psychology.72 Although it is difficult to
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demonstrate that the medical error movement has improved hospital patient safety in general,73 
quantitative analysis can identify factors associated with errors—including preventable ones— 
and thus suggest strategies for error reduction.74 Chapter 9 discusses the importance of 
implementing effective systems to detect deviations from desired practices and incorrect 
judgments in latent print casework.
Finally, in the legal system, quantified “error 
rates” have long been a consideration in 
judging the admissibility of findings or the 
weight that should be given to them. 
Quantification not only can lead to 
improvements in the reliability and validity of 
current practices, but it also could assist in 
more appropriate use of the evidence by 
fact-finders. The objective, in other words, is 
improving the “back end” of the system—
the use of the evidence in investigations and 
legal proceedings. Many court opinions have 
discussed error rates of scientific tests such as 
polygraphy, speaker identification, and latent 
print identification as a consideration affecting 
the admissibility of these tests. To ascertain the 
prospects for useful quantification, however, 
there must be clarity about the meaning of 
the surprisingly ambiguous term “error” as it 
applies to the task of latent print identification. 
It is necessary to consider various ways to 
measure a suitably defined “error rate” that can 
be used to assess the validity of the method and 
conclusions.
2.1 The Systems View of Errors and Human Factors
The systems view of human error regards errors and adverse events as a function of a system of 
interacting parts, any or all of which could present opportunities for preventing and correcting 
errors. Forensic science evidence results from a complex productive system. A single examiner 
conducts latent print examinations using various technological tools, but more than one 
individual participates in the production process. A detective may provide candidate suspect 
prints, and an examiner may run a search of an automated fingerprint identification system 
(AFIS) that produces both viable matches and nonmatches that initially appear similar. Finally,
Box 2.1: Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and “Error Rates”
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,75 the Supreme Court wrote that federal courts 
should determine whether contested scientific 
evidence is “scientifically valid.” It listed four 
non-exhaustive factors that trial judges could 
consider in making these determinations. One of 
these factors came from a federal court of appeals 
opinion on spectrographic voice identification 
that relied on laboratory experiments measuring 
the rate of false positives and false negatives. 
Citing this case, the Supreme Court stated, “In the 
case of a particular scientific technique, the court 
ordinarily should consider the known or potential 
rate of error.”76
The rules of evidence in many states treat “general 
acceptance” in the scientific community rather 
than “scientific validity” as the touchstone for 
admitting scientific evidence. Courts in these 
jurisdictions have treated error rates from 
controlled experiments as a factor that can help 
show whether a technique is generally accepted.
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additional individuals may verify work. Thus, the etiology of errors requires a characterization 
of not only the contributions of each state of the process to potential errors, but also their 
interactions, since interactions among parts of the system can serve to reduce errors or contribute 
to them. Simply blaming errors on individuals is simplistic and unproductive. One must 
appreciate how human actors function in and interact with other components of a more complex 
system.
The “Swiss cheese” model of errors (see Figure 9.2 in Chapter 9),77 which allows classifications 
of various human factors that contribute to errors, provides a framework for identifying 
weaknesses in the examination process. Briefly, this framework involves factors that are specific 
to an individual examiner, those that are features or products of the work environment, and those 
that are the result of failures of supervision and the structure of the organization. This model is 
explained in more detail in Chapter 9. A seminal example of the effects of interactions between 
humans and technology comes from Hutchins,78 who characterized the tools, procedures, 
training, and checklists that allow a cockpit crew, working with tools such as airspeed indicators, 
to ensure that an airplane does not stall on landing approach. The indicators and control surface 
settings provide valuable safety margins and checks, but they can also can lead to crashes if set 
incorrectly.
Similarly, latent print examination may well benefit from procedures such as verification, but if 
such procedures are implemented improperly, they can lead to a mere illusion of error reduction. 
Not knowing when an examiner has erred makes error reduction difficult. Numerous studies have 
found that without quick and accurate feedback on correct and incorrect judgments, experience 
does not enhance expertise79 and that experts routinely overestimate their skills.80 Weather 
forecasters are particularly well calibrated; when they report that the chance of rain is 60%, it 
rains about 60% of the time. Lawyers and doctors are not so well calibrated; their predictions of 
the outcomes of cases tend to be optimistic.81 The explanation for the difference, at least in part, 
is that meteorologists get frequent, immediate feedback and rewards for correct predictions.82 
In forensic handwriting analysis, latent print identification, toolmark identification, and other 
pattern and impression evidence comparisons, examiners do not routinely receive such prompt 
and frequent feedback.83 Under what circumstances would examiners realize that they are 
working with prints that are beyond their current capabilities? If an examiner feels that his
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abilities far outstrip his colleagues’ and is willing to make identifications that they would not, 
how would such a situation be identified and resolved? Procedures to reconcile differences of 
opinion might only reduce the independence of each examiner without moving the decision 
criterion toward an optimum.
Thus, procedural changes aimed at error reduction must be devised and examined at a system-
wide level. These changes must emphasize data collection and feedback to allow both the agency 
and the examiners to adjust their decision criteria and methods. Well-designed proficiency 
tests, employed to enhance skills, are one way to supply feedback. Excluding unnecessary 
contextual information that might affect the outcome of an examination is another strategy best 
implemented with an appreciation of how the system works, since such information may need to 
be integrated at later stages without affecting the initial examination.
Detecting, analyzing, quantifying, and reducing error is difficult, but these efforts are important 
quality assurance steps. To take these steps, however, it is necessary to define terms such as 
“error” precisely. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, analyzes the meaning of “error,” 
elucidates some possible types and sources of error in the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and 
Verification (ACE-V) process, and compares methods for estimating the risk of error in latent 
friction ridge identification as performed by examiners following ACE-V.
2.2 Errors in Executing a Procedure
When an individual is expected to follow well-defined steps in a procedure, a departure from 
the protocol or a mistake in one of the steps might be designated an error. For example, suppose 
that a forensic service provider requires its examiners to mark the useful features in a latent print 
before making a side-by-side comparison to an exemplar. A particular examiner neglects to do 
so, but correctly determines that the differences between the latent images and the exemplar 
are so extensive and clear that the prints could not have originated from the same source. The 
examiner then correctly excludes the suspect from whom the exemplar came.
This examiner has not erred in the sense of reaching a false conclusion, but the examiner has 
erred in deviating from the prescribed procedure. Identifying such procedural errors (also called 
“process errors” in medicine),84 perhaps through audits of casework, could be valuable even 
when the errors did not lead to a false conclusion. If the procedural step serves a useful function 
in general, then discovering that examiners are not performing the step may warrant corrective 
action. For example, the system might be redesigned so that examiners must sign a checklist as 
they go along to remind them to complete each step in order.85
If an agency has a policy demanding blind verification of identifications, another example of 
procedural error would be providing the verifying examiner with the knowledge that an earlier 
examination conducted by a highly respected colleague resulted in an identification. Such 
policies serve to prevent any “expectancy effect” from influencing the verification (see Chapters
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89 For ease of exposition, the explication of the concept of error in inferring identity that follows speaks of a single 
examiner. The final categorization could result from one examiner using the ACE phases of the process (or any other 
process) or from several examiners using ACE-V (or any other process).
90 E.g., Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit.
91 In the terminology of the 2009 NRC report and statistics and measurement theory generally, latent print 
identification as performed through the steps of ACE-V is an act of classification. To avoid confusing the yes-
no type of classification for identification in latent print work with ten-print classification systems (such as the 
Roscher system, the Juan Vucetich system, and the Henry system), however, this chapter generally uses the term 
“categorization.” See Allen, M. and W. Yen. Introduction to Measurement Theory. Waveland Press, 2001; Suppes, P. 
and J. Zinnes. “Basic Measurement Theory.” In Handbook of Mathematical Psychology. Wiley, 1963; and Rothman, 
K., S. Greenland, and T. Lash. Modern Epidemiology. 3rd ed. Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins, 2008, p. 138.
1 and 3). In a laboratory that requires blind verification, a nonblind verification would be a 
procedural error. Discovering a large rate of such departures from the established protocol should 
produce an inquiry into what should be done to correct the situation.
2.3 Errors in Outcomes
Another type of error, an outcome error, contrasts with procedural error. It is closer, but not 
identical, to an “adverse event” in fields such as aviation and medicine86 and relates to reporting 
the wrong conclusions in latent print examination. Bias does not always produce an incorrect 
outcome. For instance, a radar gun that gives readings that are always 2 miles per hour too low is 
biased, but a reading of 45 mph is a good indication that a driver is exceeding the speed limit of 
35 mph (at least when the random error also is small relative to the measured excess of 10 mph). 
In this example, the performance of the measuring device can be compared to the true state of 
affairs—what sometimes is called “ground truth” in biometrics87 or “states of nature” in decision 
theory.88 However, in real-world latent print casework, this true state of affairs is rarely available.
Human decision making also can be poorly calibrated or well calibrated in terms of its accuracy 
in ascertaining the true state of affairs. If a latent print and an exemplar come from two different 
individuals, will an examiner (or an initial examiner and a verifier)89 report that the two prints 
match? If the two prints come from the same individual, will the examiner report that they do not 
match? Of the positive identifications made by examiners, what percentage is mistaken? Of the 
exclusions, what percentage is incorrect? Each of these questions leads to a different statistic—
there is no single “error rate” and no single number that gives the “accuracy” of judgments 
about the origin of pairs of prints.90 Moreover, as discussed below, further questions arise when 
one considers an examiner’s determination that a latent print is insufficient to warrant further 
examination or that the further examination is inconclusive.
The simplest measures of accuracy (or, conversely, error) in categorization arise when 
there are only two categories. Putting aside, for the moment, judgments of “insufficient” or 
“inconclusive,” the examiner reports either that the prints match or that they do not. The same 
kind of binary categorization task is central to many other disciplines.91 Clinical diagnosis, 
predictions of future violence, and signal detection are a few examples. A radar operator may
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Signal Detection Theory. Oxford University Press, USA, 2002. 
93 When the categorization system maps quantitative scores into binary categories, its performance can be depicted 
as a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. This is a plot of the true positive rate (sensitivity) vs. false 
positive rate (1 – specificity) for a binary classifier system as its discrimination threshold is varied. National 
Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Evaluation of Sound Spectrograms. On the Theory 
and Practice of Voice Identification. National Academies Press, 1979, p. 4.
need to distinguish between a missile launch, on the one hand, and a flock of birds or anything 
else on the other. Signal-detection theory provides a well-developed analytical framework
involving the probabilities of false alarms (false positives) and missed signals (false negatives).92
The definition of error in this analytical framework is simple. The outcome is judged against a 
true state of the world. An error is a reported categorization that does not report the true state. 
If the radar operator misses the signal of the missile launch (a false negative), or if the operator 
declares an alarm when no missile is in the air (a false positive), then the error will become 
apparent all too soon.93 Table 2.1 summarizes the same two kinds of errors that can arise in 
determining whether a latent print is from the known source of an exemplar. The first column 
lists the examiner’s possible decisions: declare that the prints are so different that the source 
of the exemplar is excluded (abbreviated as –) or declare that the prints are so similar that the 
source of the exemplar is included (an identification, abbreviated as +). The first row lists the 
true states of the world: different source (d) or same source (s). In casework, these states would 
not generally be known. In an experiment or a proficiency test, however, they would be. This 
knowledge makes no difference to the definition of an outcome error, although it affects our 
ability to estimate the conditional error probabilities. In the table, “P( )” stands for “probability 
of.” The vertical bar “|” stands for “given that” or “on the condition that.”
Different source (d) Same source (s)
Exclusion (–) True negative
Specificity = P(–|d)
False negative (a miss, type II 
error)
1 – sensitivity = P(–|s)
Identification	
(+)
False positive (false alarm, type I 
error)
1 – specificity = P(+|d) 
True positive (a hit)
Sensitivity = P(+|s)
Table 2.1: Types of errors and correct conclusions in a binary classification task
In latent print comparisons that lead to only the two outcomes shown in Table 2.1—exclusions 
and identifications—a false negative error is an exclusion when the pair actually originated from 
the same friction ridge skin. Its probability, marked in the upper right-hand corner of the table, is 
P(–|s). In contrast, a false positive probability P(+|d), in the lower left-hand corner of the table, 
measures the chance of an identification when the pair actually did not originate from the same 
source. 
Instead of referring to these two conditional error probabilities, one can refer to two related 
quantities that define the accuracy of the judgment. Sensitivity is the probability of identification
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given that the prints actually come from the same source. These correct outcomes lie in the 
bottom right-hand corner of the table. Specificity is the probability of exclusion given that the 
prints actually came from different sources (upper left-hand corner). 
Sensitivity and specificity are commonly used to appraise the diagnostic value of a test in clinical 
medicine. A pregnancy test that almost always gives a positive result in cases of pregnancy has 
a high sensitivity. On the other hand, a pregnancy test that identifies many women as pregnant 
when they are not has low specificity. That pregnancy test is sensitive to the condition but 
its positive results are not very specific to pregnancy. An ideal diagnostic test is both highly 
sensitive and highly specific, and so is the ideal fingerprint examiner. Encountering a latent 
and an exemplar from the same source, this examiner almost always makes an identification. 
Presented with a latent and an exemplar from different sources, this examiner almost always 
makes an exclusion. 
The important points to be gleaned from Table 2.1 are that (1) each type of error has a probability 
of occurring given the true state of the world (whether known or unknown), and (2) the false-
positive probability is not generally equal to the probability that the prints are from different 
individuals when an examiner declares a match. The latter is a posterior probability (Chapter 1). 
To make this more concrete, suppose that an experimenter gives an examiner 200 pairs of prints 
to examine. A latent and an exemplar comprise each pair. For 100 of the pairs, the latent and 
the exemplar come from different individuals (d); and for the other 100 pairs, the latent and the 
exemplar come from the same individuals (s). The examiner compares the prints in each and 
every pair, and correctly classifies 99 of the former group and 98 of the latter. This situation 
is shown in Table 2.2. Again, these numbers are hypothetical and merely intended to illustrate 
how various measures of accuracy and error are computed. Results from a recent experiment are 
described later in this chapter.
Different source (d) Same source (s)
Exclusion (–) True negatives = 99
Specificity = P(–|d) = 99%
False negatives = 2
1 – sensitivity = P(–|s) = 2%
Identification	
(+)
False positives = 1
1 – specificity = P(+|d) = 1%
True positives = 98
Sensitivity = P(+|s) = 98%
Table 2.2: Outcomes of a hypothetical experiment that estimates an examiner’s sensitivity and 
specificity 
The examiner in this example has performed with a sensitivity of 98% (correct identifications) 
and a specificity of 99% (correct exclusions). Equivalently, the examiner’s false negative and 
false positive rates were 2% and 1%, respectively. 
It is important to understand that these numbers do not translate directly into a probability that an 
identification or an exclusion is correct. The probabilities of a correct identification or exclusion 
are influenced by the proportion of cases in which the pairs of prints actually come from the 
same individuals. Box 2.2 presents a numerical example of how changing the mix of true and 
false pairs changes the probability of a true positive identification.
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94 These computations are examples of Bayes’s rule, where the proportion of true pairs in casework is the prior 
probability that a random pair comes from the same source. Compare Parmigiani, G. Modeling in Medical Decision 
Making: A Bayesian Approach. Wiley, 2002, p. 9. In a fully Bayesian analysis, however, the prior probability is 
subjective and need not equal the past frequency. But even if there is no known value, the existence of a prior 
probability that a random pair comes from the same source has to be borne in mind. In that way, examiners are more 
likely to remember that the probabilities of exclusion or identification given a pair of impressions from the same 
source are not the probabilities that a source exclusion or attribution is correct.
Thus far, we have assumed that the identification process always reaches a conclusion of 
exclusion or identification, and we have described how an experiment could measure the 
sensitivity and specificity of examiners using the ACE-V (or any other) process to reach these 
conclusions. However, examiners have other options. They can declare the latent print (or 
exemplar) to be insufficient for a comparison, or they can make a comparison but designate it as
Box	2.2:	How	Prevalence,	Sensitivity,	and	Specificity	Affect	the	Posterior	Probability	of	a	
Correct	Positive	Identification
The probability that the examination has correctly classified a pair of prints as identifying the individual 
is the proportion of all those cases in which the examiner has made a positive identification that involve 
true pairs. For example, consider a set of 1,000 pairs of prints that includes only 800 true pairs for an 
80-20 mix. An examiner with a sensitivity of 98% would classify approximately 98% of these 800, or 
784, as identifications. But there also are 200 false pairs to consider. The examiner with a specificity 
of 99% would classify approximately 1% of these 200, or 2, as identifications. The total number of 
identifications therefore would be 784 + 2 = 786. Thus, the examiner would make correct identifications 
for approximately 784 out of 786 identifications: P(s|+) = 784/786 = 99.7%. The following table 
summarizes these calculations:
Number Number + Pr(s|+)
True pairs (s) 800 784
False pairs (d) 200 2
Total 1,000 786 784/786 = 99.7%
Table 2.3: Hypothetical data to show probability of correct identifications in an 80-20 mix
Now suppose that the examiner’s casework consisted of a 10-90 mix of true and false pairs. Of the 
1,000 cases, 100 are true pairs, and 900 are false pairs. This depresses the value of P(s|+) to (100 × 98%) / 
[(100 × 98%) + (900 × 1%)] = 98 / (98 + 9) = 92%. The examiner’s ability to discriminate between a true 
pair and a false pair has not changed. The sensitivity is still 98%, and the specificity is still 99%. However, 
the expected number of each type of error in the sample of casework is different, lowering the probability 
that a positive identification is correct, as shown in the following table:94
Number Number + P(s|+)
True pairs (s) 100 98
False pairs (d) 900 9
Total 1,000 107 98/107 = 92%
Table 2.4: Hypothetical data to show probability of correct identifications in a 10-90 mix
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95 See Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Draft for Comment: Standard 
for the Definition and Measurement of Rates of Errors and Inappropriate Decisions in Friction Ridge Examination. 
Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, February 2011. 
96 Koehler, J. “Fingerprint Error Rates And Proficiency Tests: What They Are And Why They Matter.” Hastings Law 
Journal, 59 (2008): 1077.
“inconclusive.” Table 2.1 can be expanded with an additional row to account for those possible
outcomes (Table 2.5).
Different source (d) Same source (s)
Exclusion (–) True negative
Specificity = P(–|d)
False negative
1 – sensitivity = P(–|s)
Identification	(+) False positive
1 – specificity = P(+|d) 
True positive (a hit)
Sensitivity = P(+|s)
Insufficient	or	
inconclusive
Missed an exclusion Missed an identification
Table 2.5: Types of errors and correct conclusions in a binary classification task  
with the option of not deciding
The additional row complicates the computation of error and accuracy rates.95 Should sensitivity 
and specificity be calculated relative to ground truth for all cases presented, or just for those 
in which an examiner reaches a definitive conclusion (an exclusion or an identification)? The 
argument for tossing out inconclusives is as follows: 
When an examiner offers an “inconclusive” opinion about whether two prints 
match, there is a sense in which he has erred. After all, he did not get the 
answer right, and the consequences of this failure may be serious (e.g., missed 
opportunity to exonerate a suspect). However, in the more usual sense of the 
meaning of error, an inconclusive is not an error. It is a pass. An inconclusive 
means that the examiner offers no judgment about whether two prints do or do not 
share a common source.96
Suppose, then, that one agrees that an inconclusive cannot be considered an outcome error (not 
even an outcome error that is less serious than a false identification or a false exclusion). It is still 
not clear whether the inconclusives should be included in the denominators of the proportions for 
true and false positives and true and false negatives. 
The answer may turn on the setting in which the error and accuracy rates will be used. The view 
that inconclusives should not count is appropriate from the perspective of a judge or juror who 
might consider error rates or probabilities to assess the probative value of an identification or an 
exclusion. For that purpose, it does not matter how often the examiner refrains from reaching 
a categorical conclusion. What matters is accuracy in those cases in which the examiner does 
offer an opinion on identification or exclusion. These are the only cases in which an examiner’s 
testimony might lead the jury astray. Testimony that the latent print contained inadequate 
information to reach any conclusion as to the origin of the print occurs less often and should not
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97 Because of the differing possible uses of error and accuracy rates, in discussing studies of these rates, this chapter 
gives the results of calculations both with and without inconclusives.
propel the jury in any particular direction. Therefore, any calculated error rate presented in a trial 
involving an identification or an exclusion should be based upon the subset of cases in which 
examiners actually make an identification or an exclusion.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the police, what matters is all the cases that an examiner 
considers rather than just those in which the examiner ultimately might testify. In terms of 
improving the contribution of the examiner to the investigative process, it is appropriate to 
regard the failure to identify or exclude when the latent print contains adequate information as a 
potentially correctable error. Likewise, deciding that the latent print is of sufficient quality, but 
concluding that the comparison is inconclusive when, in fact, the similarities (or differences) 
are distinct and extensive, also is an error. Whether one regards such errors as outcome or 
process errors (or both), they are important because they might warrant a change in training or 
operational procedures to take fuller advantage of the latent friction ridge data.97
To help identify undesirable inconclusives, reliability and reproducibility studies could compare 
the performance of examiners in making judgments of sufficiency and conclusiveness. When the 
same examiner reaches the same conclusions (whether right or wrong) in repeated examinations 
of the same set of prints with no recollection of the earlier results, “intra-examiner reliability” 
is high. When different examiners independently studying the same set of prints reach the same 
conclusions, “inter-examiner reproducibility” is high. Table 2.6 uses four categories for the 
outcomes of latent print examinations: identification, exclusion, inconclusive, and insufficient 
(not suitable for comparison). A high number of discrepant judgments signals a need to 
understand what is causing the discordance and perhaps to correct it.
Examiner 2
Identification Exclusion Inconclusive Insufficient
E
xa
m
in
er
 1 Identification AGREE
Exclusion AGREE
Inconclusive AGREE
Insufficient AGREE
Table 2.6: Concordancy in judgments of two examiners
A related method of spotting problematic judgments uses pairs of prints that are relatively 
complex to examine but that the agency is convinced should result in specific judgments in each 
category. In this situation, there are correct answers (in the judgment of the best experts), and 
the objective is to ensure that all examiners reach these desired outcomes. Table 2.7 shows the 
correct and incorrect outcomes relative to the desired outcomes rather than to ground truth.
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98 Kersta, L. As summarized in “The Law: Speak, Voiceprint.” Time. January 10, 1972.
99 NAS, NRC, Committee on Evaluation of Sound Spectrograms, op.cit.
100 For examples, see Kaye, D. “Probability, Individualization, and Uniqueness in Forensic Science Evidence: 
Listening to the Academies.” Brooklyn Law Review, 75 (Summer 2010): 1163.
101 National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science. 
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Desired Outcomes as Determined by Experts
Identification Exclusion Inconclusive Insufficient
E
xa
m
in
er
Identification CORRECT False positive False positive False positive
Exclusion False negative CORRECT False negative False negative
Inconclusive Missed an 
identification
Missed an 
exclusion CORRECT
Missed 
insufficient
Insufficient
Missed an 
identification
Missed an 
exclusion
Missed an 
inconclusive CORRECT
Table 2.7: Concordancy with desired outcomes as determined by experts
The discordant outcomes in Table 2.7 are of varying importance. Many of them would not affect 
the usefulness of the examiner’s findings. For example, if an examiner concludes that the prints 
are insufficient for comparison when the “correct” opinion is that they are worth further study but 
are nonetheless inconclusive, then the examiner did not produce a result that could have affected 
the outcome of that case. Nonetheless, an examiner who is too prone to dismiss samples as 
unsuitable when they are sufficient for comparison but ultimately inconclusive also might be too 
inclined to regard them as insufficient when they would permit an identification or an exclusion. 
These discordant outcomes may not produce outcome errors, and they are not amenable to 
inclusion in “error rates” for ascertaining probative value. But following up on them could be 
important to making the best use of the data and to reducing the risk of actual outcome errors.
2.4 Measuring the Prevalence of Error: Prospects and Pitfalls
On occasion, the lures and pressures of the adversarial system, combined with the natural 
tendency of scientists and technicians to be confident in the power of the technology at their 
command and their decision-making abilities, can lead to excessive claims of accuracy. Two 
examples unrelated to friction ridge identification illustrate the phenomenon. First, claims 
that “everyone’s voiceprint is as unique as his fingerprints, and that any skilled technician can 
identify a voiceprint with more than 99% accuracy,”98 prompted the National Research Council 
(NRC) to caution that “the assumption that intra-speaker variability is less than … inter-speaker 
variability … is not adequately supported by scientific theory and data.”99 Second, in the initial 
years of DNA testing, expert witnesses claimed that false positive matches were impossible.100 
In response, a separate NRC committee reminded them that “laboratory errors happen, even in 
the best laboratories and even when the analyst is certain that every precaution against error was 
taken.”101
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104 Ibid., p. 143.
105 Zabell, S. “Fingerprint Evidence.” Journal of Law and Policy, 13 (2005): 177.
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108 Cole, S. “More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification.” Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology, 95 (2005): 1033.
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110 NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, op. cit., p.143.
111 SWGFAST, 2009, op. cit.
112 573 F.3d 979, 984 (10th Cir. 2009).
Expert witnesses on latent print identification have heeded these admonitions. To be sure, many 
experts once assured courts that the examination process was so rigorous that no competent 
examiner meticulously following the prescribed steps could reach a mistaken conclusion.102 
Today, however, many experts understand that insistence on “perfect accuracy,” “no errors,” and 
“a zero error rate”103 for the ACE-V “method itself, if followed correctly … does not lead to a 
process of method improvement”104 and that these claims “have no scientific basis”105 and “are 
not scientifically plausible.”106 Commentary from the latent print community “acknowledges 
that errors do occur and furthermore that claims of zero error rate in the discipline are not 
scientifically plausible.”107
But if the rates of various kinds of errors are not zero, how can we know what they are, and what 
use can courts make of the possible estimates? The frequency with which different types of errors 
occur—and even whether meaningful data exist or can be produced to estimate this frequency—
are subject to differing opinions. In a lengthy review, Cole concluded that “the existing data 
are inadequate to calculate a meaningful error rate for forensic fingerprint identification.”108 
Pointing to “known cases of fingerprint misattribution” and a 0.8% rate of false positives on 
external proficiency tests, however, he proposed that “the error rate may not be trivial.”109 The 
NRC committee was more circumspect when it wrote that “there is limited information about the 
accuracy and reliability of friction ridge analyses.”110 In response, the Scientific Working Group 
on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology insisted that
history demonstrates that the actual error rate in practice is very low. ... Billions 
of comparisons worldwide have occurred over the course of a century with an 
extremely low number of errors. … Recent studies published in peer-reviewed 
journals, although limited, also tend to suggest that the error rate of friction ridge 
examination, when conducted by competent examiners, is very low.111
Likewise, in United States v. Baines,112 a former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) supervisor 
testified that the FBI had “made, on average, about one erroneous identification every 11 years.” 
Estimating the total number of comparisons made at about 1 million per year, he assured the 
court that the known actual error rate was about one per eleven million comparisons.
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115 E.g., Koehler, op. cit.
116 Peterson, J., G. Lin, M. Ho, et al. “The Feasibility of External Blind DNA Proficiency Testing.” Journal of 
Forensic Sciences, 48 (2003): 21.
117 Butler, J. Fundamentals of Forensic DNA Typing. Academic Press, 2010, p. 299.
118 Rand, S., M. Schürenkamp, and B. Brinkmann. “The GEDNAP (German DNA Profiling Group) Blind Trial 
Concept.” International Journal of Legal Medicine, 116, no. 4 (2002): 199.
But the reliance on denominators of millions and “billions of comparisons” has been challenged 
on the grounds that
the chances of uncovering an erroneous identification are remote. Most fingerprint 
identifications are not challenged in court either because the defendant pled 
to some other charge or because the defense did not obtain a second opinion. 
Further, after conviction, the opportunities for innocent persons to obtain new 
evidence and have their convictions reviewed and overturned are still extremely 
rare.113
Historical inquiry is simply not a viable way to estimate how low the false positive rate has been, 
let alone to estimate the size of the false negative rate.
Instead, one might consider using data from five possible sources: non-blind proficiency tests 
currently in use; realistic, blind proficiency tests; verifications; random audits of case reports; 
and controlled experiments. These kinds of data vary in their suitability for estimating error 
rates, and all of them have significant limitations. To begin with, proficiency tests designed 
and administered for certification and quality improvement purposes bear little resemblance to 
actual casework. The employees or trainees taking them are not blind to the fact that they are 
being tested, and the samples prepared for certification and quality improvement purposes can 
be different from casework samples. For such reasons, one large proficiency test provider has 
cautioned against using its proficiency test data for calculating error rates. 114
Second, recognizing that normal proficiency tests are neither designed for nor particularly 
suitable for estimating error rates, some commentators have proposed more realistic, blind 
proficiency testing to produce estimates of error rates for individuals, organizations, or the entire 
profession.115 Truly blind proficiency testing is possible, but implementation on a large scale 
may not be feasible given the logistics and costs.116 For the entire laboratory to be blinded, law 
enforcement authorities must disguise the test so that it appears as a routine case to the target 
laboratory. European DNA laboratories undergo two “blind trials” a year with many samples, 
but these are really “a ‘graded’ interpretation test.”117 The commission that designed the trials 
“seriously considered” but rejected “the setting up of a ‘fake’ or simulated casework situation 
to be distributed among the participants … [because] this was deemed to be extremely difficult 
to implement from a practical point of view and also to offer no great advantage to the testing 
procedure.”118 Thus, if actual error rates are quite small, an impractical number of realistic 
proficiency tests (in which the entire laboratory is blind to the testing) would be required to
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produce accurate estimates.119 Using the upper bound of a confidence interval based upon a small 
sample could grossly overstate the likelihood of an error in a particular case (see Box 2.3).120
Third, forensic service providers that 
routinely use verifications could compile 
statistics on the outcomes. Because 
verifications are less costly than blind 
proficiency tests, a much larger number  
of observations would be available, 
leading to a more precise estimate. 
However, at best, statistics on the 
outcomes of verifications estimate 
reproducibility rather than validity. That 
two examiners agree does not prove that 
both are correct; that they disagree does 
not tell us which one is correct. 
Consequently, statistics on verifications 
would not estimate false positive or false 
negative probabilities.
This is not to say that verification 
statistics have no relevance to error 
probabilities. If examiners usually reach 
conflicting results, one can infer that the 
ability to make correct classifications of 
pairs of prints is limited. Establishing 
reproducibility, therefore, is a part of the 
process of validating measurements, but 
concordance between the two examiners 
is a flawed measure even of 
reproducibility if the verifying  
examiner’s judgments are influenced by  
knowledge of the first examiner’s  
opinion. Forensic service providers that conduct a large number of blind verifications, however, 
could contribute to a more complete base of knowledge about the examination process by 
compiling statistics on these verifications. That verifying examiners, proceeding with no 
knowledge of the outcome of the initial examination, almost always reach the same conclusions
Box 2.3: The Zero Numerator Problem
Suppose that a group of latent print examiners is not 
known to have made any false identifications over a 
long period. One cannot be sure that there have been 
no false positives, because there has been no intensive 
effort to detect any. Over the next decade, therefore, 
the examiners undergo a series of 100 blind proficiency 
tests on prints representative of casework. This situation 
gives rise to the question in the title of a well-known 
article, If Nothing Goes Wrong, Is Everything All Right? 
Interpreting Zero Numerators.121  A quick answer, 
according to classical statistical theory, is the “Rule of 
Three,” which states that 3/n is a good approximation 
for an upper 95% confidence bound for the probability 
P of an outcome of an event when the proportion of the 
outcomes in a large number n of independent trials is 
0/n.122  Therefore, 3/100 is a conservative estimate of the 
probability of a false positive for these examiners who 
passed the 100 realistic, representative, blind proficiency 
tests involving true positives. 
However, it is a very conservative estimate. It 
corresponds to starting with the belief that P is equally 
likely to be anywhere in the interval between zero and 
one.123  Prior to the proficiency tests, it was plainly 
unrealistic to think that it was just as likely that the 
examiners’ probability of a false positive was greater 
than one-half as it was to have been less than one-half.124 
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as initial examiners would indicate that the judgments of different examiners are at least 
reproducible. Moreover, whether or not the verifications are blind, the data on initial 
discrepancies could be helpful in identifying individual examiners or situations that merit 
constructive, corrective action.
Fourth, the outcomes of random audits of completed casework might be used to estimate false 
positive or false negative probabilities. For quality assurance, random technical case audits 
test the entire scope of evidence examination and reporting. Such audits can be conducted 
internally (by the same agency that did the examination) or externally (by an outside entity). 
These technical case audits include a re-analysis of the evidence and an associated evaluation. As 
with proficiency tests, the purpose of conducting technical case audits is to improve laboratory 
performance and to increase reliability and reproducibility. There is an inherent value of a 
program including these audits (regardless of any particular case audit outcomes) that results 
simply from each examiner knowing that some of his work will be re-examined. This knowledge 
may make people more conscientious in their documentation and performance.
Case audits are designed to detect deviations from ideal, normative, or intended practices. 
Finding these alone makes the audit process useful. The findings can identify specific corrective 
actions (as they relate to the case), or they can identify more general issues, resulting in 
recommendations for improvements (for example, changes in processes or in training methods). 
Audits generally do result in such findings, since all processes can be improved; arguably, if an 
agency performs audits, it should make them rigorous enough for the agency to acquire data on 
areas for improvement. Thus, compilations of technical case audit findings are a potential source 
of valuable information. They provide quantitative data regarding the occurrence of different 
types of deviations from ideal or intended practices. The data can suggest which deviations may 
be occurring systematically, leading to modifications in technical audit procedures or to more 
specific investigations or research.
Technical case audit compilations, however, are not a reasonable way to measure overall 
latent print process performance or to estimate the error rate of a specific latent print process. 
Individual technical audits differ in their criteria, rigor, and areas of concern (as is appropriate 
and consistent with their purpose). Compilations of findings will represent combinations of cases 
with different examiners, different levels of difficulty, and different examination processes. The 
actual causes of problems detected in technical case audits usually cannot be determined. And, 
once again, ground truth, which would be necessary for establishing errors in identifications and 
exclusions, is unknown for audited casework.
Rather than auditing casework, an expert panel of latent print examiners could conduct its own 
evaluations of a large sample of previous casework (blinded to the earlier outcomes).125 The 
results would test the conclusions reached in actual casework. However, the true source of the 
latent prints in these cases would not be known with certainty. The panel’s conclusions would 
have to be accepted as correct if they are to serve as the measure of accuracy in casework. 
Without proof of the panel’s accuracy, the experiment would be subject to the criticism that 
it seeks to prove one unknown by means of another. Although the absence of ground truth 
technically makes this experiment a reproducibility study, the expert panel experiment could be
35 Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis
126 509 U.S. 594 (1993).
127 Rand, Schürenkamp, and Brinkman, 2002, op. cit.
128 Ibid.
129 Rand, S., M. Schürenkamp, and B. Brinkmann. “The GEDNAP (German DNA Profiling Group) Blind Trial 
Concept Part II: Trends and Developments.” International Journal of Legal Medicine, 118, no.2 (2004): 83.
130 Ibid., p. 88.
131 Ulery, B., A. Hicklin, J. Buscaglia, et al. “Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions.” 
Proceedings of the NAS. 2011.
revealing. Studies of the predictive power of screening tests in medicine rely on this 
experimental design when they use a more precise (but still imperfect) test to measure the 
accuracy of the first result. A large number of discordant evaluations would reveal the need 
for further research targeted to ascertaining the sources of the discrepancies. Conversely, high 
concordance rates would support the perception that latent print analysis is a reliable and 
reproducible process as currently practiced.
Finally, controlled experiments with simulated materials are possible. These could illuminate the 
conditions under which possible errors might occur, could help provide a scientific foundation 
for the validity of the ACE-V process (as practiced by the subjects in the experiment), and could 
supply the kind of error rate information mentioned in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.126 To determine error rates of a specific type, or for a specific process, one can design an 
experiment that has a consistent process and for which the correct outcomes are known. In this 
way, an error can be detected conclusively (as distinct from a process divergence examined in 
case audits).
This is the logic that underlies the European collaborative exercises in the DNA field.127 The 
researchers conducting these exercises have found that the overall error rate dropped sharply 
with the introduction of standardized, commercially available DNA testing kits in 1999; that 
“human carelessness is the predominant source of error regardless of the technology used;” that 
these errors take the form of “the transposition of samples, … albeit never [twice] by the same 
laboratory” and “writing a correct result incorrectly in the summary sheet supplied” but not 
normally used in the laboratory;128 and that the total error rate has stabilized in the range of 0.4% 
to 0.7%.129 The researchers’ conclusions indicate the value of experiments like these: “During 
the development of the trials over the last decade since the introduction of STRs [short tandem 
repeats], many lessons have been learnt which have led to improvements not only in the trials 
themselves, but also have achieved the goal of improved quality of results within the forensic 
community as a whole.”130
Results from the first large-scale, controlled experiment on the accuracy of fingerprint examiners 
appeared in 2011.131 Sacrificing the realism of casework for known ground truth, experimenters 
from the Noblis Corporation and the FBI presented latent print examiners with pairs of prints 
consisting of one latent print and one exemplar, each from known sources. Some of the pairs 
(520) were mates that came from the same finger. The rest (224) were nonmates that came from 
different fingers. These nonmated pairs were designed to yield difficult comparisons. Unusually 
similar exemplars in the nonmates came from searches of the prints of the 58 million persons 
then in FBI’s Integrated AFIS database. Moreover, an abnormally large proportion of the latent 
prints were of poor quality.
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132 During the study, examiners were asked to provide one of four decisions: “the analysis decision of no value 
(unsuitable for comparison); or the comparison/evaluation decisions of individualizations (from the same source), 
exclusion (from different sources), or inconclusive.” Ibid. 
133 There were an additional 3,122 comparisons based on latent fingerprints deemed of value only for exclusion. 
Because standard operating procedures typically include only value-for-individualization comparisons, these other 
outcomes are not presented here.
134 In no case did two examiners make the same false positive error. The errors occurred on image pairs where a 
large majority of examiners made correct exclusions; one occurred on a pair where the majority of examiners judged 
the comparisons to be inconclusive. Thus, the six erroneous identifications probably would have been detected if an 
independent, blind verification were performed as part of the operational examination process.
After a double-blind presentation of the mated and nonmated pairs to the latent print examiners, 
the experimenters measured the proportions of identifications132 for the mates (sensitivity) and 
nonmates (false positives), as well as the proportions of exclusions for the nonmates (specificity) 
and mates (false negatives). For the particular mix of mates and nonmates in the test set, 
they also determined the proportion of correct judgments among the identifications (positive 
predictive value) and exclusions (negative predictive value). Box 2.4 provides a small part of the 
data obtained and the resulting statistics on errors and accuracy.
Of course, the experimental results may not lead to reasonable estimates of the rates at which 
errors occur in practice. To the extent that the experimental conditions and the examiners who 
are tested in the experiment do not mirror the conditions and examiners encountered in actual 
casework, the measured error probabilities will not apply directly to the field as a whole. They 
may, however, answer such questions as “How well do skilled examiners, working under ideal 
conditions on a difficult case, perform?” As noted, the legal system values the answers to such 
questions. Chapter 6 considers the admissibility of various statistics on error rates and offers 
recommendations on how an expert witness might approach the issue of error in a particular 
case.
Box 2.4: Selected Results of the Noblis-FBI Experiment
This experiment presented 169 relatively experienced and proficient latent fingerprint examiners, who 
knew they were being tested, with pairs of latent and exemplar prints selected to be challenging and 
judged by the examiners in the study to be representative of casework. The examiners worked through a 
total of 17,121 presentations of 744 image pairs (roughly 100 pairs per examiner). Table 2.8 summarizes 
the results of the examiners’ efforts for those pairs of prints that they initially deemed “of value for 
individualization.”133
Nonmate Mate All
Exclusion 3,622 450 4,072
Identification 6 3,663 3,669
Inconclusive 455 1,856 2,311
All 4,083 5,969 10,052
Table 2.8: Outcomes for pairs judged to be “of value for individualization”
Of the presentations deemed of value for individualization (59%, or 10,052), five examiners  
(5/169 = 3%) made false identifications. One of the five examiners made two false  
identifications. Looking just to the outcomes likely to be seen in court—the identifications and 
exclusions—the false positive rate is 6/3,628 = 0.2%.134 (For brevity, the discussion here is
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135 Adding inconclusives lowers the false positive rate to 6/4,083 = 0.1%.
136 Again, the text deals only with the pairs deemed of value for identification and resulting in a definitive conclusion. 
The sensitivity was 3,663/5,969 = 61.4%, including inconclusives.
137 Adding inconclusives lowers the false negative rate to 450/5,969 = 7.5%.
138 Adding inconclusives lowers the specificity to 3,622/4,083 = 88.7%.
2.5 Summary
This chapter discussed types of error and the differences between process errors and outcome 
errors. It also reviewed how the system in which the examiner works can contribute to such 
errors. Finally, the chapter outlined the challenges and benefits of trying to calculate the 
prevalence of error in latent print examinations.
confined to this set of cases in which the examiners were able to make an identification or an 
exclusion.135)
As discussed earlier, “sensitivity” is the proportion of cases in which an examiner confronted with a mated 
pair makes a positive identification. Thus, in this experiment, the sensitivity was 3,663/4,113 = 89.1%.136
Whereas the false positive rate was only 0.2%, the false negative rate was 450/4,113 = 10.9%.137 Defining 
specificity as the proportion of exclusions for nonmates judged to be of value for inclusion, the specificity 
was 3,622/3,628 = 99.8%.138 Table 2.9 summarizes these error and accuracy rates.
Nonmate Mate
Exclusion Specificity: 99.8% False negative rate: 10.9%
Identification False positive rate: 0.2% Sensitivity: 89.1%
Table 2.9: Accuracy and error rates for exclusions and identifications in pairs judged to be  
“of value for individualization” and leading to exclusions or identifications
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Chapter 3: Interpreting Latent Prints
Introduction and Scope
Latent print examination requires the careful interpretation and comparison of friction ridge
impressions. From the first examination of the features contained in a latent print to a final
conclusion regarding an identification or exclusion, an examiner engages in many acts of
interpretation. Current methods of interpretation are based upon professional knowledge and
experience rather than formal decision thresholds or statistical models.
This chapter describes the critical interpretative stages that are part of every latent print
comparison. It surveys the current state of knowledge, based upon published research, regarding
the interpretive stages and the implications for pitfalls that may arise during the interpretive
process. It also identifies the most important questions in this area that require further study.
Finally, this chapter provides recommendations and best practices relating to the interpretive
stages.
3.1 Preliminary Observations and Caveats
Several preliminary observations are important. To begin with, the chapter focuses almost
exclusively on latent fingerprint examinations using the ACE-V process (Analysis, Comparison,
Evaluation, and Verification), drawing on the Latent Print Examination Process Map of Chapter
1 (Figure 1.1). This chapter maps the interpretive stages onto the relevant sections of that Process
Map. The focus on ACE-V is not intended as an endorsement of ACE-V as a “methodology.” As
explained in Chapter 1, ACE-V maps the steps of a process, but it does not provide specific
functional guidance on how to implement that process, nor does it detail the substantive content
of the various steps.139 Although ACE-V provides a useful framework for describing the steps
taken for interpreting prints, it does not offer specific criteria to guide those interpretations.
A second preliminary observation concerns the analysis of the subjective elements in human
interpretation. To recognize such subjectivity is not to disparage the process. The act of
interpreting inevitably requires human judgment and necessarily implies at least some
subjectivity. If one simply follows a clear, bright-line rule with no discretion or independent
judgment, one is not actually interpreting. Interpretation goes beyond merely executing a set of
rules; thus, the exercise of judgment and expertise inevitably makes the interpretive process
partly subjective.
Third, with the subjectivity of interpretation comes the possibility of reduced performance
because of human factors issues. As explained in Chapter 1, cognitive bias is one aspect of
human interpretation that has received significant attention. Writing about sorting fingerprints
according to Purkenje’s standards, Francis Galton recognized the difficulty of accurate
interpretations of fingerprints and the possible dangers of cognitive bias:
139 See also Mnookin, J. “The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science.” Brooklyn Law Review, 75, no.
4 (2010): 1209.
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On considering the causes of these doubts and blunders, different influences were
found to produce them, any one of which was sufficient by itself to give rise to
serious uncertainty. A complex pattern is capable of suggesting various readings,
as the figuring on a wallpaper may suggest a variety of forms and faces to those
who have such fancies.140
All human interpretation is potentially subject to biasing effects, as the enormous research
literature across a wide variety of domains establishes (as noted in Chapter 2). To recognize that
latent print examiners are potentially subject to bias is not to single them out but rather to suggest
that they are not exempt from those cognitive biases that all interpreters of data and information
face. Indeed, many psychologists claim that susceptibility to bias is part of the architecture of the
human brain. The same processes that help us make sound judgments in many circumstances
also create the possibility for bias. In some instances, cognitive biases lead to improved
performance, whereas in other circumstances they degrade performance.141
Bias is only one of the many factors that can affect examiner performance. It receives particular
attention in this chapter because of the extensive research on cognitive bias in other fields and
the emerging research in this field that reveals the possible effects of bias on interpretive
performance. Other chapters focus on other factors—from lighting, to technology access, to
work culture—that also affect interpretation. Recognizing that a variety of human factors affect
the interpretive process, this chapter examines the process with an eye toward identifying the
facets that raise research and operational issues because of the possibility of cognitive bias.
Fourth, although this chapter attempts to highlight those locations within the interpretive process
of latent print examination where subjectivity and error due to human factors might be especially
salient, it makes no effort to quantify the potential risk of error in latent print interpretation. The
discussion is primarily theoretical. For the most part, the empirical basis for clearly establishing
the extent of these risks does not yet exist. Further research is needed to establish whether, in
what circumstances, and to what extent these theoretical issues of interpretation create an
elevated risk for error.
Many of the interpretive issues discussed in this chapter are well known to latent print
examiners. However, some of the interpretive inflection points in the latent print identification
process traditionally have not had precise names associated with them and are not clearly
articulated in day-to-day practice. Enormous variability exists in how various forensic service
providers approach these interpretive issues. This chapter offers a framework for thinking about
interpretation, and it presents a vocabulary for considering the interpretive inflection points, but
it does not attempt to detail the variations in approaches to interpretive questions across
laboratories or jurisdictions. The major interpretive stages involved in latent print examination
discussed in this chapter are as follows:
• Feature selection: The examiner selects specific friction ridge details within a latent print 
on which to focus subsequent inquiry.
140 Galton, F. Finger Prints. 1892. Reprint, William S. Hein & Co., 2003, p. 66.
141 Potchen, E., J. Gard, P. Lazar, et al. “The Effect of Clinical History Data on Chest Film Interpretation: Direction
or Distraction?” Investigative Radiology, 14 (1979): 404
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• Utility assessment: At various points in the latent print identification process, an examiner 
decides whether the print is of value for numerous purposes. Examples include assessing 
whether the latent is suitable for comparison, whether it is suitable for an automated 
fingerprint identification system (AFIS) search, and whether the potential source print 
is suitable for comparison. Because these interpretive determinations are all forms of 
sufficiency analysis, they are considered under a common rubric.
• Feature weighting: An examiner assigns weight and significance to individual features 
and their configuration and assesses the overall strength of their synthesis.
• Discrepancy interpretation: An examiner interprets the significance of observed 
divergences between a latent print and an exemplar and determines whether the 
differences establish that the two impressions arose from different sources or are 
consistent with a common origin.
• Source attribution: An examiner decides whether two prints share a common source, or 
determines that the information presented does not permit a categorical conclusion.142
In addition to discussing these interpretive stages individually, this chapter addresses a number
of issues common to several interpretative stages, including the need to establish adequate
documentation and the desirability of procedures to help avoid bias. The next section discusses
these crosscutting issues and presents recommendations regarding them. The remainder of the
chapter (1) describes the interpretive stages and explicitly connects them to the Latent Print
Examination Process Map set out in Chapter 1, (2) describes and discusses any key published
research findings that relate to the particular interpretive stage, (3) provides recommendations
and best practices relating to the interpretive stage, and (4) highlights important research
questions connected to each interpretive stage.
3.2 Issues Relevant to Multiple Interpretative Stages
3.2.1 Documentation
One crosscutting issue is the need for adequate documentation of an examiner’s reasoning and
conclusions. Documentation is not itself an interpretive practice, but rather a practice for
capturing an examiner’s interpretive judgments in a form that would permit the examiner, or
another examiner, to make sense of a decision at a later time. Documentation serves to maximize
the transparency of the interpretative process and to provide a record that can be useful for many
purposes, including reports and testimony, future research and evaluation, and quality assurance.
Documentation requirements also may affect the interpretive process itself by requiring
judgments to be explicit and thus potentially subject to greater reflection on the part of the
examiner.
142  There are other interpretive stages beyond the five described here. For example, it can be argued that a major step
is classifying an impression as emanating from a finger or palm and determining what orientation to use to search
the latent print. These decisions, if incorrect, can lead to a missed opportunity for an identification or to an erroneous
exclusion. However, the focus here is on the steps that can present some of the more complex issues in
comprehending the associated human factors concerns.
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Questions regarding how much documentation should be required clearly are relevant to feature
selection, utility assessment, and discrepancy interpretation. How much documentation to
provide is difficult to legislate because the degree and detail of documentation can vary
depending on the complexity of the comparison. The more complex the cognitive and
interpretive assessment, the more there is to be gained from detailed and explicit documentation.
However, assessing the complexity of a comparison requires additional research. Without clear
guidelines on complexity, the examiner’s subjective assessment of complexity can be used, but
this assessment too should be part of the record. For both legal and scientific purposes (see
Chapter 5), the documentation should supply detail sufficient for another expert to understand
the basis for the examiner’s conclusions and to replicate the steps the examiner followed.
Such documentation should be contemporaneous with the analysis or as nearly so as is
practicable.143 Because the purpose of documentation is to capture an examiner’s interpretive
process, both to assist that examiner in recalling what occurred and to make these processes as
transparent as possible to others, documentation will be most helpful and accurate when
conducted at the same time as the interpretation itself.144 The closer in time the documentation is 
conducted to the mental processes it details, the more complete and accurate the documentation 
is likely to be.
Recommendation 3.1: A report and contemporaneous supporting notes or materials
should document the examination to make the interpretive process as transparent as
possible. Although the degree of detail may vary depending on the perceived complexity
of	the	comparison,	documentation	should,	at	a	minimum,	be	sufficient	to	permit
another examiner to assess the accuracy and validity of the initial examiner’s
assessment of the evidence.
Another question that arises in more than one interpretative stage is the extent to which it is
legitimate to reassess a latent print or other exemplar after looking at a potential source print.
Norms and laboratory practices vary in this regard. At one extreme, some forensic service
providers permit examiners to undertake comparisons without any prior explicit feature
assessment in the questioned print. At another extreme, some providers discourage any “new”
features from being noted in the latent print after comparison has begun. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that many laboratories routinely reassess the features within the latent print after
undertaking a comparison to a known exemplar. This recursive practice should not be ruled out,
because the exemplar may draw attention to a genuine feature in the latent print that was not
previously observed or that was interpreted as likely to be an artifact until the same feature was
apparent in the comparison print. 145
However, recursion raises the possibility that an examiner will be unduly influenced by the
exemplar when reassessing the latent print. In other words, although the comparison process may
reveal true similarities regarding features that had not previously been noted, it also can lead to
143 See American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board. ASCLD/LAB Guiding
Principles of Professional Responsibility for Crime Laboratories and Forensic Scientists. Principle 15, Version 1.1.
144 See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. The FBI DNA Laboratory: A Review of Protocol
and Practice Vulnerabilities. U.S. Department of Justice, May 2004.
145 Vanderkolk, J. Forensic Comparative Science: Qualitative Quantitative Source Determination of Unique
Impressions, Images, and Objects. Academic Press, 2009, p. 23, 92 – 94.
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the perception of a similarity that does not exist. In some instances, the comparison print may
help the examiner accurately clarify ambiguous minutiae in the latent image, whereas in other
instances, an examiner may, in all good faith, be misled by what cognitive psychologists call
expectation effects. Given this complex interaction between the interpretation of a latent and
known print, this report can offer no hard rules about the appropriateness of making use of this
interpretive practice. However, procedural steps can make the use of this interpretive procedure
more transparent and reflective. At a minimum, there should be an explicit determination of
features in the latent before the comparison process. This initial determination need not limit the
features that can be used in subsequent analysis; identifying this initial set ensures that the
analyst’s approach remains transparent. But because of the danger of bias emerging in going
back and forth between latent and exemplar prints—and to maintain the transparency of the
process—any features that are noted after comparison has begun or as the result of the
comparison process (rather than before comparison begins) should be indicated and explicitly
included in the documentation.
Recommendation	3.2:	Modifications	to	the	results	of	any	stage	of	latent	print	analysis
(e.g., feature selection, utility assessment, discrepancy interpretation) after seeing a
known	exemplar	should	be	viewed	with	caution.	Such	modifications	should	be
specifically	documented	as	having	occurred	after	comparison	had	begun.
3.2.2 Cognitive Biases
Another crosscutting issue is cognitive bias. Chapter 1 notes the substantial body of
psychological research illustrating the tendency for human beings to engage in motivated
reasoning or to be affected by contextual knowledge. Even people attempting to be fair
interpreters of the evidence may be influenced by information outside the formally relevant
decision criteria. Such biases may be present in the work of latent print examiners.146 However, 
the extent to which cognitive bias creates the danger of erroneous interpretations in real-world 
circumstances has not yet received significant research attention. Continued research about the 
presence or absence of such biases in the latent print domain and the extent of any impact on 
accuracy and reliability is needed. However, given the decades-long research into the significant 
effects of cognitive bias in other domains, it seems wise to minimize the potential for such biases 
in latent print interpretation, even in the absence of definitive research results for latent print 
analysis.
An obvious way to minimize the effect of contextual information is to keep the interpreter from
having access to that contextual information in the first place. For example, the double-blind
study is the gold standard for clinical drug testing because it ensures that the clinicians
administering a drug and evaluating the patient’s response do not know whether the patient is
receiving the drug or the placebo. Treating physicians still have all the information they need to
provide quality care, but those participating in the testing process are shielded from the
information that could bias them.
146 Dror, I., D. Charlton, and A. Peron. “Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous
Identifications.” Forensic Science International, 156, no. 1 (2006): 74–78. See also authorities cited, Chapter 2.
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Currently, there is no systematic effort to blind forensic examiners from contextual information
that is clearly not domain relevant—information that is not related to or necessary for their
analysis. For example, the suspect’s prior convictions, gang membership, or confession does not
assist in the print analysis. Such extraneous information could create bias. It is therefore good
practice to avoid disclosing extraneous, domain-irrelevant information.147 To be sure, 
someinformation may be necessary at a later point in the forensic analysis and should be 
provided at that point. The goal here is not to define what information is necessary at each point 
in the analysis but simply to suggest that procedures should be designed to eliminate access to 
potentially biasing, domain-irrelevant information.
Recommendation 3.3: Procedures should be implemented to protect examiners from
exposure to extraneous (domain-irrelevant) information in a case.
This recommendation is not suggesting that examiners should be denied access to information
that is legitimately relevant to their substantive analysis. Examiners must have the information
that is necessary to do their jobs effectively. Some information will be both potentially biasing
and domain relevant—for example, information about the substrate from which a print was
lifted, or the fact that the source print is the result of an AFIS search. Unless further research
points to particularized dangers of bias, examiners should have access to whatever information is
legitimately relevant to the exercise of their expertise, notwithstanding some theoretical but
unproven danger of bias.
However, given the genuine dangers of cognitive bias, the better practice is to protect examiners
from inadvertent bias by shielding them from information that is clearly unnecessary and not
relevant to their assessment. It might not always be feasible to implement such procedures, and it
may well be infeasible to implement them perfectly. Forensic scientists strive to reach
conclusions “based on the evidence and reference material relevant to the evidence, not on
extraneous information, political pressure, or other outside influences.”148 If examiners routinely 
receive extraneous, domain-irrelevant information, forensic service providers should examine 
whether they can modify their procedures to shield examiners from this unnecessary and 
potentially biasing information.
The three recommendations above apply to multiple interpretative stages. The sections that 
follow focus on the stages of the latent print analysis, with reference to the research that is 
relevant to each stage and recommendations (beyond those given above) that are specific to each 
stage of interpretation.
3.3 Feature Selection
The first major interpretative stage in a latent print analysis occurs during the initial examination
of the latent print. In this stage, the examiner identifies features in the latent print (e.g., ridge 
147 Others have made similar suggestions. E.g., Risinger, D., M. Saks, W. Thompson, et al. “The Daubert/Kumho
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion.” California
Law Review, 90, no. 1 (January 2002); Krane, D., S. Ford, J. Gilder, et al. “Sequential Unmasking: A Means of
Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 53, no. 4 (2008):
1006–7.
148 ASCLD/LAB, Principle 2, op. cit.
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flow type or ridge path minutiae) that allow a determination of whether the latent print has
sufficient detail to form the basis for subsequent comparisons. Section 3.5 provides figures and
more explanation about minutiae and the levels of detail in print images.
3.3.1 Corresponding Phase in the Latent Print Examination Process Map
One of the primary tasks of the Analysis phase of the ACE-V process is the selection of reliable
friction ridge features in a latent print for comparison against features in exemplar prints. This
corresponds to steps 210 and 320 in the Latent Print Examination Process Map (Figure 1.1). The
process of feature selection may occur simultaneously with the other interpretative processes
such as analysis of distortion and suitability determination (see the discussion of these topics
below and steps 210 through 240 in the Process Map). These interpretative processes, in fact,
may all color and influence each other because they have direct impact on the determination of
the quantity, quality, and reliability of the features selected for analysis.
3.3.2 Findings from Existing Research
Feature selection begins with an analysis of the latent print by itself. This generally occurs—and
should generally occur—before viewing the exemplar print. The features that will be selected
usually include those that are the most clearly visible and distinctive, and they will serve as the
basis for the comparison against exemplar prints.
In studying a latent print, an examiner will likely note some minutiae that he is certain exist and
other that he is less sure about. The former should be the primary focus. Confidence about a
feature refers to two things: (1) the examiner is confident that the feature genuinely exists in the
latent print, and (2) the examiner strongly expects to observe that feature in a corresponding
exemplar print from the same source. The degree of expectation relates to the level of tolerance
that the examiner is willing to accept when observing differences during the subsequent
Comparison phase. In other words, if an examiner believes a feature exists in the latent print and
strongly expects to see it in any print from the same source, then the absence of the feature could
significantly affect the examiner’s source attribution. The effect of this feature’s absence
increases with the examiner’s confidence that the feature existed in the original latent print (and
could not be interpreted as anything else).
Typically, high-confidence features will have the highest reliability (accuracy and precision in
selection).149 Because these features will form the basis for the decision, the manner in which
they are selected, how they are documented, and what level of confidence is assigned to them
become critical in understanding the examiner’s decision-making process. Feature selection
becomes crucial in the examination because criteria for the decision-making processes are
neither clearly defined a priori nor made using an objective, validated metric.
Defining the Features
Examiners are not limited to the “points” or “minutiae” when selecting features during the
Analysis phase (although commonly these may be the only formal features documented).
149 Langenburg, G. and C. Champod. “The GYRO System—A Recommended Approach to More Transparent
Documentation.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 61, issue 4 (July/August 2011): 373 – 384.
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Examiners will utilize several classes of features, often referred to as “levels of detail.” There are
also occasional features not associated with any of the traditional levels of detail that appear,
such as creases and wrinkles, permanent scars, temporary skin damage, or skin disease, that
examiners might use.150
Level 1 Detail (L1D) is defined as “ridge flow.”151 Ridge flow often translates to a pattern type
in a finger or palm, such as a loop, whorl, or arch formation; ridge flow also includes other
information such as relative curvature. Pattern types are class characteristics shared by many
individuals. Furthermore, L1D can be easily distorted as a result of the flexibility of skin.152
Therefore, although L1D might be selected, this level of detail is not always reliable, especially
if signs of distortion appear in the image. Figure 3.1 provides illustrations of some L1D.
Level 2 Detail (L2D) is defined as “ridge path.”153 L2D includes minutiae, such as ridge endings, 
bifurcations, or dots. Even the absence of minutiae in an area (called an “open field”) can be 
significant and highly discriminating. Ridge path features are also some of the most robust
features, and they will be present even under extreme conditions of distortion.154 They also tend
to be highly discriminating155 and thus are ideal features for comparisons.
Level 3 Detail (L3D) refers to the edges of ridges (which may appear indented or protruded) and
pores (the location of the center of the pore, not the size or shape, which can be highly variable
within a source).156 Although the reproducibility of pores in latent prints (or low-resolution
capture systems for exemplars) can be problematic in low-clarity images, these features can be
highly discriminating when visible.157
150 This will vary significantly among jurisdictions. For example, in countries that require a minimum number of
minutiae to declare an identification, scars and creases may not be used to reach the minimum. Other agencies may
be unwilling to use creases to contribute to the identification decision but will use creases to narrow a search through
set of exemplar prints.
151 Ashbaugh, D. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced
Ridgeology. CRC Press, 1999.
152 Maceo, A. “Qualitative Assessment of Skin Deformation: A Pilot Study.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 59,
no. 4 (2009): 390–440.
153 Ashbaugh, op. cit.
154 Maceo, op. cit.
155 Egli, N., C. Champod, and P. Margot. “Evidence Evaluation in Fingerprint Comparison and Automated
Fingerprint Identification Systems—Modelling Within Finger Variability.” Forensic Science International, 167
(2007): 189–95; Jain, A., Y. Chen, and M. Demirkus. “Pores and Ridges: High-Resolution Fingerprint Matching
Using Level 3 Features.” IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 29, no. 1 (2007): 15–27;
Neumann, C., C. Champod, R. Puch-Solis, et al. “Computation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for
Configurations of Any Number of Minutiae.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 52, no. 1 (2007): 54–64; Srihari, S., H.
Srinivasan, and G. Fang. “Discriminability of Fingerprints of Twins.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 58, no. 1
(2008): 109–27.
156 Roddy, A. and J. Stosz. “Fingerprint Features—Statistical Analysis and System Performance Estimates.”
Proceedings of the IEEE, 85, no. 9 (1997): 1390–1421; Richmond, S. Do Fingerprint Ridges and Characteristics
Within Ridges Change with Pressure? Australian Federal Police, Forensic Services, 2004.
157 Jain, Chen, and Demirkus, op. cit.; Kryszczuk, K., A. Drygajlo, and P. Morier. “Extraction of Level 2 and Level
3 Features for Fragmentary Fingerprint Comparison.” In Proceedings of the Second COST Action 275 Workshop,
2004, 83–88.
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Occasional features such as scars and creases can be selected. These features vary in their
reproducibility. For example, creases may not always reproduce consistently158 but can be fairly
discriminating,159 whereas scars reproduce very consistently and are also believed to be highly
discriminating.160 In some instances, such as temporary skin damage, there is a low expectation
of reproducibility in exemplar prints, but the presence of such a feature can be highly significant.
How examiners select and document features can vary significantly among jurisdictions. In some
instances, the examiner observes and notes features to use for comparison without producing any
formal documentation; this examiner might change his mind about the features selected without
documenting the change. On the other end of the spectrum, some examiners formally select
features a priori and annotate the features during the Analysis phase. In some agencies,
examiners must justify in writing any modifications made to their initial feature selections during
the Comparison phase.161
Whether features are selected formally or informally, there are two major decision components
involved: determining the existence of a feature and identifying the type or shape of the feature.
These decisions are distinct, and each decision can have its own assigned level of confidence. In
other words, deciding if a feature is present is different from determining precisely what the
feature is. Both decisions may be limited by the quality and clarity of the image.
The determination that a feature exists is akin to the concept of signal-to-noise ratio
determination. Typically, a targeted feature produces a stimulus signal to the observer greater
than the background noise. In some instances, additional information near the suspected signal is
relevant to ascertaining the existence of a feature. An example would be the observation that
adjacent ridges next to a suspected feature react to account for the presence of the suspected
feature. Another example would be three ridges entering a small smudged area from which only
two ridges exit. These indicators allow an examiner to infer the existence of a feature that cannot
be observed directly.
The identification of the type of feature observed is, as a logical matter, a separate inquiry made
after determining the existence of a feature. For this decision, the examiner will attempt to
classify and identify the type of feature with as much specificity as possible. For example, after
noting L1D that includes a recurve and a single delta formation, the examiner might classify this
ridge flow as a loop pattern. Similarly, an examiner observing a ridge path event may conclude
that the feature is an ending ridge or a bifurcation (illustrations of these minutiae are available in
Table 3.4 and Figure 4.3). Or perhaps the examiner cannot tell and will simply refer to the
minutiae as a “ridge event.” In this last scenario, the examiner has no doubt that a minutia exists 
in the latent print, but the examiner cannot, on the basis of what is observable in the latent image,
158 Richmond, op. cit.
159 Tietze, S. and K. Witthuhn. Papillarleistenstruktur der menschlichen Handinnenfläche. Luchterhand, 2001.
160 Feng, J., A. Jain, and A. Ross. “Detecting Altered Fingerprints.” In 2010 20th International Conference on
Pattern Recognition (ICPR), August 2010, 1622–25.
161 See, e.g., Interpol European Expert Group on Fingerprint Identification – IEEGFI II. Method for Fingerprint
Identification. Interpol European Expert Group on Fingerprint Identification – IEEGFI II, 2004; U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of the Inspector General. A Review of the FBI’s Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case
(Unclassified and Redacted). U.S. Department of Justice, March 2006.
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determine the specific type of minutia. The examiner, in this instance, has great certainty about
the minutia’s existence, but great uncertainty about its specific nature.
For each of these decisions—determining the existence of the feature and determining the type of
feature—the examiner has some internal level of confidence. This level of confidence may be
documented formally, or it may simply be an informal or even implicit judgment by the
examiner, depending on local practices. The levels of confidence can also be very different for
the two decisions. For example, the examiner might be highly confident that a feature exists
when three ridges enter a smudged area but only two exit; yet the examiner might have no
confidence regarding whether the event is a bifurcation or ridge ending (although the examiner
might have high confidence about what the feature is not—for example, a dot).
3.3.3 Issues and Recommendations
Confidence Levels and Documentation
During feature selection, there may be a wholly implicit or a more explicit assignment of weight
to the features, mostly as a function of their specificity (discriminating strength). This chapter
covers weighting of features in section 3.5; here the focus is on the role of an examiner’s
confidence in such weighting and the importance of documenting the degree of confidence. An
examiner’s confidence in the existence of the feature and confidence in its classification will
undoubtedly affect the weight applied to the feature, independent of specificity. Generally
speaking, examiners would give more weight to a rare feature, such as a trifurcation, when it is
clear and distinct and when the examiner is confident in selecting it than when it is part of an
indistinct, distorted, or low-quality area that may possibly include a trifurcation or something
else (or may not even exist). Weight is a function of both confidence about the feature’s
existence and the perceived rarity of the feature. Because not enough is known about rarity, and
even that which is known is not necessarily part of an examiner’s formal training, this aspect of
interpretation is often an implicit judgment based on the examiner’s experience.162
The examiner’s decisions in the Analysis phase and the associated levels of confidence will only
be captured by documenting these aspects contemporaneously. An examiner may choose to
document the features and levels of confidence using a narrative, although this can be somewhat
time-consuming and burdensome. Another way to record this information is to annotate the
features with dots, tracings, and other markings on a photograph of the latent print. Numerous
software packages can facilitate this process. Some software has been designed for fingerprint
case annotation and includes tools for marking various friction ridge features, classifying these
features, and assigning levels of confidence to the decisions.163 Newly developed algorithms,
such as used in an automated quality mapping assessment,164 may be able to extract features
automatically and to assign a level of confidence in the existence of the feature. While waiting
162 Osterburg, J. “An Inquiry into the Nature of Proof. The Identity of Fingerprints.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 9,
no. 4 (1964): 413–27. Osterburg explored this issue and found large differences in examiners’ perceived
contribution for different minutia types and their configurations. However, Osterburg’s study had significant 
limitations in its design and execution.
163 Langenburg and Champod, 2011, op. cit.
164 See, e.g., Tabassi, E. and C. Wilson. “A Novel Approach to Fingerprint Image Quality.” IEEE International
Conference on Image Processing, 2 (September 2005): 37–40; Nill, N. “IQF (Image Quality of Fingerprint)
Software Application.” MITRE (May 2007). Accessed April 22, 2011. http://www.mitre.org/tech/mtf/.
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for this software to be further tested and more readily available, however, some examiners have
developed annotation schemes for indicating their personal assessments of confidence in the
existence of a feature. For example, one scheme uses colors to represent an examiner’s level of
confidence.165 Similar to a traffic light, green features represent high confidence, yellow features
represent medium confidence, red features represent low confidence, and orange features are
those observed during the Comparison phase. This report does not offer specific prescriptions
regarding which approaches or technologies should be used; however, tools that make explicit
documentation both more routine and less time-consuming for examiners offer significant
benefits to the interpretive process.
If time were no limitation, elaborate, formal documentation of all discriminative features in
advance of a comparison would be ideal. The examiner would document all relevant and
significant features observed and would record the confidence regarding these features before
engaging in comparison. This annotation in advance would make explicit whether any significant
features were noted only after the comparison had begun, whether the examiner’s confidence in
the existence of minutiae changed as a result of the comparison process, and whether these
changes were justified. It would make the examiner’s internal thought process more transparent
to later observers and more transparent to the examiner himself.
However, not every comparison is complex, and time and resources are limited. Heavy caseloads
are the norm for many forensic service providers. Therefore, the benefits of detailed and
formalized documentation requirements must be balanced against the time and resources they
require. Recommendation 3.1, regarding the importance of documentation to maintain
transparency, which is highly relevant to feature selection, attempts to provide this balance by
requiring some degree of contemporaneous documentation in all cases while also recognizing
that the degree and detail of documentation may vary with the complexity of the print and the
comparison.
Variation
Intra-examiner reliability refers to reproducibility on the part of the same examiner. Intra-
examiner reliability would be present during feature selection when an examiner selects certain 
features in a questioned latent print at one time and selects different features from the same print 
at a later time (without recollection of the initial features selected). Inter-examiner
reproducibility refers to the variation that exists across different examiners—variation that
occurs when different examiners are presented with the same latent print and independently
select different features. Studies of intra-examiner and inter-examiner variation reveal significant
differences.166 Methods to reduce variation in feature selection are currently being explored and
tested.167 In the meantime, because inter-examiner variation can be extensive, an examiner
cannot assume that another examiner will see the same features (or place the same level of   
165 Langenburg and Champod, 2011, op.cit.
166 Evett, I. and R. Williams. “A Review of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in England and Wales.”
Fingerprint Whorld, 82 (1995): 125–43; Langenburg, G. “Pilot Study: A Statistical Analysis of the ACE-V
Methodology—Analysis Stage.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 54 (2004): 64–79; Dror, I., C. Champod, G.
Langenburg, et al. “Cognitive Issues in Fingerprint Analysis: Inter- and Intra-Expert Consistency and the Effect of a
‘Target’ Comparison.” Forensic Science International, 208 (2011): 10–17.
167 Langenburg, G., C. Champod, T. Genessay, et al. “Informing the Judgments of Fingerprint Analysts Using
Quality Metric and Statistical Assessment Tools.” National Institute of Justice Impression and Pattern Evidence
Symposium, Clearwater, Florida. August 2010.
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confidence in the existence of any given feature).168 Documentation of the feature selection
process is critical to understanding the differences among examiners and their decisions.
Examination Complexity
Not all print comparison tasks are equal in difficulty. Some comparisons are simple; others are
far more complex. Although there is no formal method or metric for assessing complexity,
experience and common sense point to some of the relevant factors. Examples of factors that
lead to complexity include significant elements of distortion, reduced image quality (clarity), few
reliable features available for comparison, or unusual, rare features to consider.
As described in Recommendation 3.1, the amount of documentation needed may vary depending
on the complexity of the particular examination. In fairly simple, unambiguous cases, examiners
appear to be fairly resistant to certain bias effects.169 Furthermore, although extensive 
interexaminer variation in feature selection appears to exist, some research suggests that this 
variation does not have significant effects on the ultimate decisions in noncomplex cases, but it is 
more significant in complex cases.170
These findings comport with intuition. When information is clear and plentiful, different
examiners may elect to focus on different minutiae and yet reach consistent results. For the sake
of efficiency, in these simple cases with significant quantity and quality of features present,
minimal documentation may be sufficient because the risk of error due to bias or other human
factors is also fairly minimal. Conversely, in complex cases, with limited quantity and quality of
features, research shows that a variety of factors can influence interpretation and decisions.171
In these more difficult interpretations, documenting all available and reliable features and 
following stricter protocols regarding the analysis of the latent print before exposure to an 
exemplar can be critical in reducing the potential for error.
However, if documentation is permitted to vary with the complexity of the examination,
examiners need to be able to determine complexity. It then becomes very important during the
Analysis phase that the examiner both assesses and documents the complexity of the case.
Current research is attempting to develop tools and metrics for quantitatively assessing the
difficulty or complexity of a latent print comparison. In the meantime, an examiner’s subjective
assessment of case complexity can, by necessity, substitute, but this judgment must be
documented in the case record. Some agencies may elect to institute a quality assurance policy or
minimum minutiae threshold to assist in deciding how to document a case. For example, a
168 An illustration can be found in the responses of the dozens of examiners in the public judicial inquiry set up by
Scottish Ministers to verify the fingerprints associated with the case of H.M Advocate v. McKie in 1999, and related
matters. Many chartings of the disputed latent print Y7 were submitted into evidence. Experts in the case disagreed
about which features were reliable. Transcripts and court exhibits can be viewed at
www.thefingerprintinquiryscotland.org.uk, accessed June 2, 2011.
169 Dror, I., A. Peron, S. Hind, et al. “When Emotions Get the Better of Us: The Effect of Contextual Top-Down
Processing on Matching Fingerprints.” Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19 (2005): 799–809; Dror, I. and D. Charlton.
“Why Experts Make Errors.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 56, no. 4 (2006): 600–16.
170 Evett and Williams, op. cit.; Dror, Charlton, and Peron, op. cit.; Langenburg, G., C. Champod, and P. Wertheim.
“Testing for Potential Contextual Bias Effects During the Verification Stage of the ACE-V Methodology When
Conducting Fingerprint Comparisons.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 54, no. 3 (May 2009): 571–82.
171 Stacey, R. “A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case.”
Journal of Forensic Identification, 54, no. 6 (2004): 706–18; Dror, Charlton, and Peron, op. cit.
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forensic service provider might require examiners to document all features during the Analysis
phase when a latent print has fewer than 12 minutiae.
Recursive Practice
Once the examiner enters the Comparison phase and compares the latent print against an
exemplar print (beginning with step 500 on the Latent Print Examination Process Map), looking
at the exemplar may cause the examiner to re-evaluate aspects of the latent print. The examiner
might use features in the exemplar print to find new features or to reassess previously noted
features in the latent print. This practice, which has been referred to as “teasing the points”172
when used to attain a required minimum number of minutiae, poses possible concerns about bias.
Some have criticized it as a form of circular reasoning because it uses the exemplar to infer
meaning from the source print and vice versa.173 However, there are occasions when the exemplar 
may legitimately draw clearer attention to an important feature or reveal that some
detail in the latent print previously thought to be “noise” is actually “signal.”
Some sources, describing the advantages of a more cyclical process, defend examinations that
move back and forth between latent and exemplar prints,174 whereas other sources discourage it
in favor of a more linear approach.175 The difficulty is that the comparison print may lead both to
accurate and inaccurate judgments about previously unnoticed features of the latent print, and
there is no foolproof way to tell the two apart. Eliminating recursion would protect against
picking or trimming the data to fit the conclusion, but it would also prevent the examiner from
using valuable information. Moreover, recursive examinations may be especially important for
reaching the conclusion to exclude. If the examiner sees several similarities between a latent and
exemplar, notices another feature in the potential source print, returns to the latent, and does not
see the corresponding feature, then the examiner is engaging in a form of recursion; yet even
those who criticize recursive examinations would likely not wish to prevent such an analysis.
Recently, Dror et al.176 and Langenburg et al.177 proposed using features in the latent print that
were selected after observing the exemplar only if the nonlinearity of the process is documented.
These sources recommend that if these features are used, they must be formally documented as
features observed during, rather than prior to, the Comparison phase, and typically they should
be assigned less weight than if the feature had been observed initially in the Analysis phase. This
documentation-focused compromise has significant merit. This approach is captured in
Recommendation 3.2, which states that any modification to an analysis after examining the
exemplar (both in feature selection and in other interpretive phases) should be formally
documented.
172 Evett and Williams, op. cit.; Tiller, C. “Fingerprint Identification in the United Kingdom—Do They Really Need
16 Points?” Canadian Identification Society Newsletter, 39 (1983): 11.
173 IEEGFI II, op. cit.; U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, op. cit., p. 138.
174 Vanderkolk, 2009, op. cit.; Triplett, M. and L. Cooney. “The Etiology of ACE-V and Its Proper Use: An
Exploration of the Relationship Between ACE-V and the Scientific Method of Hypothesis Testing.” Journal of
Forensic Identification, 56, no. 3 (2006): 345–55.
175 Haber, L. and R. Haber. Challenges to Fingerprints: A Guidebook for Prosecution and Defense and Examiners.
Lawyers and Judges Publishing Co., 2009; IEEGFI II, op. cit.
176 Dror, Champod, Langenburg, et al., op. cit.
177 Langenburg and Champod, 2011, op. cit.
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Cognitive Bias
Various studies have shown that context information or other external factors can influence
feature selection.178 However, some of this research has shown that not all bias effects are
necessarily negative. At times, the biases can create more conservative decisions by examiners,
even during feature selection. Whether greater conservatism is a plus or a minus depends on
factors not yet fully understood (such as error rates in a variety of circumstances as well as
policy decisions regarding tradeoffs between Type 1 and Type 2 errors). More study of the
risks—and any benefits—of these bias effects and how to minimize them is warranted. One
advisable countermeasure for bias in feature selection is simply to select features in the latent
print separately from the exemplar. More generally, sequential unmasking, which excludes
irrelevant contextual information, is a valuable strategy.
3.3.4 Research Needs in Feature Selection
Assessing Variation in Feature Selection
A handful of studies have assessed variation in the feature selection process. Generally, they find
a wide variation among examiners during the task of feature selection. At this stage, what may be
of more interest to the community are methods to reduce the variation of feature selection and
tools and technologies to help identify the most reliable features. These tools are likely to be
especially important for complex comparisons, and they may have benefits more broadly.
Link between Feature Selection and Source Attribution
The link between variations in feature selection and the examiner’s ultimate decision is not well
understood. Emerging research suggests that there is a relationship,179 but the effect may be
competing with other major interpretative steps, such as interpreting discrepancy, feature
weighting, and thresholds for reaching identification decisions. A better understanding of the link
between feature selection and the ultimate decision would permit best practices to be formulated
and would allow technology to select the most reliable and useful features on which to base
decisions later in the ACE-V process.
What is clear from the research is that in complex cases, examiners who perceive and compare a
greater number of features are more likely to reach a conclusion about source attribution (rather
than determining the print to be inconclusive). Therefore, in complex cases, there is a strong
need for tools or methods to standardize the selection of features. More generally, standardized
methods for feature selection should result in less variation in the features that are selected and
compared, which in turn should lead to more consistency in the decisions. However, even if
decisions were more consistent, they would not necessarily be more accurate. It is possible, for
example, that the best interpreters of prints would be more accurate using their own methods
instead of following a standard protocol. This too, deserves attention and research.
178 Evett and Williams, op. cit.; Dror, Charlton, and Peron, op. cit.; Langenburg, Champod, and Wertheim, op. cit.;
Dror, Champod, Langenburg, et al., op. cit.
179 Langenburg, Champod, Genessay, et al., op. cit.
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3.4 Utility Assessment
Several points in the latent print analysis process require a determination of latent print utility or
sufficiency. The examiner must determine whether the print has enough clarity and quantity of
information for some specified purpose. This happens both early in the process (e.g.,
determinations of whether the latent is suitable for analysis or suitable for an AFIS search) and
later in the process (e.g., determinations of sufficient information to compare the latent and
exemplar). For convenience, the common points are discussed here, since the recurring question
is whether there is sufficient information for making the next inquiry.
3.4.1 Corresponding Steps in the Latent Print Examination Process Map 
 
Key points at which utility determinations are relevant are discussed here with the numbers in
parentheses referring to steps in the Latent Print Examination Process Map. Upon acquiring a
latent print, an examiner must determine whether it is suitable for comparison (step 240). This
typically involves examining the details and any relevant distortion in the latent print to
determine whether there is enough usable information to make a comparison viable. Assuming
the latent print is suitable and that known prints are available, the examiner next determines if
the known prints are suitable for comparison (step 350) and if the two prints combined are
sufficient to see the comparison through to a decision (step 370). If no known prints are
available, the examiner may be called on to determine if the latent print is suitable for an AFIS
search (step 270).
3.4.2 Findings from Existing Research
The Working Group found no research that effectively addresses utility or sufficiency in the
context of fingerprint analysis. This is unsurprising, for a critical piece for any such research—
the definition and validation of a metric for assessing utility—is still missing. Research has been
carried out related to the examiner decision process that implicitly involves judgments of utility
and sufficiency, but these studies tend to focus only on the accuracy or repeatability of the
ultimate decision and thus are reviewed in the relevant sections below.
3.4.3 Recommendations and Best Practices
The absence of research findings specific to the determination of utility precludes evidence-based
recommendations to guide practitioners. Instead, the primary findings with regard to utility
determination concern practices to encourage consistent decision-making and to allow for
ongoing evaluation of quality both within and across forensic service providers. This involves
Recommendation 3.1, regarding the importance of documentation, and Recommendation 3.2,
regarding the special importance of documenting any utility determinations that are altered after
examining the exemplar. Such documentation is critical in utility determinations because it
allows for internal quality control and quality assurance. It also is of great importance for any
potential future external evaluations of quality.
Agencies and forensic service providers can enhance the transparency of their analyses and
conclusions by determining clear guidelines that assist examiners in making determinations of
utility. This refers to guidelines for deciding whether a print warrants further assessment and not 
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to guidelines for making ultimate source attribution. For example, an agency might require at
least five minutiae to conduct an AFIS search.
This chapter does not propose particular guidelines for determining utility but suggests that each 
forensic service provider try to make this step as explicit as possible. Until a substantial research 
basis exists from which best practices can be generated, it is inappropriate to require field-wide 
shared standards. Nevertheless, forensic service providers can draw on experience to establish 
clear guidelines. Information that could be incorporated in an agency’s guidelines includes 
number of minutiae and visibility of ridge flow, pores, ridge edges, and details of incipient 
ridges, creases, and scars. The guidelines for determining whether a latent print is suitable for 
comparison are necessarily different from the guidelines for comparing a pair of prints.
Recommendation	3.4:	Each	agency	or	forensic	service	provider	should	define	“suitable”	
or	“sufficient”	in	its	standard	operations	procedures.	These	guidelines	should	be	as	
explicit	as	possible	about	what	is	expected	for	sufficiency	determinations	at	different	
stages of the latent print examination process.
The Working Group takes no position on whether agencies should couch guidelines as 
recommendations or as requirements.
3.4.4 Research Needs in Utility Assessment
Existing research has not resolved the questions of utility, sufficiency, and value determination in 
latent print analysis. The Working Group strongly endorses further research in this area to enable 
the development of evidence-based guidelines and recommendations for utility determination. 
Although a general discussion of the need for research and a recommendation regarding research 
is provided near the end of the chapter, some preliminary thoughts regarding research questions 
relevant to utility or value determinations are provided here.
Important areas for study include the following:
• Reproducibility and accuracy: It is of great interest to understand the degree to which 
utility determinations are reliable. For each utility determination, researchers could 
present the same print at different times to a single examiner, present the same print to 
different examiners, or both. These studies could provide significant information about 
consistency, though they would not tell the researcher anything directly about accuracy. 
Assessing the accuracy of utility determinations is more problematic because there is no 
objective basis for ascertaining when a determination is correct.
• Factors affecting utility determinations: A wide range of factors can affect utility 
determinations. One possible topic for consideration is context effects: does the type of 
case (e.g., violent crime versus property crime) have an effect on the determination of 
utility, or does background knowledge about the case affect utility judgments? Another 
possible topic is comparator effects: are different utility determinations obtained for 
comparing latent prints with suspect prints as opposed to comparing latent prints with 
AFIS-generated targets? Other factors that should be studied include forensic service 
provider culture norms and other human factors.
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• The effect of laboratory culture: The relationship between the culture and expectations in 
an agency and examiner performance has not been studied. For example, do laboratories 
that frown on inconclusive determinations eliminate more prints at an earlier utility stage?
• Utility effects with relation to manual, as opposed to AFIS, search strategies: Research 
could investigate, for example, whether certain pattern types create different utility 
strategies in relation to searching manually or on AFIS.
3.5 Feature Weighting
Practitioners recognize that assigning weights to latent print features and their configuration is a 
fundamental decision-making or interpretive step, either as an output of the Analysis phase or as 
part of the Evaluation phase. Pioneers such as Locard indicated that fingerprint features should 
be assessed as a function of their relative rarity (and clarity).180
3.5.1 Frequencies of Friction Ridge Details
As discussed in section 3.1, the weighting of individual features currently reflects subjective, 
experience-based judgments of the probability associated with their occurrence. Whether done 
subjectively or in a more data-oriented fashion, weighting is a probabilistic assignment of the 
selectivity of the features being considered. The process of weighting among practitioners today, 
however, remains essentially holistic, and the subjective probabilities are rarely made explicit.181 
In addition, no clear consensus exists among practitioners as to the reproducibility and perceived 
contribution of L3D features appearing in both latent and exemplar prints.182
Although individual experience may provide some insight into probabilities, carefully collected 
data should be used to provide more accurate assessments that can inform the weighting of 
features in the interpretive process. To demonstrate the nature and value of such data, this 
section summarizes the major sources of data available on the classification and prevalence 
of L1D features (general flow of the ridges) and L2D features (here restricted to minutiae) for 
fingerprints.183 Limited statistical data are available for L3D features of fingerprints. Other types 
of friction ridge impressions (palms, toes, etc.) do not yet have comparable data available for 
even L1D features.
L1D Features
The prevalence of different types of L1D features in the population is well documented. 
Dermatoglyphic data from studies in anthropology, population genetics, and early detection of
180 Locard, E. “La Preuve Judiciaire par les Empreintes Digitales.” Archives d’Anthropologie Criminelle, de 
Médecine Légale et de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique, 29 (1914): 321–48.
181 In fact, in one early study, latent print examiners did not provide consistent rankings of how frequently fingerprint 
features occur. Osterburg, op. cit.
182 Anthonioz, A., N. Egli, C. Champod, et al. “Level 3 Details and Their Role in Fingerprint Identification: A Survey 
Among Practitioners.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 58, no. 5 (2008): 562–89.
183 Part of this section is based upon a report of C. Champod, provided on September 28, 2009, to the Scottish 
Ministers’ Fingerprint Inquiry, available at www.thefingerprintinquiryscotland.org.uk/inquiry/2090.html, accessed 
April 22, 2011.
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disease, are one source.184 These data can be used in forensic science, but the classifications often 
do not match those used by forensic experts. Other data come from collections of ten-print cards. 
The majority of large collections were classified according to the Galton-Henry scheme,185 as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1:
Figure 3.1: Level 1 Detail features186 
184 See, e.g., Kumbnani, H. “Dermatoglyphics: A Review.” In Anthropology Today: Trends, Scope and Applications, 
edited by M. Bhasin and V. Bhasin, 285–95. Kamla-Raj Enterprises, 2007.
185 Henry, E. Classification and Uses of Finger Prints. 4th ed. George Routledge and Sons, 1900.
186 Images adapted from Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Fingerprint Manual. Chapter 2. Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, 1990.
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Data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Crime Information Center permits
estimates of the prevalence of each class of L1D in the U.S. population. 
0.09%
Male Left Hand Patterns Male Right Hand Patterns
Arches 3.6% 2.9%
Tented Arches 3.1% 2.7%
Right Loops 3.9% 58.0%
Left Loops 63.7% 4.4%
Pla in Whorls 17.3% 24.4%
Central Pocket Loops 3.8% 4.1%
Double Loops 4.1% 3.2%
Accidental Whorls 0.1% 0.083%
Missing or Amputated 0.2% 0.2%
Scarred or Mutilated 0.094%
Table 3.1: Distribution for the general patterns on fingerprints from the left and right hands of males 
(89,755,960 fingers)187
The relative frequencies of L1D can vary depending on the finger considered and, to some 
degree, the sex and ethnic background of the population. For example, comparing right thumbs 
to the little fingers of males produces the distributions in Table 3.2.
Male Right Thumb Patterns Male Right Little Finger Patterns
Arches 2.5% 0.7%
Tented Arches 0.4% 0.6%
Right Loops 50.8% 82.3%
Left Loops 0.4% 0.3%
Pla in Whorls 34.8% 11.8%
Central Pocket Loops 1.1% 3.6%
Double Loops 9.9% 0.4%
Accidental Whorls 0.021% 0.009%
Miss ing or Amputated 0.088% 0.1%
Scarred or Mutilated 0.025% 0.059%
Table 3.2: Distribution for the general patterns on fingerprints from the right thumb and little fingers 
of males (17,951,192 fingers)188
 
Some classes of L1D can be subdivided according to ridge counts (number of ridges between the 
core of the pattern to the delta) and ridge tracing (relative positioning of the deltas). Statistics in 
relation to these subclassifications are available. Table 3.3 presents two examples.
187 Champod, C., C. Lennard, P. Margot, et al. Fingerprints and Other Ridge Skin Impressions. CRC Press, 2004.
188 Ibid.
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Table 3.3: Examples of statistics on subclassifications189
These data can assist fingerprint examiners in several ways. Because the frequencies of general
patterns vary across the different fingers, the patterns offer information on which finger the latent
print came from. In addition, during the Evaluation phase, a rare general pattern, such as a tented
arch, can be weighted more than a common general pattern, such as a loop with a ridge count of
between 11 and 20.
L2D Features
The following two tables list frequencies, reported in studies prior to 1985, of the more
discriminating L2D features (especially minutiae).190 Not all types of minutiae were considered
in each study.191
Study Authors, (Number of Prints) Number of Minutiae
Minutia Type Example
Gupta, (1,000 
ulnar loops) 
Unknown number 
of minutiae 
Osterburg et al., 
(39	fingerprints)	
8,591 cells of 1 
mm2
Lin et al.,
(76	fingerprints)	
14,280 minutiae 
Ridge ending 7.50% 8.32% 9.60%
Bifurcation 
opening
8.00% 3.82% 2.60%
Deviation 0.90% Not considered Not considered
Bridge 0.80% 1.22% Not considered
Island 2.50% 1.77% 0.99%
189 Ibid.
190 Stoney, D. “Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality.” In Advances in Fingerprint Technology, edited by Henry 
C. Lee and R.E. Gaensslen, 327–87. 2nd ed. CRC Press, 2001, p. 327.
191 A more recent analysis appears in Gutièrrez, E., V. Galera, J. Martínez, et al. “Biological Variability of the 
Minutiae in the Fingerprints of a Sample of the Spanish Population.” Forensic Science International, 172 (2007): 98.
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Minutia Type Example Gupta Osterburg et al. Lin et al.
Interruption 0.90% 1.39% 1.20%
Hook 2.00% 0.75% 0.48%
Lake 2.50% 0.64% 0.17%
Dot 3.50% 1.51% 0.52%
Crossing 0.50% Not considered Not considered
Transversal 0.50% Not considered Not considered
Return 0.80% Not considered Not considered
Double 
bifurcation
Not considered 0.14% 0.27%
Trifurcation Not considered 0.09% Not considered
Angular line Not considered Not considered 0.17%
Delta Not considered 0.20% Not considered
Other multiple 
occurrence
Not considered 3.55% Not considered
Absence of 
minutiae
Not considered 76.60% 83.90%
Table 3.4: Relative frequencies for different types of minutiae according to Gupta (1968),192 
Osterburg et al. (1977),193 and Lin et al. (1982)194, 195      
192 Gupta, S. “Statistical Survey of Ridge Characteristics.” International Criminal Police Review, 218 (1968): 130.
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Study Authors, (Number of Prints) Number of Minutiae
Minutia Type
Santamaria 
Beltran, (1,000 
fingerprints)	
Unknown 
number of 
minutiae
Kingston, (100 
ulnar loops) 
2,464 minutiae
Sclove, (39 
fingerprints)	
2,536 minutiae
Stoney, (412 
thumbs–distal 
area) 2,645 
minutiae
Ridge ending 53.40% 45.90% 49.70% 56.80%
Bifurcation 
opening
15.10% 34.10% 15.90% 43.20%
Bifurcation 
closing
13.10% Not considered Not considered Not considered
Deviation 2.20% Not considered Not considered Not considered
Bridge 1.30% 1.90% 5.58% Not considered
Island 5.40% Not considered 10.30% Not considered
Interruption 1.60% Not considered Not considered Not considered
Hook Not considered Not considered 3.50% Not considered
Lake 4.20% 3.20% 2.63% Not considered
Dot 2.20% 8.30% 10.20% 5.30%
Crossing 0.22% Not considered Not considered Not considered
Transversal 1.30% Not considered Not considered Not considered
Return 0.024% Not considered Not considered Not considered
Double bifurcation Not considered Not considered 0.64% Not considered
Trifurcation Not considered Not considered 0.28% Not considered
Delta Not considered 1.70% 1.35% Not considered
Other multiple 
occurrence
Not considered 3.10% Not considered Not considered
Table 3.5: Relative frequencies for different types of minutiae according to Santamaria Beltran 
(1953),196 Kingston (1964),197 Sclove (1979-1980),198 and Stoney (1985)199 
193 Osterburg, J., T. Parthasarathy, T. Raghavan, et al. “Development of a Mathematical Formula for the Calculation
of Fingerprint Probabilities Based on Individual Characteristics.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 72
(1977): 772.
194 Lin, C., J. Liu, J. Osterburg, et al. “Fingerprint Comparison I: Similarity of Fingerprints.” Journal of Forensic
Science, 27, no. 2 (1982): 290.
195 Images adapted from Champod, C. Reconnaissance Automatique et Analyse Statistique des Minuties sur les
Empreintes Digitales. PhD Thesis. Institut de Police Scientifique et de Criminologie, Université de Lausanne,
Lausanne, Suisse, 1996.
196 Santamaria Beltran, F. “Une Nouvelle Méthode d’Évaluation des Points Caracteristiques des Crêtes Papillaires.”
Assemblée Générale de la Commission International de Police Criminelle – Oslo. 24–29 June 1953; Santamaria
Beltran, F. “Sous-Commission á la Dactyloscopie, Nouveaux Concepts d’Évaluation des Points Caractéristiques de
F. Santamaria Beltran.” Assemblée Générale de la Commission International de Police Criminelle – Oslo. 25 June 
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Although this information could be helpful to an examiner, the data have significant limitations. 
There is no standardized nomenclature for the type of minutiae considered, how they were 
counted, how the absence of minutiae was evaluated, or how minutiae were distinguished 
from one another (e.g., when two bifurcations should be counted as two events or one double 
bifurcation event). This lack of standardized terminology applies across the entire fingerprint 
comparison field200 and makes comparison across these studies extremely challenging.
Also, the density of minutiae and their relative proportions depends greatly on their positioning 
on the papillary surface (especially in relation to core and deltas). For example, areas such as 
deltas and ridge flow regions along “type lines” tend to produce a higher number of minutiae. 
None of the studies took this into account. More recent models have begun to account for this 
phenomenon by using data-driven approaches that do not rely on pre-defined categories.201
L3D Features202
Limited statistical analyses of pores, or by extension, of L3D features of fingerprints, have been 
carried out for latent print comparisons in a forensic context. Ashbaugh indicated that 20 to 
30 corresponding pores between a latent print and a reference print would be sufficient for an 
individualization.203 Roddy and Stosz concurred.204 However, their models relied on questionable 
independence assumptions205 and, more importantly, did not take into account the potential lack 
of reproducibility of these features from one impression to the next. Parsons et al. investigated 
within-source variability and concluded that “due to contamination and inherent dependence, 
matching on 20 pores as has been previously suggested (Ashbaugh, 1983) appears to us overly 
optimistic. On the basis of this study, we would conjecture that good fingerprints with more 
1953; Santamaria Beltran, F. “A New Method for Evaluating Ridge Characteristics.” Fingerprint and Identification
Magazine, 36, no.11 (1955).
197 Kingston, C. “Probabilistic Analysis of Partial Fingerprint Patterns.” Doctorate of Criminology diss., University
of California, Berkeley, 1964.
198 Sclove, S. “The Occurrence of Fingerprint Characteristics as a Two-Dimensional Process.” Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 74 (1979): 588; Sclove, S. “The Occurrence of Fingerprint Characteristics as a
Two-Dimensional Poisson Process.” Communications in Statistics – Theoretical Methods, A9 (1980): 675.
199 Stoney, D. “A Quantitative Assessment of Fingerprint Individuality.” PhD thesis, University of California, Davis,
1985.
200 Saviers, K. “Friction Skin Characteristics: A Study and Comparison of Proposed Standards.” Journal of Forensic
Identification, 39 (1989): 157.
201 Champod, C. and P. Margot. “Computer Assisted Analysis of Minutiae Occurrences on Fingerprints.”
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Fingerprint Detection and Identification. 1995; Neumann,
Champod, Puch-Solis, et al., op. cit.; Egli, N. “Interpretation of Partial Fingermarks Using an Automated Fingerprint
Identification System.” PhD thesis, École des Sciences Criminelles, University of Lausanne, 2009; Su, C. and S.
Srihari. “Probability of Random Correspondence for Fingerprints.” Computation Forensics: Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, 5718 (2009): 55.
202 This section comes from the supplementary report C. Champod provided on October 21, 2009, to The Fingerprint
Inquiry of Scotland, available at www.thefingerprintinquiryscotland.org.uk/inquiry/2090.html, accessed April 22,
2011.
203 Ashbaugh, D. “Poroscopy.” RCMP Gazette, 45, no. 2 (1983): 12.
204 Roddy and Stosz, op. cit.
205 Parsons, N., J. Smith, E. Thönnes, et al. “Rotationally Invariant Statistics for Examining the Evidence from the
Pores in Fingerprints.” Law Probability & Risk, 7, no. 1 (2007): 1.
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than about 80 pores appear to have potentially strong evidential value using this extraction 
algorithm.” 206
Some biometric identification systems use pores and other features, such as dots and incipient 
ridges, to increase the efficiency of matching algorithms based on minutiae.207 However, high- 
quality input prints increase the performance of such systems; L3D may have minimal added 
value for forensic latent prints of varying clarity and degrees of distortion.
3.5.2 Recommendations and Best Practices
Data on minutiae rarity, density, and location should be important to latent print examiners in 
weighting different types of minutiae. These data can contribute to an expert’s informal judgment 
on the relative frequency of a given minutia. At the moment, surveys providing such information 
are available only for fingerprints, not for other forms of friction ridge areas such as palms or 
feet. Furthermore, the above data illustrate that a simple additive rule with equal weight for 
each minutiae within a fingerprint, such as a 12-point standard, ignores statistically important 
information. The data clearly show, as many examiners well recognize, that all minutiae are not 
equally useful for interpretation. For example, it may be seven times more common to see a ridge 
ending within a delta zone than a hook. The amount of discriminating information provided by 
the former is thus significantly less than that provided by the latter. Future research could better 
quantify the weight that should be assigned to different types of minutiae. Educating examiners 
about existing statistics, the limitations of these data, and the potential value of better statistics 
will advance the field.
Recommendation 3.5: Because statistical information plays a fundamental role in
weighting latent print feature evidence, training should include the best available
empirical information and should educate examiners about probabilistic reasoning in
using that information.
Given the current limitations in data and probabilistic models, other difficulties in weighting 
fingerprint evidence arise in some circumstances. Modern investigations often compare latent 
prints to exemplars from AFIS searches. Such exemplars raise the possibility of increased 
similarity to a latent print that actually comes from a different source. This phenomenon has 
been called “incidental similarity.”208 Of course, the computer programs that generate candidates 
compare prints differently than human examiners do; nevertheless, when looking in a large 
database for those prints that bear the greatest similarity to the latent print in question, these 
206 Ibid. 
207 Chen, Y. and A. Jain. “Dots and Incipients: Extended Features for Partial Fingerprint Matching.” Paper presented
at the Biometrics Symposium 2007; Kryszczuk, K., A. Drygajlo, and P. Morier. “Study of the Distinctiveness of
Level 2 and Level 3 Features in Fragmentary Fingerprint Comparison.” Presented at the Proceedings of Biometric
Authentication Workshop, ECCV, Prague, Czech Republic 2004, 124–33; Jain, Chen, and Demirkus, op. cit.; Zhao,
Q., D. Zhang, L. Zhang, et al. “High Resolution Partial Fingerprint Alignment Using Pore-Valley Descriptors.”
Pattern Recognition, 2009; Vatsa, M., R. Singh, A. Noore, et al. “Combining Pores and Ridges with Minutiae for
Improved Fingerprint Verification.” Signal Processing, 89, no. 12 (2009): 2676–85.
208 For a discussion of this issue see Dror, I. and J. Mnookin. “The Use of Technology in Human Expert Domains:
Challenges and Risks Arising From the Use of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems in Forensic Science.”
Law, Probability & Risk, 9 (2010): 47–67.
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programs could select a print from a nonsource that is far more similar to the latent print than 
examiners are accustomed to seeing.209
An examiner whose idea of the necessary amount of information for a match comes from a 
nondatabase world may not be taking into account the possibility of incidental similarity that a 
large database carries with it. Unfortunately, no one has studied whether incidental similarity in a
database context is a substantial problem,210 and it is tricky to recommend modifications to an
interpretive system that is largely non-formalized. However, the Working Group believes that
interpreting the quality of the evidence in such cases requires special care because the chances of
finding a close nonmatch are higher. Such care might include strategies such as being more
explicit about the weight assigned to individual features, using a higher threshold before reaching
the conclusion for a match, or narrowing the tolerances for visual differences in appearance.
These considerations lead to the following recommendation:
Recommendation 3.6: When comparing latent prints to exemplars generated through
AFIS searches, examiners must recognize the possibility and dangers of incidental
similarity. Adjustments such as a higher decision threshold, stricter tolerances for
differences in appearance, and explicit feature weighting need to be considered.
Modifying quality assurance practices for this scenario also should be considered.
3.5.3 Research Needs in Feature Weighting
There is a strong need for systematic studies pertaining to the reproducibility and discriminating
strength of fingerprint features. More specifically, although the prevalence of particular L1D
features is well documented, a more complete understanding of the dependencies in these
features between fingers is desirable. Regarding L2D features, there is limited research that
would allow a global assessment (without strong independence assumptions) of the strength of
minutiae configurations. Likewise, the information power of L3D features is not fully understood
nor has it fully been explored for forensic use. Limited systematic studies have been carried out
on features such as creases, lines, and scars, which are useful to support the evaluation process
when these features are present. These studies should take into account variables such as sex,
finger number, pattern, and race.
Such research is important when the examiner subjectively assigns weight to a set of features.
Empirical studies on rarity can inform these experience-based judgments and help allow an
examiner to assign appropriate weights to sets of features. Moreover, research exploring how
examiners overestimate or underestimate the significance of features as a function of training,
motivation, or context of the examination would be useful. 
209 Ibid. 
210 But see Ulery, B., A. Hicklin, J. Buscaglia, et al. “Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint
Decisions.” Proceedings of the NAS. 2011. This experiment found relatively few false identifications for a sample of
latent prints drawn in part from the results of AFIS searches, discussed supra Chapter 2).
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3.6 Discrepancy Interpretation
In the friction ridge discipline, tolerance has been described as “the limits of how much 
distortion or difference is still considered within the parameters of agreement.”211 No two images, 
even if from the same source, will look identical. The question is the extent to which differences 
in the appearance of a particular friction ridge feature in the impression should be considered 
consistent with it coming from the same source as the exemplar print.
3.6.1 Corresponding Stages in the Latent Print Examination Process Map
The decision regarding distortion occurs in several places in the latent print examination process. 
During the Analysis phase, an examiner observes not only the distinctive details of the latent 
print (step 210), but also analyzes the relevant distortion present in the latent print (step 220). 
Factors that affect the appearance of a latent print include the pliability of skin, condition of skin, 
deposition pressure, lateral movement, matrix (substance coating the ridges), substrate (surface 
on which the print is deposited), and development method.212 An important part of the initial 
analysis is the determination of how these factors might affect the latent print.
A similar, but separate, analysis is conducted on the known print (step 330). Pliability and 
condition of skin, recording method (e.g., ink or livescan), deposition pressure, lateral 
movement, and other factors can distort these impressions as well.
In the Comparison phase, an examiner observes the latent and known prints side by side. The 
examiner must decide whether to tolerate the observed dissimilarities at all three levels of 
detail. If the two prints cannot be excluded based on L1D (step 500), the examiner continues the 
comparison to determine if the previously selected target group (step 290) falls within tolerance 
in the known print (step 510). If so, the examiner continues comparing additional detail. As 
dissimilarities are detected during the process, the examiner must determine if those differences 
are within tolerance for identification (step 600).
3.6.2 Findings from Existing Research
To assess distortion accurately, examiners must understand the flexibility of the skin, the limits of 
skin deformation, and other factors that may affect the appearance of a friction ridge impression. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the range of distortion that can be expected on prints left by the same finger. 
211 Ashbaugh, 1999, op. cit.
212 Ibid.
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Figure 3.2: Examples of skin distortion on prints of the same finger with arrows indicating location of 
the same minutiae in different impressions213
In developing automated fingerprint recognition systems, the biometrics industry conducted 
considerable research into the flexibility of skin.214 However, nonlinear distortion is complex. 
Although some research examines the effect of different pressures and motions on friction ridge 
impressions,215 examiners must predominantly rely on the knowledge gained during training and 
subsequent experience to recognize and interpret distortion.
Under the one-dissimilarity doctrine, an examiner who does not know the cause of a dissimilarity
must exclude the two prints as having come from the same source.216 Under this rule, an incorrect 
interpretation of just one dissimilarity could lead to an erroneous exclusion. Some examiners do 
not accept the “one-dissimilarity” doctrine, believing it to be too strict given thecomplexity of 
impressions and the difficulty of distinguishing “true” dissimilarities from other distortions. Even 
among those examiners who do accept the rule in theory, it is not clear how rigorously it operates 
in practice. Faced with overwhelming detail in agreement and only one dissimilarity, examiners 
may have an understandable tendency to rationalize away the dissimilarity, even if they are not 
confident about its cause. Research does not establish whether such rationalization increases 
the accuracy of ultimate decisions or decreases it. It is certainly possible that a willingness to 
explain away difference in the face of a large amount of similarity would lead, on balance, to 
greater accuracy. Confirmation bias—the tendency to give more weight to confirming rather than 
disconfirming information—has been observed in many human endeavors (see Chapter 2). This 
type of bias also could occur if information from the known print influences the interpretation 
of the latent print. To minimize this effect, a thorough analysis of the latent print should be 
conducted before analyzing the known print. 
Although some literature demonstrates the effects that different distortions may have on friction 
ridge impressions,217 little research has tested the examiner’s ability to accurately identify the 
213 Fingerprint images adapted courtesy of the Instiut de Police Scientifique, Université de Lausanne.
214 Dorai, C., N. Ratha, and R. Bolle. “Dynamic Behavior Analysis in Compressed Fingerprint Videos.” IEEE 
Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, 14, no. 1 (2004): 58–73.
215 Cowger, J. Friction Ridge Skin: Comparison and Identification of Fingerprints. CRC Press, 1992; Maceo, op. cit.
216 Thornton, J. “The One-Dissimilarity Doctrine in Fingerprint Identification.” International Criminal Police 
Review, 32, no. 306 (1977): 89–95.
217 Maceo, op. cit.
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different types of distortion. Such research is more common in other disciplines. In the medical 
field, for example, research has investigated how an expert develops the complex skill of 
interpreting X-ray images with a high degree of accuracy.218 Within the fingerprint field, the 
limited research has suggested that some assumptions about the causes of distortion have been 
wrong.219
3.6.3 Recommendations and Best Practices
Given the importance of judgments that must be made about distortion in latent prints, it is 
critical that such judgments be documented clearly. As with other interpretive stages, examiners 
also need to document any modifications that are made after seeing the exemplar. Thus, 
Recommendations 3.1 and 3.2, described earlier in this chapter, are relevant to distortion. 
Likewise, steps to minimize cognitive biases are important for judgments regarding discrepancy. 
Therefore, Recommendation 3.3, that unnecessary information be kept from examiners, is also 
important in this context.
3.6.4 Research Needs in Discrepancy Interpretation
Variability of Distortion
Examiners must predominantly rely on the knowledge gained during training and subsequent 
experience to recognize and interpret distortion. Underestimating the variability of distortion may 
lead to a false exclusion, while overestimating the variability may lead to a false identification. 
Studies to measure the variability of distortion and the extreme limits of distortion are needed.
Identification and Interpretation of Distortion
An examiner’s ability to identify types of distortion has not been thoroughly studied. Research 
is needed not only to determine if an examiner’s working assumptions regarding the effects and 
degree of distortion have an empirical basis but also to determine if, or in what circumstances, a 
misattribution of distortion may lead to an incorrect conclusion. Experiments in which “ground 
truth” is known to the researchers (see Chapter 2) are appropriate for this purpose.
Contextual Bias
There has been little research in the fingerprint domain to determine the extent to which 
contextual information affects the interpretation of dissimilarities. More research is needed 
to determine when various context effects, such as confirmation bias, may lead to erroneous 
conclusions.
3.7 Source Attribution
Within the ACE-V process, three traditional options have been available to the examiner to 
signify findings. First, the examiner can conclude that the source of a known print is the source 
218 Sowden, P., I. Davies, and P. Roling. “Perceptual Learning of the Detection of Features in X-Ray Images: A
Functional Role for Improvements in Adults’ Visual Sensitivity?” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 26, no. 1 (2000): 379–90.
219 Langenburg, G. “Deposition of Bloody Friction Ridge Impressions.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 58, no. 3
(2008): 355–389.
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of the questioned print. In current practice, this identification is a claim that the latent matches
the exemplar and that it would not match exemplars from anyone else in the world. Second, the
examiner can conclude that the exemplar and the latent do not match and cannot share a common
source, which is a categorical exclusion. Finally, the examiner may determine that the
corresponding information in the latent and exemplar prints is inadequate to permit a conclusion.
In this case, the examiner would state that the comparison was “inconclusive” and would provide
no additional information about the chances that the two prints did or did not share a common
source. The ultimate decision occurs near the end of the Process Map, at step 720 or 750, when
the examiner determines whether the latent print matches the exemplar.
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3.7.1 Findings from Existing Research
The Decision Process
Much has been written about the decision process by which a latent print examiner moves from 
feature detection and weighting, through a comparison with the exemplar, to reach a decision.220 
Broadly speaking, an examiner uses an intuitive procedure to arrive at a subjective probability 
for source attribution. If this probability is high enough, the examiner declares an identification. 
If it is low enough, the examiner declares an exclusion, and if it is somewhere between these 
extremes, the examiner makes no inference (inconclusive).
Bayesian decision theory offers a more complete, formal model of the intuitive decision-
making process.221 According to this model, a latent print examiner should consider both the 
source probability and the costs and benefits (utilities) of correct and incorrect decisions. More 
specifically, the Bayesian examiner:
(1) Assesses the prior probability that source of the exemplar left the latent print. An
examiner who purports to rely solely on the information in the prints rather than the
context of the case or the other evidence against this individual would have no reason to
distinguish this individual from anyone else on the planet capable of being where the
latent print was found. An examiner who considers more details of the case might treat
the source of the exemplar as equivalent to a random person drawn from a smaller
population of conceivable suspects. Such reasoning leads to the reciprocal of the size of
the relevant population as the prior probability.
(2) Assesses the weight of the evidence as a function of the similarities and differences
observed between the latent print and the exemplar. Formally, the weight is a likelihood
ratio, as discussed below and in Chapter 1. Examiners may arrive at the weight intuitively
(using their knowledge and experience) or by consulting data-driven likelihood models.
However, these models currently use fewer features than a human examiner would, and
they have other limitations.
(3) Computes the posterior probability of the proposition that the source of the exemplar left
the latent print by combining the prior probability and the likelihood ratio according to
Bayes’s rule (see Chapter 1).
(4) Combines the posterior probabilities with the utilities of the possible correct and
incorrect decisions to reach and report the optimal decision.
220 For an overview of the decision process and discussion of the philosophy of making individualization decisions,
see generally Ashbaugh, 1999, op. cit.; Vanderkolk, J. “Levels of Quality and Quantity in Detail.” Journal of
Forensic Identification, 51, no. 5 (2001): 461–68; Kwan, Q. “Inference of Identity of Source.” PhD thesis of
Criminology, University of California, Berkeley, 1977. For discussion of the probabilistic nature of identification or
individualization decisions see Champod, C. “Identification and Individualization.” In Wiley Encyclopedia of
Forensic Sciences, edited by A. Moenssens and A. Jamieson, vol. 3, pp. 1508–11. J. Wiley & Sons, 2009.
221 Biedermann, A., S. Bozza, and F. Taroni. “Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification: Underlying
Logic and Argumentative Implications.” Forensic Science International, 177 (2008): 120.
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Scholarship on the interpretation of forensic evidence argues that (1), (3), and (4) are in the 
exclusive province of the fact-finder (e.g., the jury in a trial) rather than the expert.222 In this  
view, the examiner should report only the weight of the evidence (2), expressed either 
quantitatively or qualitatively. Today, however, in most jurisdictions, the examiner implicitly 
takes all the above steps.
Regardless of whether the details of the Bayesian formulation provide an adequate descriptive 
or normative model of a latent print examination, the analysis is useful in clarifying the factors 
that, in some manner, must inform an identification decision. The weight of the evidence, the 
prior probability, the posterior probability, and the utilities of the possible decisions all bear on an 
examiner’s ultimate conclusion, but presenting that conclusion is not inherent in the examiner’s 
role of evaluating the latent print evidence. In particular, step (2) can be carried out via a 
likelihood ratio or through a less formal assessment that characterizes the Evaluation phase of 
ACE-V. Having performed this expert function, the examiner then can describe the weight of the 
latent print evidence to an investigator or fact-finder (see Chapter 6).
Weight of the Evidence
Evaluation is the phase in a latent print examination during which the examiner assesses the 
totality of the features compared in the latent print and the exemplar. This can be thought of as 
the end result or the culmination of the stages described in earlier sections of this chapter. There 
are many ways for this assessment to occur, two of which are described below.
The ACE-V process attempts to provide the framework from which a transparent threshold for 
an accurate and repeatable assessment of friction ridge skin can be established. The Evaluation 
phase refers to the final evaluation of whether the comparison results are sufficient to allow a 
determination, and if so, whether that determination is an identification or an exclusion. ACE-V 
does not, however, prescribe how this is done.223 Friction ridge examination by human beings is 
both human-resource intensive and subjective in the way in which the broadly defined ACE-V 
process is applied. There are no formal thresholds for any sufficiency determinations, and feature 
selection and weighting are matters of personal judgment. This is not to suggest that experts are 
poor at any of these tasks. Rather, it is simply to note the absence of objective criteria. Some 
countries take a less holistic approach and apply a minimum point standard. Although this does 
reduce subjectivity, it does not give adequate attention to variations in the rarity and clarity of 
the minutiae. Currently, the traditional ACE-V approach largely lacks validated, transparent 
thresholds.
The likelihood ratio approach to evidence interpretation attempts to measure the total weight of 
evidence using information about the frequency with which different features are observed in 
the population. As explained in Chapter 1, the likelihood ratio is the probability of the data when 
one hypothesis is true compared to (divided by) the probability of the data when the competing 
hypothesis is true. Because it focuses attention on the support the data provide for the relevant 
hypotheses, the likelihood ratio is especially suitable for assessing the contribution of forensic 
222 E.g., Aitken, C. and F. Taroni. Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic Scientists. 2nd ed. John
Wiley & Sons, 2004; Kaye, D., D. Bernstein, and J. Mnookin. The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Expert
Evidence. 2d ed. Aspen Publishers, 2011.
223 Mnookin, op. cit.
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findings in a balanced way.224 It applies regardless of the type of forensic evidence 
considered.225 The likelihood ratio invites forensic practitioners to assess the likelihood of the 
observed findings (the pattern of matching minutiae and other key observations) under the two 
different hypotheses that are relevant to the fact-finder (namely, that the prints came from the 
same source or different sources).
In the case of latent print identification, the forensic findings are a set of concordances and 
dissimilarities (that can be reduced sometimes to a similarity score) of the comparison between 
the ridge detail features from the latent print and from an exemplar print from a potential source. 
The propositions under which the forensic findings are evaluated reflect the issues at hand; for 
example, either the friction ridge skin area of a potential source has truly left the latent print, 
or someone else from a relevant population of potential donors is actually the source of the 
latent print. Assessing the strength of evidence means answering two questions: (1) What is the 
probability of observing the similarities and dissimilarities if the two impressions come from the 
same source? (2) What is the probability of observing the similarities and dissimilarities if the 
two impressions come from different sources?
The “likelihoods” that form the numerator and denominator of the likelihood ratio can represent 
an examiner’s subjective probabilities, or they can be determined from a data-driven probabilistic 
model. Without becoming mired in details, one can consider the conceptual steps involved in the 
formal modeling. To answer question (1), the similarity score of the latent print and the known 
exemplar images are positioned among all the possibilities of comparisons between the exemplar 
and distorted images of that precise source. Estimates of the distribution of similarity scores for 
distorted prints might be obtained either empirically (if sufficient control prints are available 
for that task) or by using a mathematical distortion model with parameters obtained from a 
large collection of prints taken from an individual. The location of the observed score within 
the estimated distribution indicates the probability of observing the level of agreement found 
between the latent print and the known exemplar, given the possibilities of distortion and the 
hypothesis that they come from the same source (the numerator).
The denominator requires an estimate of the distribution of similarity scores when pairs of prints 
are drawn from different sources. The variation should be larger than that due to distortion alone, 
and the level of similarity should be low. The relevant question is whether the similarity score 
is more consistent with the type of variation that would be expected if the print originated from 
the same source than if it originated from another source. The next chapter reviews research on 
methods for automating the assessment of the likelihood ratio.
One final topic associated with the likelihood ratio deserves attention. This concerns the 
interpretation of the likelihood ratio when an AFIS database search produces the candidate for 
comparison. There has been extensive debate, primarily in regard to DNA database trawls, about 
224 For a short introduction, see Champod, C. and I. Evett. “Evidence Interpretation: A Logical Approach.” In Wiley 
Encyclopedia of Forensic Sciences, edited by A. Moenssens and A. Jamieson, vol. 2, pp. 968–76. J. Wiley & Sons, 
2009.
225 Aitken, op.cit.; Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit. The LR framework has been recommended in a standard 
adopted by all laboratories affiliated with the Association of Forensic Science Providers. Association of Forensic 
Science Providers. “Standards for the Formulation of Evaluative Forensic Science Expert Opinion.” Science and 
Justice, 49, no. 3 (2009): 161–64.
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how the search process affects the likelihood ratio. Most scholarship suggests that producing the 
suspect through a database search lowers the prior probability and raises the likelihood ratio.226 It 
lowers the prior because there normally was 
no stronger reason to suspect the subject 
of the “hit” than there was to suspect other 
persons in the database.230 It raises the 
likelihood ratio primarily by eliminating 
(or least reducing the source probabilities 
for) all other individuals represented in 
the database.231 How to present the results 
of a database search most fairly remains 
debatable, but the concerns raised earlier 
about exemplars resulting from AFIS 
searches would be handled differently if 
the examiner were presenting both a prior 
probability and a likelihood ratio instead of 
collapsing these quantities into a subjective 
source attribution.
Knowledge of Examiner Performance
It can be difficult to create realistic 
scenarios in which examiners re-examine 
the same set of prints or in which they 
examine a set of prints for which the 
correct conclusion is known. As a result, 
controlled experiments that would 
illuminate the actual decisionmaking 
and source-attribution processes of latent 
print examiners during casework are 
unusual. The limited studies that have been 
done, however, suggest that variation in 
decisions occur, especially when contextual 
information is varied. Two noteworthy 
studies are discussed in Box 3.1. 
These experiments pose a real challenge. 
Experience is of enormous value and 
allows experts in a range of fields to 
operate at a high level. At the same time, experts can be prone to context effects. Although 
Box 3.1: Studies on the Effect of Biasing
Information
In two studies in 2006, researchers collected casework 
that had been analyzed by experienced latent print 
analysts during their normal routine work several years 
earlier.227 The laboratory presented this casework to 
the analysts again in the ordinary flow of casework. In 
the first study, five examiners received a latent print 
and exemplar that they had previously classified as 
a match along with new contextual information that 
very strongly suggested that the pair did not match.228 
Three of the five changed from their earlier conclusion 
of an identification to an exclusion. Another found the 
evidence inconclusive.229
In the second study, six analysts received eight pairs 
of prints from earlier casework that was a mix of 
exclusion and individualization decisions. This time, the 
biasing information was weaker, and a control group 
that received no biasing contextual information was 
present. Only two of the six examiners made consistent 
decisions across all eight pairs of prints; the others 
changed one or more of the earlier decisions. Of the 
forty-eight presentations, there were six changes from 
the earlier judgments. In the biasing condition, there 
were three changes from individualization to exclusion, 
and one from individualization to inconclusive. In the 
control group of examiners who were not given any 
biasing contextual information, there was one change 
from individualization to exclusion and one from 
exclusion to individualization. The authors interpreted 
these outcomes as establishing “that fingerprint experts 
were vulnerable to biasing information when they were 
presented within relatively routine day-to-day contexts, 
such as corroborative (or conflicting) evidence of 
confession to the crime.”
226 For a review of the DNA literature, see Kaye, D. “Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis 
of DNA Database Trawls.” North Carolina Law Review, 87, no. 2 (2009): 425–503.
227 Dror and Charlton, op. cit.; Dror, Charlton, and Peron, op. cit.
228 The experts were told that the prints were from the highly publicized misidentification of Brandon Mayfield in the 
Madrid train bombing case.
229 The study had no control group that unknowingly revisited earlier, challenging pairs of prints that they had 
determined to match.
230 Kaye, op. cit., pp. 463 – 464.
231 Ibid., pp. 461 – 462.
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additional study is clearly required, the evidence to date in the psychological literature, including 
the limited number of studies specific to latent print examination, supports Recommendation 3.3, 
which states that analysts should not be given contextual information that is not directly relevant 
to their analysis.
3.7.2 Recommendations and Best Practices
The discussion of the decision process, the way in which the weight of evidence is determined, 
and the possibility of errors all argue strongly that the common practice of claiming to uniquely 
identify an individual is not appropriate. As indicated above, a fingerprint identification was 
traditionally considered an “individualization,” meaning that the latent print was considered 
identified to one finger of a specific individual as opposed to every other potential source in 
the universe. However, the recent attention focused on this issue reveals that this definition 
needlessly claims too much, is not adequately established by fundamental research, and is 
impossible to validate solely on the basis of experience. Nor does fingerprint evidence have 
objective standards or a well-validated statistical model that can provide an objective measure 
of the strength of the fingerprint evidence in a given instance. Therefore, examiners should 
not claim to be able to exclude every other finger in the world as a potential source. Rather, 
an identification decision suggests a substantial enough similarity that the examiner believes 
that the two impressions originated from a common source. But whether any other finger in 
the world might also be able to leave an impression with a comparable amount of similarity is 
not fully known, and the examiner’s testimony should not suggest otherwise. Regardless of the 
specific words used to describe an identification, examiners should refrain from claiming that an 
identification means that they have excluded all other individuals in the world.
Recommendation 3.7: Because empirical evidence and statistical reasoning do not 
support a source attribution to the exclusion of all other individuals in the world, latent 
print examiners should not report or testify, directly or by implication, to a source 
attribution to the exclusion of all others in the world.
As explained in Chapter 1, the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study 
and Technology (SWGFAST) recently drafted language that eliminates this needlessly strong 
meaning of an identification (although SWGFAST also elected to continue to use the term 
“individualization” notwithstanding its long association with this idea). The proposed SWGFAST 
draft states, “Individualization of an impression to one source is the decision that the likelihood 
the impression was made by another (different) source is so remote that it is considered as a 
practical impossibility.”232
Eliminating the previous “to the exclusion of all others” language from the definition is a step 
in the right direction. However, the new text raises two concerns. First, it is unnecessary for an 
examiner to reach conclusions about what is a “practical impossibility.” Although fingerprints 
are clearly highly discriminating, until further research permits better validated statements about 
probabilities, neither experience nor statistical modeling justifies conclusions about what is or is 
not practically possible across a population of billions of individuals (and billions times billions 
232 Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Draft for Comment: Standards 
for Examining Friction Ridge Impressions and Resulting Conclusions (To Replace: Friction Ridge Examination 
Methodology for Latent Print Examiners, Version 1.01, and Standards for Conclusions, Version 1.0). Version 1.0. 
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, August 2010, p. 4.
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of possible pairs of prints). Second, given that the word “individualization” has been associated 
precisely with the “to the exclusion of all others” claim of universal individualization based 
on a premise of general uniqueness (see Chapter 1), it is potentially problematic and confusing 
to attempt to redefine it by fiat. Using alternative terminology might be a superior solution to 
attempting to “legislate” a new and slightly modified meaning to a much-criticized term and 
theory.
In July 2010, the membership of the International Association for Identification (IAI) adopted 
Resolution 2010-18, allowing members to give qualified opinions if supported with a statistical 
model “accepted as valid by the IAI.”233 However, the IAI also stated that it does not endorse 
any models as ready for casework or introduction into the courtroom. The resolution is another 
important step in the right direction, and the Working Group supports further movement in this 
direction.
Until statistical models are implemented, concerns remain about over-expressing the evidence 
(see Chapter 6). In addition, there are legitimate concerns about under-expressing, or not 
expressing at all, the wealth of evidence that can be found in the large grey zone between 
“identification” and “exclusion.” In the future, it seems likely that examiners will be required to 
provide more nuanced information than the current, narrow range of allowable conclusions. In 
time, it should be possible to provide quantitative measures in the form of likelihood ratios or 
posterior probabilities (see Chapters 4 and 6). Even if this does not happen, qualified conclusions 
consistent with existing knowledge should be permitted.
The difficult problem here is to find a balance between the two views of how to report fingerprint 
evidence, since both views have strengths and weaknesses. If absolute conclusions are not 
allowed, then one is left only with reported conclusions that allow for more than one possible 
donor of a latent print, as is the case with other types of forensic evidence canvassed in Chapter 
6. Conversely, there may be instances in which a single source attribution is warranted based 
upon the theory of local uniqueness outlined in Chapter 1. If qualified opinions are not allowed, 
then one may be keeping from fact-finders evidence that exists in the grey continuum between 
absolute source attribution and absolute exclusion. There is often evidence that is strongly 
associative to a source, based upon high likelihood ratios (either explicitly or implicitly 
derived), but that does not rise to the level at which an examiner feels comfortable providing a 
traditional “identification” conclusion. This evidence and the decision to withhold it are typically 
not communicated to the fact-finders. This all-or-nothing approach keeps potentially critical 
evidence from fact-finders based on the profession’s need to maintain categorical opinions of 
“identification” or “exclusion.” Alternatively, there may be instances (for example, when dealing 
with fully rolled fingerprints, identification of deceased individuals, and ten-print examinations) 
when categorical decisions such as “identification” or “exclusion” are completely warranted, 
justified by the overwhelming availability of discriminating features, and practical for the 
circumstances. Finding the balance between these issues is not easy, especially in the absence of 
data showing which approach is most appropriate for the circumstances and which approach will 
not confuse or mislead the fact-finders. 
233 International Association for Identification. IAI Resolution 2010-18. International Association for Identification,
July 16, 2010.
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The Working Group could not resolve the important questions surrounding whether, or when, 
latent print examiners should be permitted to testify to probabilities rather than absolute 
categories, nor did it endeavor to determine what form probabilistic testimony should take. These 
issues will continue to grow in both salience and importance in the coming years. Hence, the 
Working Group strongly recommends ongoing attention to this issue.
Recommendation 3.8: The friction ridge examiner community and other experts should
determine	under	what	circumstances	a	qualified	rather	than	an	absolute	conclusion	is
warranted.
3.7.3 Research Needs in Source Attribution
Research in the latent print domain in past decades has largely been centered on automated 
fingerprint identification systems and physical and chemical detection techniques. Very little 
research, until the last few years, has centered on human performance in pattern recognition and 
interpretation. Much more research is needed not only to validate ideas being put forward today 
but also to expand understanding further.
• Research and testing to develop greater knowledge about error rates for latent print 
examination must be undertaken. While a single error rate for the field is neither desirable 
nor achievable, it is critical to develop more knowledge about error rates, what affects 
them, and the extent to which they are correlated to the relative difficulty of comparisons 
(see Chapter 2). Indeed, it is possible that such work will help define levels of complexity.
• It will be important to understand what influences affect not only the ultimate decisions 
of examiners but also their decision-making thresholds. It is entirely possible that 
bias influences decision thresholds, but not decision outcomes, in easy latent print 
comparisons. At what point does this impact on thresholds change outcomes? 
• With expanded knowledge on thresholds must come research that investigates whether 
considering certain features makes examiners more vulnerable to inaccurate decisions. 
• More research is needed into the relationship between risk and cost to examiners when 
making decisions. For example, does the cultural default position of law enforcement 
and its relationship with forensic practitioners create an environment in which latent print 
examiners shun the inconclusiveness of evidence in favor of more definitive conclusions 
that are more conducive to current law enforcement expectations? Research will better 
inform whether there needs to be a change in the culture of forensic support services in 
relation to their policing partners.
• The confidence associated with decision making in latent print examination should be 
studied to see if confidence levels are consistent when making identifications as opposed 
to exclusions. It will also be important to determine under what circumstances a qualified 
conclusion would be warranted, whereby a lack of strong confidence in a particular 
decision based upon a latent print comparison might be better expressed as “consistent 
with.” In other words, when might it be appropriate to offer a conclusion that is less 
emphatic? 
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3.8 The Need for Research
The previous sections each ended with a list of research topics relevant to the particular 
interpretative stage. This section characterizes in broad terms the types of research that 
are required and incorporates a final recommendation about the importance of the federal 
government finding a mechanism to fund a research program.
The research topics identified throughout the chapter can be broadly categorized into three 
types: (1) developing metrics or measurements that characterize key elements of the interpretive 
process, (2) assessing the reliability of measures or determinations, and (3) determining the 
factors associated with different performance levels.
3.8.1 Developing Metrics
Across the interpretive stages, there is a need to carefully define elements being used by 
examiners in a manner that allows the processes to be studied quantitatively. Examples 
include developing a way to characterize selected features (perhaps by location and degree of 
confidence), developing a series of indicators of sufficiency, conducting additional work on the 
frequency of features in different populations, and perhaps ultimately developing a measure of 
the complexity of a particular comparison.
3.8.2 Assessing Reliability, Reproducibility, and Validity
A process for making measurements or decisions is reliable when the outcomes are repeatable 
and reproducible, both within and across examiners. It is important that feature selection, 
sufficiency determination, feature weighting, judgments regarding distortion, and ultimate 
decisions be reproducible. An examiner repeatedly presented with the same sets of prints should 
obtain the same interpretive conclusions (intra-examiner reliability), and different examiners also 
should be able to obtain the same results (inter-examiner reproducibility). For many, these two 
concepts are at the heart of the ongoing discussion about the desirability of research to reaffirm 
the consistency of latent print judgments. Some research has been conducted on this issue,234 but 
more is needed.
Accuracy is whether the determinations made by the analyst correctly express the true state of 
the world. This accuracy can be measured in various ways, as discussed in Chapter 2. A final 
term, validity, also refers to accuracy but extends further to encompass the issue of whether the 
measurements, judgments, and decisions being made are appropriate for their common uses. 
Thus, validity is a relative term. The polygraph is a valid means of detecting stress, but its 
validity as a device to detect conscious deception is much more doubtful. Whether ACE-V does 
what its practitioners claim it does and whether the resulting decisions are adequately supported 
by scientific knowledge are questions about validity. 
234 Langenburg, G. “A Performance Study of the ACE-V Process: A Pilot Study to Measure the Accuracy, Precision,
Reproducibility, Repeatability, and Biasability of Conclusions Resulting from the ACE-V Process.” Journal of
Forensic Identification, 59, no. 2 (2009): 219–57; Evett and Williams, op. cit.; Dror and Charlton, op. cit.
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3.8.3 Explaining Variations in Performance
The final element of a research program would attempt to explain observed variations in 
reliability or accuracy. A key question that underlies much of the discussion in this chapter 
is how the complexity of a comparison impacts the reliability of the determined conclusions. 
There are, however, as many types of analyses as one can imagine. Relating performance 
to the individual characteristics of the examiner, including physical characteristics, training 
completed, and aspects of the working environment, may help supervisors determine strategies 
for recruitment and training to optimize performance. This list is not comprehensive. It argues 
strongly, however, as do other chapters in this report, for an extensive research program.
Recommendation 3.9: The federal government should support a research program that
aims to:
a. Develop measures and metrics relevant to the analysis of latent prints;
b. Use such metrics to assess the reproducibility, reliability, and validity of various 
interpretive stages of latent print analysis; and
c. Identify key factors related to variations in performance of latent print 
examiners during the interpretation process.
3.9 Summary
For each interpretive stage of latent print examination, this chapter offers recommendations and 
best practices to help ensure the accuracy and transparency of the interpretive processes. The 
chapter describes and defines the multiple critical interpretive stages that are part of every latent 
print comparison. The Working Group based its analysis and recommendations on the current 
state of knowledge established by published research regarding the interpretive stages and on the 
implications of this research for potential concerns and pitfalls that may arise in the interpretive 
process.
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Chapter 4: Looking Ahead to Emerging and Improving Technology
Introduction and Scope
Latent print examiners use online databases, digital enhancement software, and other types of 
technology to assist with the Analysis, Comparison, Examination, and Verification (ACE-V) 
process. Combining these tools with the examiner’s own expertise can make investigations more 
reliable and easier to explain to juries. This chapter discusses how these and newer technologies 
can automate complicated and work-intensive parts of the process and thereby reduce human 
error. In particular, the chapter addresses the following technology-related questions:
• Fingerprint and palm print databases at the federal, state, and local levels can be searched 
through automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) databases, which saves 
examiners from manually searching through hundreds of exemplars looking for close 
matches. How can these systems (and the training provided to examiners in their use) be 
improved to provide greater confidence in the results and more value to examiners?
• Digital scanning devices known as livescan are frequently used to capture exemplar 
prints and to submit them to automated systems. This process allows high-quality digital 
images to be stored in central databases. How can this technology be improved?
• When comparing digital exemplars to digital latent prints, examiners can enhance the 
images to clarify minute details. What are the best practices for enhancement? The 
process of enhancement can be challenged in court, so examiners must understand and be 
able to explain the technology.
• When testifying, examiners should qualify their conclusions instead of stating an 
exclusion or identification in absolute terms. With modern computational power, 
researchers have implemented various probabilistic models to allow examiners to 
quantify the similarities between two prints and to assess the implications of these 
similarities. How can these models be used, and what are their long-term implications?
• How can automated systems assist in ascertaining the quality and quantity of the features 
in a latent print?
• How do examiners interact with new technological tools? How can technology-training 
programs be more effective for examiners at all career levels?
4.1	 Automated	Fingerprint	Identification	Systems
AFIS databases exist at federal, state, and local levels.235 The Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (IAFIS), managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), holds 
most of the fingerprint sets and other identification records collected in the country, both from 
criminal and civil sources. In addition, every state either has its own AFIS or shares an AFIS with 
other states. Many localities, especially large metropolitan areas, have their own systems as
77 Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis
236 Ibid.
237 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System.” Accessed November 
25, 2011. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis.
238 See Dror, I., K. Wertheim, P. Fraser-Mackenzie, et al. “The Impact of Human-Technology Cooperation and 
Distributed Cognition in Forensic Science: Biasing Effects of AFIS Contextual Information on Human Experts.” 
Journal of Forensic Sciences (forthcoming).
well. All of these automated systems have capabilities such as latent print searching, electronic 
image storage, and fingerprint image transmission, and some include palm prints as well.236 In 
criminal cases, IAFIS searches through millions of criminal entries and returns results in about 
10 minutes.237
4.1.1 Training
The companies that supply AFIS software and hardware provide general training on using the 
system, but they do not clearly define which latent prints are most suitable for database searches. 
With experience, latent print examiners may develop an understanding of what makes a latent 
print of “AFIS quality” for a particular system, but receiving formal instruction and training in 
making these determinations would be more efficient.
Likewise, AFIS vendors typically do not provide training on how to encode a latent print 
to maximize the match capabilities of the system. An AFIS search merely provides a list of 
exemplars with the highest similarity scores, as determined by a proprietary algorithm. Latent 
print examiners often use trial and error, entering the same latent print multiple ways to see the 
effect on the resulting candidate list. Vendors should expand their training programs to include 
instruction in the most effective methods for encoding.
In addition, more education on the meaning of the AFIS scores could be useful. Some examiners 
use rank or score as a filter, hoping to avoid wasting time on fruitless comparisons. Thus, many 
examiners will not look beyond rank 5 or 10 (sometimes by policy). Some examiners use a 
system-specific score as a cutoff. Others look at candidates based upon the differences between 
scores, believing that any score that is substantially greater than that for the next candidate is 
worth comparing, whereas a series of candidates with very similar scores are much less likely 
to be matches. Some examiners look at all the candidates, assigning some weight to a high 
AFIS score or rank. Still other examiners entirely disregard score and rank information. There 
is some evidence that knowing the rank of an AFIS candidate influences the judgments of some 
examiners, but it is not clear whether this knowledge benefits or hinders the ACE-V process.238
On the basis of the available research, we can make no recommendation on whether the 
examiner should be blinded to the scores or ranks of AFIS-generated exemplars when conducting 
comparisons and evaluations. Regardless of the advisability of knowing the scores or ranks of 
these exemplars, however, latent print examiners who frequently work with exemplars from 
AFIS searches should have a clear understanding of how the system works and the meaning and 
limitations of AFIS scores and ranks.
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4.1.2 AFIS Algorithms
AFIS algorithms could be expanded to match prints to account for the diagnostic value of 
the positions at which minutiae are located. Exploiting this information might improve AFIS 
searches, and research into the utility of using the additional information might assist in the 
development of probabilistic models (as discussed in section 4.3.1).
4.1.3 Interoperability
The 2009 report of the National Research Council239 recommends improving the interoperability 
of AFIS systems among states and the FBI. Searching multiple databases would help states 
identify criminals who have been fingerprinted in other states. Because the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology has established a separate working group on this topic, this Working 
Group did not pursue this issue.
4.1.4 Other Skin Surfaces
Automated search technology can be applied to impressions from all friction ridge skin areas, 
such as palmar (palm or digital joint) or plantar (toe or foot) friction ridges. These impressions 
sometimes are searched if the capability exists within the automated identification system of the 
investigating department. Nonetheless, exemplars from these areas are collected less frequently, 
and it may prove difficult to construct large databases for these impressions.
Recommendation 4.1: The federal government should support research programs to 
improve	automated	fingerprint	identification	systems.	Such	programs	could	address	the	
following issues:
a. Expanding the algorithms used to match prints to account for the fact that the 
diagnostic value of minutiae depends on the region in which they are located;
b. Making	fingerprint	and	palm	print	databases	interoperable	among	local,	state,	
and	federal	automated	identification	systems;	and
c. Increasing	compatibility	between	automated	identification	systems	and	other	
latent print software tools, including digital enhancement programs, probability 
calculation programs, and automated quality assessment programs.
4.2 Digital Images
4.2.1 Livescan Systems
Police departments (and other government agencies) traditionally recorded known exemplars by 
inking a person’s ten fingers and rolling them onto a paper ten-print card. Larger departments 
now use livescan technology to digitally capture finger and palm prints.240 This inkless method 
captures digital images of exemplar prints, which can be transmitted together with demographic 
data and mug shots to a central location. The system rejects the print if the quality falls below a
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certain threshold. When properly maintained and used by adequately trained personnel, livescan 
can improve both the quality and speed of the ten-print collection process.
However, livescan technology can be improved. For example, livescan can produce distorted 
images of the flow of friction ridge skin because of the process of recording a three-dimensional 
object on a two-dimensional surface. Some livescan (and almost all automated fingerprint 
identification) systems compress images. This practice causes critical details in the friction ridge 
impression to be lost, even when the images are decompressed. Most AFIS and livescan systems 
use images scanned at 500 pixels per inch. Although this standard satisfies the FBI’s Electronic 
Fingerprint Transmission Specification standard, such images, especially if highly compressed, 
may not capture all Level 3 Detail (L3D) that would be desirable for examiners performing 
comparisons. Because of these limitations, many examiners prefer inked prints over livescan 
images for final comparisons.
4.2.2 Digital Enhancements
The use of digital processing and enhancement is now routine in latent print analysis. If properly 
used to remove background distractions that are not part of the friction ridge detail, digital 
enhancement can improve both the examiner’s ability to analyze the image and the jury’s ability 
to understand the evidence. Yet filtering an image also could create artifacts that an examiner 
might mistake for minutiae. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide examples of applying filters to digital 
images.
Figure 4.1: Example of a color replacement filter to remove color from a playing card241
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Figure 4.2: Example of filters used to adjust color levels and to reverse the colors242
Because of the possibility of artifacts, judges should not unquestioningly accept an expert’s 
claim that an enhanced image is accurate. There is a growing judicial recognition that the 
party introducing enhanced images as trial exhibits must be able to defend the enhancements 
in each case.243 In State v. Swinton,244 the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the admission of 
a photograph of a digitally enhanced bite mark; however, the court rejected the prosecution’s 
argument that the court should accept the enhancement as easily as the original photograph. The 
court accepted the enhancement because the expert testified “in specific detail as to the process” 
of programming the enhancement software. Moreover, the court rejected overlays created with 
Adobe Photoshop because the witness could not explain the use of the program for that purpose. 
The California Supreme Court issued a similar opinion in People v. McWhorter.245 In that case, 
a defense expert prepared an enhanced image of a window. In upholding the exclusion of the 
testimony, the court noted that the expert “could not identify the computer program he used to 
enhance or ‘electronically emboss’ the image in question, nor could he satisfactorily explain the 
full nature of the process he used to create it.”246
Although Swinton and McWhorter may have insisted on more thorough foundations than are 
typical, the decisions highlight the importance of clearly understanding the process and benefits 
of digitally enhancing images. Under the usual rules for scientific evidence and for authenticating 
photographs, an expert must be able to demonstrate that the software can accurately enhance the 
original image and that it was used properly.
The Scientific Working Group on Imaging Technology (SWGIT) has proposed best practices 
for the acquisition, storage, and processing of images.247 Underlying the guidelines are several 
basic principles. In particular, forensic service providers should validate latent print enhancement 
technologies prior to use in casework. To maintain an appropriate audit trail, the providers
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should retain the unenhanced image and should track any digital enhancements made to 
subsequent copies. Examiners should make it clear in their documentation and testimony that 
an image has been enhanced. If the proffered image is enhanced, the proponent should make 
the earlier versions of the image available to the opposition before trial. If the examiner cropped 
the image, the deleted material should be available for inspection. The proponent should not 
be permitted to claim that the original, unaltered image is unavailable due to the enhancement 
software that was used.
In many cases, examiners employ enhancement techniques during their analyses but submit 
the unaltered images to the court as evidence.248 Forensic service providers should ensure 
every examiner has received training in the technology used to assist in analysis. Moreover, 
the provider should announce guidelines for the use of such technology. Forensic services 
providers should follow the best practices the proposed by SWGIT for the acquisition, storage, 
and processing of images. Developers should validate enhancement technologies used in latent 
print processing. The laboratory using the technology should validate the technology in its work 
environment and should retain the original, unenhanced image.
4.3 Probabilistic Models to Assess Latent Print Evidence
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, examiners often offer opinions as to the source of the latent 
print in absolute terms. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 6, a 1979 resolution of the International 
Association for Identification announced that it was professional misconduct for an examiner to 
use the term “probable” in a final opinion.249 Although Resolution 2010-18 declares that the prior 
resolution was “not consistent with advancements,”250 most courts still allow the examiner to 
opine in absolute terms and to attribute a particular fingerprint impression to a single individual’s 
finger to the exclusion of all other persons in the world. These courts do not demand that the 
examiner quantify the extent of any uncertainty (see Chapter 6).
However, Chapter 3 recommends against testimony in this form. There is always some non-zero 
probability that some skin other than the defendant’s produced the latent print. Even when this 
probability is so small that a source attribution is warranted, the opinion would be more precise 
and complete if the examiner could provide an estimate of this probability. Models to allow and 
support this qualified response are being developed and validated.
4.3.1 Probabilistic Models
The last 100 years have seen many efforts to characterize the significance of similarities between 
pairs of fingerprints. Some models have tried to demonstrate the discriminating power of latent
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print evidence, other models have aimed at proving the uniqueness of latent print impressions,
and still others have focused on quantifying the weight of the latent print evidence in the case.251
Probability models date back to Galton’s 1892 model.252 Modern efforts to determine the
probability of correct latent print identification are based upon determining the locations of
minutiae,253 of minutiae and ridges,254 and even of pores255 (see Figure 4.3). These models
incorporate measures of tolerance in accounting for skin distortion and the degradation of crime
scene impressions. To date, research into probability models has been limited to the distal
segments of the fingers; the remainder of the friction ridge skin has not been considered. By 
estimating the probability of random correspondence for any given set of latent print features
rather than the probability of all of the features of a complete exemplar, the calculations reflect
the quantity of information present in the latent fingerprint.
Figure 4.3: An example of some minutiae locations in a fingerprint256
Although the modern models represent a major improvement over the early efforts, most models
assume independence among minutiae.257 That is, they assume that the occurrence of one minutia 
has no relationship to the occurrence of any other set of minutiae. However, minutiae might not 
be independent. Some data (see Chapter 3) indicate that the frequency of certain
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minutiae varies depending on the location of the minutiae within the larger pattern. One study 
reports that in 100,000 randomly chosen fingerprints of exemplar quality, there is only a 10−14 
probability that some pair of them will match in regard to both minutiae and ridge shape.258 
Without the assumption of independence, however, the computed probability could be orders of 
magnitude higher.259
Likelihood Ratio Models
Some scientists have developed models that provide likelihood ratios in biometric verification260 
and in forensic friction ridge analysis.261 The likelihood ratio combines information on the 
similarity and rarity of features in a pair of prints. In one approach, the initial step is to 
quantitatively compare an appropriate set of features characterizing Level 1 Detail (L1D) such 
as ridge flow, Level 2 Detail (L2D) such as minutiae, and minute Level 3 Detail (L3D) details 
such as pores between the two fingerprint images. This process of marking features can be 
entirely manual or partly or fully automated. If a single number is used as an overall measure 
of similarity and rarity, its probability distributions in two populations can be considered. One 
probability distribution comes from a large number of images derived from the same finger; 
the other comes from a sample of images derived from the fingers of different individuals. The 
likelihood ratio indicates how many times more probable it is to find characteristics with the 
overall similarity score when the known exemplar and the latent come from the same finger 
than when they come from different fingers. (For further explanation of likelihood ratios, see 
Chapters 1, 3, and 6.)
Studies of likelihood ratio models have produced at least three important findings.262 First, when 
fingerprint impressions come from the same source, they display a large number of matching 
features, and the likelihood ratio is large. Second, same-source impressions infrequently yield 
likelihood ratios less than one when the two impressions have the same origin. Conversely, 
likelihood ratios greater than one seldom appear when the two prints have different origins. Thus, 
research with data sets in which ground truth is known demonstrates that the models usually 
point to the correct conclusion. In addition, these data sets can be used to estimate error rates for 
making all decisions based strictly upon a particular threshold for the likelihood ratio. Finding 
much larger likelihood ratios for impressions from the same source than for impressions from 
different sources supports the claim that fingerprints contain highly discriminating
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information. Finally, different configurations of the same number of minutiae produce different 
likelihood ratios, depending on the spatial relationship between the minutiae. In many instances, 
configurations with few minutiae have larger likelihood ratios than configurations with more 
minutiae. It follows that a simple count of matching minutiae is an imprecise measure of the 
similarity of two prints.
Future Probabilistic Models
Additional work should be done to further demonstrate the reliability and validity of latent 
print probabilistic models. This work will necessitate studies with large-scale, representative 
databases. Furthermore, once a model is validated, careful thought must be given to the best 
method of communicating its output to the actors in the criminal justice system (see Chapter 6).
To facilitate the development of probabilistic models, a research database could be created by 
removing personal identifiers from digital images in AFIS databases. Anonymous versions of 
criminal DNA databases have been used for statistical research,263 and there is no insuperable 
legal obstacle to doing the same with fingerprint records in the possession of the government.264 
The only social or psychological risk to individuals whose prints are in the existing databases is 
that the de-identified images from a criminal file somehow would permit a researcher to discover 
who has been arrested for or convicted of unspecified crimes. However, the researchers have 
no means to link an image with a name, and even if they could do so, that an individual has a 
criminal conviction normally is not private information. Therefore, AFIS database administrators 
should take the simple step of de-identifying a large set of digital images for research purposes. 
This will permit the validation of probabilistic models and will facilitate studies into the 
frequencies of various fingerprint features (discussed in Chapter 3).
Recommendation 4.2: To facilitate the validation of probabilistic models and other 
statistical research, the federal government should create large, anonymous databases 
of exemplars and latent prints.
More generally, with suitable support for modern research, some of the probability models that 
researchers are currently developing could be added to the examiner’s toolkit in the near future. 
To prepare for such models, the latent print examiner community should formulate workflow 
guidelines to transition the models from the research setting to the forensic laboratory and should 
begin training examiners in elementary probability and statistics to enable them to interpret the 
output of the models. Recommendations 3.5 and 3.9 in Chapter 3, concerning federal support of 
research and educating examiners about statistical methods, are pertinent here.
4.3.2 Admissibility
Once validation studies are published, opinions based upon a probability model could be 
proffered in court. If opposing counsel objects and challenges the validity of the models, the 
courts would need to determine the admissibility of the evidence. As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
leading standards in the United States for making this determination are the scientific validity
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standard of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.265 and the general acceptance standard 
of Frye v. United States.266 Under these standards, the proponent of the output of a statistical 
model or an examiner’s opinion based on this model would have to show that the model is valid 
or generally accepted in the scientific community. It is premature to predict which probabilistic 
models will be validated and proven useful in court; the optimal model may prove to be one 
that has yet to be proposed. It is possible that multiple opinions based upon different probability 
models as well as the output of the model itself would be admissible.
4.3.3 Implications of the Validation of a Probabilistic Model
A useable probabilistic model could significantly affect the methods of latent print examination. 
First, the model might require new metrics in latent print images, that is, the documentation 
and measurement of new features. Some of the current models rely on measurements that many 
examiners do not take, such as the distance between friction ridge features. If measurements and 
the computation can be automated, then the use of the model could reduce the risk of human 
error in making and using such measurements.
Additionally, judicial acceptance of testimony based upon a probabilistic model could change 
the presentation of examiners’ opinions in court. Chapters 3 and 6 urge that examiners clearly 
communicate the qualified nature of an opinion to the court. Reliance on statistical models would 
enable the examiner to acknowledge the uncertainty of the conclusion or to dispense with a 
binary opinion.
Lastly, judicial acceptance of probabilistic models would not force examiners to become 
statisticians, but it would require them to be familiar with certain statistical concepts to testify to 
probabilities or to an opinion based upon a probabilistic model. Specifically, examiners would 
need to understand uncertainty, variability, conditional probabilities, probability distributions, 
and likelihood ratios. They should also be able to explain these concepts to judges and juries. 
Statisticians and the latent print examiner community can collaborate to design a training 
program for examiners.
Recommendation 4.3: The latent print examiner community should expand the training 
of examiners in elementary probability theory to enable examiners to properly utilize 
the output of probabilistic models.
4.4 New Technologies for Latent Print Examination
4.4.1 Automated Quality Assessment
Early in the examination process, the examiner must decide whether the latent print is suitable 
for further analysis—this is the Analysis phase in the ACE-V process. In the experience of the 
Working Group, this initial quality assessment of the latent print is often the weak link in the 
analytical process, as examiners could make two types of errors. In the first type of error, the 
examiner prematurely discards a print that should be deemed suitable for further analysis and
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comparison, possibly resulting in a missed identification or exclusion. In the second type of 
error, the examiner continues to evaluate a latent print that he ought to have deemed unsuitable 
for further processing. This outcome results in wasted time and might even contribute to an 
erroneous identification.
Currently available automated systems can assist in various steps within the Analysis phase. 
Automated systems can measure the distance between certain features in two images. They can 
also generate probabilities for such distances under the assumptions that the image of the latent 
print comes from a finger known to have produced an exemplar and that the latent comes from a 
finger of a randomly selected individual represented in a reference set of exemplars from many 
individuals. Such conditional probabilities might be used in their own right or to corroborate 
or contradict the judgment of a human examiner. Thus, an automated technique employing 
a validated algorithm for judging the quality of an image and its suitability for forensic 
identification would be extremely useful.
There have been attempts to develop automated quality assessment technology.267 Although 
the efforts have so far met with limited success,268 automation seems possible. Given a suitable 
way to calibrate the extent and clarity of the features in the latent and exemplar prints, an 
objective quality measure could be calculated. This is not to say that the task will be easy. The 
challenges to creating an automated quality assessment procedure are threefold: (1) identifying 
the most critical elements to assess the quality of an image, (2) choosing a metric to assess 
each element selected, and (3) combining these assessments to determine when the quality is 
sufficient to warrant further effort. Just as prints vary in clarity and completeness, examiners 
vary in experience and skill. An impression deemed unsuitable by an examiner of lesser skill 
might be considered useful by a more seasoned examiner. In addition, if an algorithm indicates 
that a latent print is suitable, an examiner might feel pressured to go beyond the normal comfort 
level to reach a definite conclusion.269 This pressure may be compounded by the widespread 
assumption that if a print is judged to be of value, a comparison with an exemplar print should 
always permit the examiner to either identify or exclude. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that 
algorithms can be developed to mimic this type of human interpretation, especially the evaluation 
of L3D, or that examiners can develop an effective strategy for employing such technology.
Ultimately, the research may yield the conclusion that automation cannot improve the initial 
quality assessment. Any investigation into the possibility of automating this stage ought to be 
conducted with these risks and challenges in mind. Nevertheless, because the Analysis phase is 
so important to the overall examination, a concerted effort to automate the quality assessment 
step, at least partially, is worthwhile.
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Recommendation 4.4: The federal government should continue funding research into 
automation of the initial quality assessment step in latent print analysis.
4.4.2 Latent Print Examiner Attitudes toward New Technology
Some veteran examiners began their careers well before the advent of modern technologies such 
as AFIS, livescan, and digital enhancement. Younger examiners have likely worked with these 
technologies throughout their professional lives. Understandably, examiners vary in their comfort 
level in using the most sophisticated technologies. Some examiners prefer to use a magnifying 
glass or loupe to study hard copies of the images. Others routinely compare on-screen images.
Manufacturers should take two steps to make examiners comfortable with new technologies. 
First, manufacturers should ensure that new products are as usable as reasonably possible (see 
Chapter 7). Second, manufacturers should expand their training programs. Traditionally, training 
programs have focused primarily on the technical aspects of the instrumentation. Training 
programs also should confront the fact that some examiners may subconsciously resist new 
technologies that supplant the methods that they have been using for decades. In addition to 
teaching examiners the specific mechanics of using the new technology, the program ought to 
attempt to enhance the trainee’s general technology skills. Chapter 8 provides more information 
on training improvements.
Forensic laboratory staff members should collaborate with manufacturers on the development 
of training programs and usable tools. As the consumers of the tools and training programs, the 
laboratory staff members have unique perspectives that can make a significant contribution to 
both development projects. Chapter 7 addresses this topic of holistic and user-centered design in 
more detail.
4.5  Summary
Technology can help latent print examiners fully analyze evidence and reach reasonable 
conclusions that they can defend in court. Some of these technologies, such as AFIS, livescan, 
and digital enhancement software, already exist; however, there is room to improve these 
products, and further research should be conducted to enhance these technologies.
In addition, research into probability models that allow examiners to qualify their conclusions 
should continue. Quantitative measures of fingerprint similarity can and have been developed. 
The likelihood ratio for a measurement indicates how many times more probable it is for a pair 
of prints from the same source to possess the measured degree of similarity than it is for a pair 
from different sources to be that similar. By expressing the strength of the evidence in this way 
and noting uncertainties in the values of the likelihood ratios, experts leave it to the judge or 
jury to use the degree of similarity, along with the other evidence in the case, to decide whether 
a pair of prints has a common source (see Chapter 6). Research into models that generate 
valid probabilities should continue, and examiners should receive training to explain relevant 
probabilities and statistics in court. Finally, research should be conducted into software to assist 
examiners with quantity and quality assessments for latent prints.
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Examiners and other forensic laboratory staff members should work with technology 
manufacturers to ensure that the products are designed for ease of use and that training programs 
are sufficient. Training programs should consider those examiners who may be reluctant to rely 
on new technology processes that augment their traditional methods of moving through the 
Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation phases. Research into new and valuable technologies 
and the further validation of existing technologies and methods will have a positive, long-term 
impact on the latent print community.
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Chapter 5: Reports and Documentation
Introduction and Scope
This chapter concerns written records of the results of friction ridge skin impression 
examinations in criminal investigations. The process of documenting an examination can help 
address human factors issues that could lead to inferential errors. Best practices for documenting 
the examination and producing a summary report for investigators and the judicial system 
increase the likelihood that the conclusions of the examiner are accurate and supported and will 
be used appropriately.
The two recommendations presented here are intended to increase the level of comprehensibility, 
transparency, and completeness of written (or electronic) records without imposing impractical 
and undue demands on the often over-burdened agencies and examiners. In developing these 
recommendations, the Working Group was guided by, but not confined to, existing standards and 
guidelines of professional organizations and accrediting bodies.
Throughout the chapter, the generic term “record” denotes both the written report and the 
underlying documentation, such as bench notes and copies of images. This chapter does not 
attempt to specify precisely how to allocate the information between the report and the residual 
documentation, but it does list the minimum information that should appear in the summary 
report. It also urges that reports use clearly defined terms so as to be most useful to criminal 
investigators, lawyers, judges, and juries. To provide the rationale for the recommendations, the 
chapter begins with a description of the value and purposes of contemporaneous documentation 
of examinations and the preparation of written reports.
5.1 Reporting and Documentation for Quality Assurance and Control
A written report of an examination of friction ridge skin impressions presents the examiner’s 
findings, indicates how the examiner arrived at these findings, and refers to more detailed 
documentation of the process. These records serve both scientific and legal functions. From 
the scientific standpoint, proceeding according to a well-defined, uniform protocol and 
contemporaneously recording the results can improve interpretation (see Chapter 3). In addition, 
“thorough documentation of this process allows for the transparency required for competent 
reviewers to determine that the data and case information have been appropriately considered.”270 
“By ensuring that the examiner has followed the prescribed procedure, and by permitting 
external review, reports are a quality [assurance and] control mechanism.”271 
These considerations lead to the overarching principle that a report and supporting notes or 
materials should document the examination process in sufficient detail so that a reviewing expert 
could verify the validity of the examiner’s assessment of the evidence. This principle is
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incorporated in Recommendation 3.1 (Chapter 3) and endorsed by scientific working groups
from a variety of forensic disciplines, including friction ridge analysis,272 firearms and toolmarks 
analysis,273 and drug analysis.274 It leads to more specific recommendations that further define the 
minimum level of detail required for quality assurance and control purposes. Before presenting 
these more detailed recommendations, it is helpful to consider the role that reporting and 
documentation play in the legal system.
5.2 Legal Purposes of Written Records
5.2.1 Pretrial Uses of Reports
Expert reports convey useful information to the prosecution and defense before trial. “Because
the reports are discoverable, they assist attorneys in preparing for trial and thus render effective
representation.”275 Accordingly, one federal magistrate judge recently urged that
to ensure that defense counsel can make any challenges to the admissibility of
toolmark identification evidence and that courts may conduct hearings to resolve
these challenges based on sufficient record, the Government should be required to
strictly and timely comply with its [pretrial discovery] obligations regarding the
opinions to be offered by firearms examiners in sufficient detail and sufficiently
far in advance of motions deadlines or trials as to enable defense counsel to
evaluate the conclusions and bases, determine whether to engage experts to test
them, and if appropriate, challenge them.276
Moreover, due process principles require the prosecution to disclose information that is
“favorable to the accused”277 and “material either to guilt or to punishment,”278 as well as
“evidence that the defense might have used to impeach the government’s witnesses by showing
bias or interest.”279 The prosecution is responsible for disclosing all such information, even if it
is in the hands of the law enforcement agency.280 Making a good faith effort to ensure reports
contain all known exculpatory and impeachment material helps the government comply with its
disclosure obligations and avoid accusations of hiding relevant evidence. As in other fields,281
such accusations are not unheard of in regard to latent print examinations.282
272 Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Standard for the Documentation of
Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V) (Latent). Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on
Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, February 2010.
273 Scientific Working Group for Firearms and Toolmarks. Guidelines for the Standardization of Comparison
Documentation. Scientific Working Group for Firearms and Toolmarks, October 2010.
274 Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs. Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized
Drugs (SWGDRUG) Recommendations. Revision 5.1. Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs,
January 2011.
275 American Bar Association, op. cit., p. 73 (note omitted).
276 United States v. Willock, 696 F.Supp.2d 536, 570 (D.Md. 2010).
277 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
280 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
281 Tiscareno v. Anderson, 639 F.3d 1016 (10th Cir. 2011), vacated in part, 421 Fed. Appx. 842 (10th Cir. 2011);
Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
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Finally, although the forensic expert cannot control the actions of police or prosecutors, the
expert may have an ethical obligation to avoid such practices as “preparation of reports
containing minimal information in order not to give the ‘other side’ ammunition for
cross-examination,” “reporting of findings without an interpretation on the assumption that if an
interpretation is required it can be provided from the witness box,” and “omitting some
significant point from a report to trap an unsuspecting cross-examiner.”283
5.2.2 Trial Uses of Reports
In addition to their pretrial uses, reports can assist experts who testify. Although there can be
obstacles (discussed below) to introducing the report itself into evidence, documentation of the
chain of custody of the evidence is crucial, and the written materials can be consulted to refresh a
witness’s recollection. In addition, when a report is admitted as an exhibit, it becomes part of the
trial record, which allows the jury to rely on the statements in it and to consult it during jury
deliberations. Admission thus can streamline the presentation and can reduce the time needed to
present the results during trial. Indeed, laboratory reports sometimes are admitted by stipulation
in lieu of live testimony.
When a prosecutor offers a report into evidence, however, a defendant can object that it is
hearsay. Although a laboratory report offered into evidence to prove the facts recorded in it is
technically hearsay, in many jurisdictions laboratory reports are admissible under an exception to
the hearsay rule.284 In addition, even if the hearsay objection prevails and the report is not
evidence in its own right, the expert who prepared the report or another expert may be permitted
to rely on it as part of the basis for the testifying expert’s own opinion.285
If the prosecutor does not present the author of the report for cross-examination at trial, a
defendant also can object that the absence of the witness violates the constitutional right to
confront one’s accusers. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents the
prosecution from introducing “testimonial” statements accusing the defendant without producing
282 See, e.g., Edwards, H. “Solving the Problems that Plague the Forensic Science Community.” Jurimetrics Journal
of Law, Science, and Technology, 50 (2009): 9; Henson, S. “Brady Violations by DPS Fingerprint Examiners? Is
Fingerprint Examination even Science?” Grits for Breakfast. Blog post, October 9, 2010. Accessed November 25,
2011. http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2010/10/brady-violations-by-dps-fingerprint.html.
283 Lucas, D. “The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the Limits.” Journal of Forensic
Sciences, 34 (1989): 724. Examples of such expert advocacy by forensic serologists can be found in Garrett, B.
Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong. Harvard University Press, 2011.
284 The hearsay issue is somewhat intricate. Congress expressly excluded police reports prepared for criminal
prosecutions from the public records exception to the hearsay rule in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(B). One line
of cases reasons that this provision implies that crime laboratory reports also are outside the scope of the related
Rule 803(6) business records exception to the hearsay rule. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977). Other
federal circuits are more willing to apply the business-records exception. E.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d
1353, 1359 (8th Cir. 1988). State court opinions also are conflicting. Compare Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d
1261 (Pa. 2007) (admissible hearsay), with People v. McDaniel, 670 N.W.2d 659 (Mich. 2003) (inadmissible
hearsay). Some states have enacted specific rules to overcome the hearsay objection to crime laboratory reports.
E.g., Massachusetts General Laws, ch. 111, §13; People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 472 (Ill. 2000) (referring
to Illinois statute).
285 E.g., Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 709 (Ind. 2009); Kaye, D., D. Bernstein, and J. Mnookin. The New
Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence. 2nd ed. Aspen Publishers, 2011. § 4.6.
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the author of the statements for cross-examination. In Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts,286 the
Supreme Court applied this doctrine to sworn statements from laboratory analysts at the state
Department of Public Health. Their “certificates of analysis”287 contained “only the bare bones
statement that ‘the substance was found to contain: Cocaine.’ At the time of trial, petitioner did
not know what tests the analysts performed, whether those tests were routine, and whether
interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment or the use of skills that the analysts
may not have possessed.”288 The Court determined that because the “analysts’ statements [were]
prepared specifically for use at petitioner’s trial, [they] were testimony against [the] petitioner,
and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.”289 Thus, whether or
not the certificates were inadmissible as hearsay, the state should not have relied on them without
giving the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the analysts themselves.
Because reports of friction ridge examinations conducted at the request of criminal investigators
are also testimonial, these reports cannot serve as a complete substitute for the courtroom
testimony of the examiners if the defendant objects to their introduction. Nevertheless, written
records can facilitate the presentation of the prosecution’s case and make the trial more efficient.
Melendez Diaz noted that “it is not the case that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in
establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device
must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.”290 Portions of a laboratory report or
documentation detailing these matters might be considered non-testimonial. Moreover, the
defendant’s right to confrontation does not prevent the prosecution from presenting a laboratory
report with the testimony of the analyst or examiner. Indeed, if the analyst is unavailable to
testify, the report still may be admissible if the “defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.”291 In addition, there may be cases in which an expert witness who did not
perform the original examination can testify to or rely on the contents of a report from the expert
who did.292 Finally, like the hearsay rule, “the right to confrontation may, of course, be waived,
including by failure to object to the offending evidence … .”293 In fact, jurisdictions are free to 
adopt statutes or rules that enable a prosecutor to secure such a waiver by giving pretrial notice 
of the intent to use the report as long as “the defendant is given a period of time in which he may
286 Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
287 Ibid., p. 2531.
288 Ibid., p. 2537.
289 Ibid., p. 2540.
290 Ibid., p. 2532, note 1.
291 Ibid., p. 2531.
292 Compare People v. Williams, 939 N.E. 2d 268, 270 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Williams v. Illinois, 80
U.S.L.W. 3003 (U.S. June 28, 2011) (allowing surrogate testimony from a DNA analyst at a state laboratory who
compared a crime-scene DNA profile generated by a private laboratory to the profile from defendant’s blood sample
and determined that they matched), with Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011) (“Surrogate testimony”
about a defendant’s blood alcohol level was inadmissible when the forensic analyst who conducted the gas
chromatography, wrote a report, and signed a certificate of analysis did not testify but was not shown to be
unavailable to testify and the witness who testified in his place worked at the same laboratory and was familiar with
its procedures but had not participated in the testing or supervised the original analyst.)
 Of course, the Confrontation Clause does not bar testimony from a fingerprint examiner who re-examines a
set of images to form an independent expert opinion. The significant questions pertain only to presenting or relying
on “testimonial statements” about the images made by other examiners who are not themselves made available for
cross-examination. See Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit., § 4.10.
293 Melendez Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535 n. 3.
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object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at trial.”294 However,
a more complete report could reduce the chance that the defense will demand the presence of the
examiner and could enhance the chance that a laboratory supervisor or other analyst can testify at
a trial if the examining analyst is unavailable.
In sum, the value of comprehensive written records in trial and pretrial proceedings reinforces
Recommendation 3.1, calling for contemporaneous documentation that makes “the interpretive
process as transparent as possible” and “sufficient to permit another examiner to assess the
accuracy and validity of the initial examiner’s assessment of the evidence.” In addition, the fact
that the readers of an examiner’s report in a case scheduled for trial are likely to be lawyers,
judges, or jurors prompts a related recommendation directed specifically at the examiner’s
summary report:
Recommendation	5.1:	The	report	of	the	examination	should	ensure	that	the	findings
and their limitations are intelligible to non-experts.
This recommendation finds support in the views of legal and scientific organizations, such as the
American Bar Association295 and the National Research Council,296 as well as forensic science
working groups and organizations, such as the European Network of Forensic Science
Institutes297 and the Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs.298 The
European Network, for example, explains that
the reports of forensic investigations will be read by a wide variety of individuals,
many of whom will have little knowledge of science. They may have to be read
aloud in courts of law to inform judges and advocates and, in some jurisdictions,
members of a jury. Reports must, therefore, be written as clearly and
unambiguously as possible. Great care must be taken to ensure that all details
relating to the examinations undertaken, and the scientific rationale on which the
examinations are based, are described in language that can be understood by
nonscientists.299
294 Ibid., p. 2541. If the defendant does object, it appears that the state cannot place the burden of calling the witness
on the defendant. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S.Ct. 1316 (2010).
295 American Bar Association, op. cit., Standard 16-3.3(c).
296 National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community. Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward. National Academies
Press, 2009, p. 186; National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council Committee on Scientific Assessment
of Bullet Lead Elemental Composition Comparison. Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence. National
Academies Press, 2004, p. 110.
297 European Network of Forensic Science Institutes Standing Committee for Quality and Competence. Performance 
Based Standards for Forensic Science Practitioners. European Network of Forensic Science Institutes Standing 
Committee for Quality and Competence, July 2004.
298 Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs. Supplemental Document SD-1 for Part I, A Code of
Professional Practice for Drug Analysts. Recommendation 2.3.1. Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of
Seized Drugs, October 2004.
299 European Network, op. cit., Activity I.
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5.3 Minimal Contents of a Report
There is no hard and fast line between the information that should be recorded in reports versus
contemporaneous, supporting documentation. One laboratory could include considerable detail
in a report prepared for police or litigants, while another might store much of the same
documentation elsewhere and write a shorter report that simply refers to the underlying
documentation. Therefore, the Working Group does not propose a one-size-fits-all division of the
necessary information. Instead, the outline below contains the minimum content of a report and
indicates what additional information should be recorded, either in the report or in related
documentation. This chapter’s appendices offer sample reports of varying length and detail.
Broadly speaking, a report should describe the items submitted to the latent print examiner, how
the examiner processed these items, and how the examiner reached any conclusions. Although it
has been said that “case documentation is not complete if the record-keeping process does not
begin at the crime scene,”300 and a full report certainly could describe the entire chain of
evidence, the focus here is on the processing, examination, and conclusions about the material
after it is delivered to a latent print examiner. The essential contents of a report on these phases
of evidence assessment are listed at the conclusion of this section in Recommendation 5.2, and
the appendices to this chapter present sample reports. The recommendation covers such matters
as reporting on each step of the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V)
process; noting non-essential, domain-irrelevant information known to the examiner (if any);
noting the existence of documentation outside the report itself; and presenting results and
defining terms.
5.3.1 Images of Friction Ridge Impressions
Friction ridge impressions on surfaces may be examined on that surface, developed from that
surface, or placed into another format (such as a photograph or scan) for analysis and
comparison. When a development process was used, or when the image was copied into another
format, the report should define the process that was used and indicate that an image of the
developed friction ridge impression was retained.
5.3.2 List of Comparisons
Latent prints can be compared to other latent prints to see if the same individual was present at
both locations. They can be compared to a ten-print card or other exemplar from a known
individual. In addition, exemplars from an individual whose identity is in question can be
compared to exemplars from known individuals. The report should list which images were
compared to one another.
Traditionally, latent prints have been compared with ten-print cards for pre-existing suspects in a
case. The creation of large databases of computer-searchable images permits comparisons to
individuals culled with automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) software (Chapter 4).
300 Peterson, P., C. Dreyfus, M. Gische, et al. “Latent Prints: A Perspective on the State of the Science.” Forensic 
Science Communications, 11, no. 4 (October 2009).
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If an AFIS search has been conducted, the report should specify the results. A record of the AFIS
candidate list should be retrievable.
5.3.3 Method and Conclusions
Just as a report should indicate how latent prints were made visible, it also should state the
procedure used to make comparisons between friction skin impressions and to draw conclusions
from these comparisons.301 The conventional procedure for associating latent and known prints
involves the ACE-V process described in Chapter 1. Traditionally, the outcome of ACE-V has
been expressed in terms of three possible categories: individualization, exclusion, or
inconclusive.302 Nonetheless, scientific research or reasoning does not limit reported results to
these three categories.303 A more finely graded set of categories is possible (see, for example,
Chapter 9), and the computer-based methods described in the preceding chapter are another way
to measure the features of prints and the degree of similarity between pairs of prints. As
automated systems advance and are further validated with large data sets, they will be useful in
conjunction with (or conceivably, at some time in the future, instead of) ACE-V. But, whatever
procedures are employed to draw inferences from the evidence—ACE-V or otherwise—the
report should designate them and should frame the conclusions in a manner that is accurate and
scientifically appropriate.
5.3.4 Limitations
For the sake of lay readers, a report may contain some general warnings that indicate its limits.
For example, if no comparisons were made, the report might note that the absence of any usable
latent prints, or even any smudges, does not mean that the surface was never touched. If the
examiner associates the latent print with a known finger, the report might observe that, standing
alone, this association does not indicate how, why, or when the latent print was deposited.
Statements like these are included in reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). They
are not necessary to present the results of an examination or to document how it was conducted,
but they may be helpful for some readers.
In addition, if there are significant reasons to question any conclusions, these should be noted.304
As the Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs concluded, forensic analysts
have the professional responsibility to present both written and oral “advice … in a clear and
objective manner”305 —a duty that entails “considering and providing alternative explanations or
301 Compare American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors. Guidelines for Forensic Laboratory Management 
Practices. American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, 1987.
302 Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Standards for Conclusions.
Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, September 2003.
303 Budowle, B., J. Buscaglia, and R. Perlman. “Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge Comparisons as a
Means of Identification: Committee Findings and Recommendations.” Forensic Science Communications, 8
(January 2006); Haber, L. and R. Haber. Challenges to Fingerprints: A Guidebook for Prosecution and Defense and
Examiners. Lawyers and Judges Publishing Co., 2009.
304 European Network, op. cit., Standard I1(c); NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community, op. cit., pp. 21-22; SWGDRUG, 2004, op. cit., Recommendation 2.3.1. But see Scientific
Working Group on Materials Analysis. Forensic Human Hair Examination Guidelines. Scientific Working Group
on Materials Analysis, April 2005.
305 SWGDRUG, 2011, op.cit., Recommendation 2.3(a).
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interpretations for their findings, where appropriate; making clear the strengths and any
limitations in their advice or evidence; [and] declaring anything that might undermine the
integrity of their evidence or its use … .”306
5.3.5 Verification	and	Consultation
If the examiner followed the ACE-V process, the report should disclose or refer the reader to the
record of who verified the results, when verification occurred, and what information the
verifying examiner had about the previous comparisons. If the Verification phase involved a
difference of opinion, then the existence of the disagreement should be noted in the report and
the basis for the final consensus should be stated in the report or other documentation.307
In some cases, an examiner seeks guidance from another expert (examiner or supervisor) before
reaching a conclusion. Consultation is a way of sharing expertise and does not mean that there is
a conflict. A poor quality unknown print, a poor quality known print, an irregular substrate,
excessive deposition or lateral pressure, limited Level 2 Detail (see Chapters 3), and other factors
could lead an examiner to consult with others. A conflict occurs when an examiner does not
agree with another examiner during the verification, technical review, or administrative review.
Such a disagreement is resolved in discussions among examiners who initially reached different
conclusions or with the involvement of supervisory personnel up to the level of the laboratory
director, if necessary. The recommendation for disclosure applies to conflicts rather than
consultations.
5.3.6 Context
Chapters 1 and 3 discuss the potentially biasing effects of contextual information. As those
chapters explained, observers’ expectations have been shown to influence judgment in a broad
range of tasks. Because “the possibility of biases influencing the decision making process of
examiners” cannot be dismissed,308 a report should reveal the context of the examination by
describing or referring the reader to the information about the case that an examiner received.
For example, the possibility of an expectancy effect in comparing and evaluating a pair of prints
argues in favor of revealing whether an examiner was informed that the exemplars were for
elimination purposes, that they came from suspects in the case, or that they were the result of an
AFIS search.309
Chapter 3 observes that in some laboratories, examiners are exposed to a great deal of
information that is clearly not related to or necessary for their analysis and calls upon
laboratories to minimize the amount of extraneous, domain-irrelevant information that is
306 SWGDRUG, 2004, op. cit., Recommendation 2.3.1.
307 Compare SWGFAST, 2010, op. cit., Standard 5.
308 SWGFAST, 2009, op. cit.
309 Dror, I. and J. Mnookin. “The Use of Technology in Human Expert Domains: Challenges and Risks Arising
From the Use of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems in Forensic Science.” Law, Probability & Risk, 9
(2010): 47 – 67. An additional reason to document the fact of an AFIS search arises when candidates from this
search are excluded. These exclusions increase the probative value of a match to a suspect. Aitken, C. and F. Taroni.
Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic Scientists. 2nd ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2004; Kaye, D.
“Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis of DNA Database Trawls.” North Carolina Law
Review, 87, no. 2 (2009): 425 – 503. For a modest number of exclusions, however, the effect is small.
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provided to examiners. The recommendation here complements this suggestion by asking for
disclosure of the information actually provided to examiners. This does not mean that the
examiner must write out everything that is known about the background of the case. For
example, if an examiner was exposed to a police case file or report containing information about
the suspect’s criminal record or the suspect’s admissions to the police, the report could simply
note that the examiner read the police report that contained information about the suspect before
reaching a conclusion.
5.3.7 References to Other Documentation
The report itself should at least describe the highlights of the examination of the evidence, and it
should be an “accurate summary of significant material contained in the case notes.”310 But it
need not present every detail of the process. If documentation, such as bench notes or additional
images, is not appended to the report, the report should note that these materials are on file and
can be obtained from the laboratory upon request.311
For example, if more than one examiner reached a conclusion about the sufficiency or similarity
of two images, the conclusions should be recorded in the documentation and noted in the
summary report. The quality assurance and quality control measures in place also should be
noted. Because these measures would be spelled out in written protocols and statements of
standard operating procedures, it should be sufficient to refer to these documents.
The Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST)
suggests that “the substrate, development medium, or preservation method can have a significant
impact on the appearance of a latent print” and that “additional analytical factors, particularly on
complex prints, provide the basis for distortion interpretation and explanations for variation in
appearance.”312 Consequently, the documentation should record information about the substrate,
development medium, and preservation method (e.g., lift, photograph, or legible copy).
The results of the effort to develop prints also should be documented by annotated images or
written descriptions that record how many and which prints were determined to be suitable for
comparison as well as the existence of prints determined to be unsuitable for comparison.313 If
the latent print examiner uses enhancement technology, he or she should retain the unenhanced
image and maintain an audit trail of all digital enhancements to subsequent copies (see Chapter
4). The FBI laboratory suggests that
once the evidence has been received in the Latent Print Unit for processing, case
note documentation should chronologically include each activity and the results of
the activity. Documentation should include any development techniques applied,
the date the process was applied, and the result. The documented result should
include the presence or absence of any prints and the indication of whether the
developed prints are suitable for capture either through scanning or photography.
310 ASCLD, op. cit., p. 43.
311 See European Network, op. cit., Standard I1(f).
312 SWGFAST, 2010, op. cit., p. 2.
313 Compare ibid., Standard 1.1.2.
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This documentation process should continue until all processing techniques have
been applied or the processing is discontinued.314
Furthermore, it recommends that
case documentation should indicate the number of latent prints of value detected
on each item, along with a description of the item, and which items did not
contain any latent prints or latent prints of value. Additional requirements include
the disposition of any images containing latent prints of value and any images of
latent prints that were not analyzed, compared, or evaluated.315
SWGFAST suggests that “documentation … may be accomplished by making a ‘no value’
notation (e.g., ‘NV’) on a lift, photograph, or legible copy retained as part of the case record [or]
by indicating in case notes that ‘no value’ impressions are present on a lift or photograph.”316
Although SWGFAST adds that “copies of latent prints that are of no value do not need to be
retained in the case record,” this Working Group recommends retaining all images for possible
later review.
Finally, the report or associated documentation should record the features that the examiner(s)
considered and relied on in reaching a conclusion of identification, including those features used
in any verification. All comparisons conducted during the course of the examination, including
latent to exemplar, latent to latent, and exemplar to exemplar, should be documented. In some
cases, a number of exclusions may be made. For example, an AFIS search will generate a list of
candidates. When, in screening these candidates, exemplars are readily excluded, the
documentation need not show the specific feature or features used for the exclusion, but the
exemplars should be retained or be kept retrievable.317
The report or supporting documentation should explain, through annotations on images or in
some other fashion, the features of the unknown that were selected for analysis and used for
comparison.318 An apparent dissimilarity that is attributed to distortion or another cause should
be noted.319 Providing this information complies with the International Organization for
Standardization’s ISO/IEC 17025: 2005, clause 5.10.5,320 which requires that “the laboratory
shall document the basis upon which the opinions and interpretations have been made” and
responds to the concern that examiners might fail “to document which features within a latent
print support their reasoning and conclusions.”321 A verifying examiner’s notes or other
materials should document the verification in similar detail.
As discussed in Chapter 3, contemporaneous documentation of each major step in the
examination process can help ensure the examination is conducted properly and thus reduce the
314 Peterson, Dreyfus, Gische, et al., op. cit.
315 Ibid.
316 SWGFAST, 2010, op. cit., p. 3.
317 Ibid., Standard 2.4.
318 Ibid., Preamble. See also Chapter 3.
319 Compare SWGFAST, 2010, op. cit., p. 2.
320 International Organization for Standardization. General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and
Calibration Laboratories, ISO/IEC 17025:2005(E), 2d ed. International Organization for Standardization, 2005.
321 NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, op. cit., p. 143.
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chance of error. It also can provide a record that might be useful for testimony by the examiner
or other possible expert witnesses at a later time.
5.3.8	 Definition	of	Terms
A report should define important technical terms, either explicitly or by reference to an
authoritative, readily available source. For example, latent print examiners often refer to
“individualization” as “identification,”322 but in ordinary parlance, an identification need not be
an assertion that only one person on Earth could be the source of an impression. An eyewitness
description might be used to “identify” a suspect, even though the individual so identified would
not be the only person in the world to fit the description. Even the word “individualize” is not
self-defining. It might mean that in a closed group of, say, seven suspects, only one suspect’s
finger could be the source of a latent print, or it might represent a more powerful assertion that
no other finger that has ever been or ever will be in existence can produce so similar a latent
print. An explicit definition informs the reader of the intended meaning, and Chapter 1 discusses
ways to define terms relating to the process of establishing an association between a known
individual and a latent print. The importance of defining terms clearly is widely recognized in the
forensic sciences,323 and this part of the recommendation also follows from Recommendation 5.1
on making the report understandable to lay readers.
Recommendation 5.2: A report should:
a. Identify the latent print examiner(s);
b. Describe the items submitted to the examiner(s);
c. List the procedures used by the examiner to develop, visualize, or enhance the 
friction ridge impressions;
d. List all comparisons conducted;
e. State all conclusions with the method used to reach them;
f. Note any important limitations to the conclusions;
g. Indicate	whether	a	verification	was	made	and	whether	there	was	any	conflict	of	
opinion among examiners prior to the reported conclusions;
h. Note (or refer to external documentation of) any information about the case that 
the examiner(s) received;
i. Note the existence of additional documentation; and
j. Define	important	technical	terms,	either	explicitly	or	by	reference	to	an	
authoritative, readily available source. 
322 E.g., SWGFAST, 2003, op. cit., Standard 1. A draft of the document intended to replace these standards does not
use the word “identification.” Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Draft
for Comment: Standards for Examining Friction Ridge Impressions and Resulting Conclusions (To Replace:
Friction Ridge Examination Methodology for Latent Print Examiners, Version 1.01, and Standards for Conclusions,
Version 1.0). Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, August
2010, p. 4. Another draft document, the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and
Technology. Standard Terminology of Friction Ridge Examination (To Replace: Glossary, Version 2.0). Version 3.
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, February 11, 2011, lists
“individualization” as the primary meaning of “identification.”
323 For example, European Network, op. cit., Activity I. SWGDRUG, 2004, op. cit., Recommendation 3.2.1.
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5.4 Summary
A report and documentation that contain the information listed in these recommendations
provide an accessible record of the work of latent print examiners. The level of detail is
sufficient to inform investigators, prosecutors, defense counsel, other experts, and judges or
juries as to how the analysis was conducted and what conclusions were reached. This type of 
reporting meets scientific norms, quality assurance, and legal concerns. Appendices offer sample 
language for a full report, a shortened report with minimal requirements, and a report with 
qualified conclusions.
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Appendix 5-A: Sample Report Summary
Bureau of Investigation      123 Main Street
Laboratory Division, Latent Print Section    Washington, D.C. 20035
SAMPLE REPORT OF EXAMINATION
To:  BI Agent John Dunne      Date: October 20, 2011
 Los Angeles Field Office
Case Number: LA-123456
Case Title:  Bank of Los Angeles
  123 California Blvd.
  Los Angeles, CA
  Aug. 28, 2011
  Bank Robbery
Date specimens received: September 3, 2011
Fingerprint Analyst: Susanne Brown
The items listed below were examined in the Latent Print Section.
Item # Description
1 Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
3 Pen with chain 
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
Table 1: Items examined in Latent Print Section
Results of Examinations
Items of evidence submitted to the Latent Print Section for examination may be examined
visually, examined with various light sources, or processed with chemicals and powders to detect
the presence of latent friction ridge prints. The specific sequence of examinations and processes
depends upon the nature of the evidence.1 I applied the following processes to the submitted
items as follows:
1 See Bureau of Investigation, Processing Guide for Developing Latent Prints, Revised 2001.
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Item 
# Description Processing techniques
1 Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…” Visual, LASER, ultraviolet,
Crimescope, 1,8-Diazafluoren-9-
one/LASER, Ninhydrin, Physical
Developer
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form Visual, LASER, ultraviolet,
Crimescope, 1,8-Diazafluoren-9-
one/LASER, Ninhydrin, Physical
Developer
3 Pen with chain Visual, LASER, ultraviolet,
Crimescope, Cyanoacrylate Fuming,
reflective ultraviolet imaging system,
Cyanoacrylate Dye
Stain/LASER/ultraviolet/Crimescope,
White Powder 
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
Visual—see crime scene log for 
additional information
Table 2: Processing techniques applied to submitted items
BI conducts friction ridge print examinations using the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
Verification (ACE-V) process. The first phase in the process is Analysis, which is conducted
independently on first the latent then the known prints. During this phase, each print is analyzed
for both the quality and quantity of information present. The qualitative assessment is based
upon the clarity of the friction ridges, the substrate on which the latent print was developed,
deposition and lateral pressures, and the processing techniques applied. The quantitative analysis
takes into account all of the information present in the print, broken down into three levels of
detail. Level 1 Detail consists of the overall ridge flow, including pattern type and orientation of
the print based upon that ridge flow. Level 2 Detail lies in individual ridge paths, including those
of continuous ridges as well as ridges that come to an end, divide to form two or more ridges, or
appear as isolated dots. Analysis of these ridge characteristics accounts for their type, direction,
location, and spatial sequence. Level 3 Detail includes individual ridge attributes, particularly
shape and width along the length of each ridge. The quality and quantity of information observed
during the Analysis phase determines whether the print contains suitable information to conduct
a comparison with another print.
Results of Analysis
I detected four latent fingerprints on Items 1, 2, and 4 that were suitable for comparison:
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Item 
# Description
# of 
prints Processing technique
1 Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…” 2 1 1,8-Diazafluoren-9- 
one/LASER, 1 Ninhydrin
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form 1 Ninhydrin
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
1 Black powder lift
Table 3: Prints determined to be suitable for comparison and the processing technique used to
detect them
In the Comparison phase of the ACE-V process, I conducted a side-by-side comparison of a
latent print with an exemplar. I examined both prints for similarities and differences, assessing
ridges sequentially for agreement or disagreement in all levels of detail.
In the Evaluation phase of the ACE-V, I considered all of the information gathered during
Analysis and Comparison to reach conclusions about the origin of the latent prints. I made
identifications as well as exclusions. An exclusion is an opinion that the two prints did not
originate from the same source because there is information in disagreement in the comparable
areas of the two prints that would not be present if the prints came from the same finger. An
identification is an opinion that the two prints originated from the same source because the
information in the comparable areas of two prints is in sufficient agreement. An identification
does not necessarily eliminate the possibility that another person in the world could leave a print
with areas of similar agreement. It means that within the examiner’s experience and knowledge,
no other prints with this much similarity have come from different people.
Results of Comparison and Evaluation
After a conversation with the case agent (see Table 7), I compared the four latent fingerprints to
the fingerprints of THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456, with the following results:
Item 
# Description
# of 
prints
Results of comparison with 
THOMAS SMITH, BI 
#123456
1 Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…” 2 2 Identifications
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form 1 Exclusion
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
1 Exclusion
Table 4: Results of comparisons with THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456
The remaining two unidentified latent fingerprints were searched in the BI automated fingerprint
identification system (AFIS). I reviewed the resulting list of candidates (available upon request
to the BI) and reached the following conclusions:
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Item 
# Description
# of 
prints Results of AFIS search
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form 1 No Identification effected
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
1 Identification with JANE 
JONES, BI #987654
Table 5: Results of AFIS searches
The remaining unidentified latent fingerprint (on item #2) is not a fingerprint of JANE JONES,
BI #987654.
Summary of Evaluation
Item 
# Description
# of 
prints Evaluation Summary
1 Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…” 2 2 Identifications with 
THOMAS SMITH, BI 
#123456
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form 1 Not a fingerprint of 
THOMAS SMITH, BI 
#123456, or JANE JONES, 
BI #987654
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
1 Identification with JANE 
JONES, BI #987654
Table 6: Summary of evaluation
The presence of a friction ridge print on an item of evidence indicates contact was made between
the source and the item of evidence. The presence of a friction ridge print alone does not
necessarily indicate the significance of either the contact or the time frame during which the
contact occurred.
Due to the many factors involved in the deposition of a friction ridge print, neither the absence of
a friction ridge print on evidence nor the exclusion of a friction ridge print with a given source
necessarily precludes that source from having touched the evidence.
Results	of	Verifications	and	Blind	Verifications
The Verification phase of the ACE-V process consists of the application of the Analysis,
Comparison, and Evaluation phases of the ACE-V process to a friction ridge print by another
qualified examiner who then expresses his or her agreement or disagreement with the original
examiner’s conclusion. On October 18, 2011, Fingerprint Analyst Robert Johnson, knowing the
outcome of the original examination, verified the identifications. There were no conflicts of
opinion.
On October 19, 2011, Fingerprint Analyst James Bishop conducted a blind verification of the
identification with JANE JONES. (In blind verifications, the verifying examiner is unaware of
the original examiner’s conclusion.) A conflict of opinion occurred during this blind verification
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of the identification with JANE JONES. Initially, the verifier deemed the comparison 
inconclusive due to poor quality exemplars. Upon consultation with the primary analyst, the
blind verifier realized that he had not received all available exemplars. After comparing the
additional exemplars, the verifier concurred with the identification decision.
Additional documentation, including bench notes and annotated images of the latent prints for
both the primary analyst and verifiers, is retained as part of the case record and can be provided
upon request. The BI Laboratory Division’s Quality Assurance Manual and Standard Operating
Procedures can be found online at www.BI.org.
Case Information Received by the Fingerprint Analyst
The following table summarizes the case-related information that I received for this case:
Date Communication Type Description
September 3, 
2011
Incoming letter Letter from contributor submitted with the evidence. 
Details of case, including type of crime, location 
of crime, date of crime, description of how bank 
robbery occurred, and description of evidence being 
submitted were included in the letter. No individuals 
to compare were provided.
September 14, 
2011
Telephone call 
(documented 
on Activity & 
Communication Log)
Telephone call with Case Agent naming individual 
to compare. THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456, had 
been developed as a suspect due to information from 
a confidential informant. 
Table 7: Information on case received by examiner
For questions about the content of this report, please contact Fingerprint Analyst Susanne Brown
at (202) 123-4567.
The specimens are being returned under separate cover.
          Susanne Brown
          Fingerprint Analyst
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Appendix 5-B: Sample Report Summary, Short Version
Bureau of Investigation      123 Main Street
Laboratory Division, Latent Print Section    Washington, D.C. 20035
SAMPLE REPORT OF EXAMINATION
To:  BI Agent John Dunne      Date: October 20, 2011
 Los Angeles Field Office
Case Number: LA-123456
Case Title:  Bank of Los Angeles
  123 California Blvd.
  Los Angeles, CA
  Aug. 28, 2011
  Bank Robbery
Date specimens received: September 3, 2011
Fingerprint Analyst: Susanne Brown
The items listed below were examined in the Latent Print Section.
Item # Description
1 Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
3 Pen with chain 
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
Table 1: Items examined in Latent Print Section
Items of evidence submitted to the Latent Print Section for examination may be examined
visually, examined with various light sources, or processed with chemicals and powders to detect
the presence of latent friction ridge prints. The specific sequence of examinations and processes
depends upon the nature of the evidence.1 A complete list of the processes used in this
submission is maintained in the case record and can be furnished upon request.
1 See Bureau of Investigation, Processing Guide for Developing Latent Prints, Revised 2001.
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Results of Examinations
Four latent fingerprints were detected on the items and compared to THOMAS SMITH, BI
#123456, with the following results:
Item 
# Description
# of 
prints
Results of comparison with 
THOMAS SMITH, BI 
#123456
1 Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…” 2 2 Identifications
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form 1 1 Exclusion
3 Pen with chain 0 N/A
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
1 1 Exclusion
Table 2: Results of comparisons with THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456
The remaining unidentified latent fingerprints were searched in the BI automated fingerprint
identification system (AFIS) with the following results:
Item 
# Description
# of 
prints Results of AFIS search
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form 1 No Identification effected
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
1 1 Identification with JANE 
JONES, BI #987654
Table 3: Results of AFIS searches
The remaining unidentified latent fingerprint (on item #2) is not a fingerprint of JANE JONES,
BI #987654.
Friction ridge print examinations are conducted using the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
Verification (ACE-V) process. The steps of ACE-V are applied to each examination as
appropriate. Analysis is the assessment of the quantity and quality of the information present in
the print to determine if sufficient reliable details are present to conduct a comparison with
another print. Comparison is the side-by-side observation of friction ridge prints to determine
whether or not the information in two prints is in agreement. Evaluation is the formulation of a
conclusion based upon the information gathered during analysis and comparison. The evaluation
can result in an exclusion, an identification, or an inconclusive outcome. An exclusion is an
opinion that the two prints did not originate from the same source because there is information in
disagreement in the comparable areas of two prints that would not be present if the prints came
from the same finger. An identification is an opinion that the two prints originated from the same
source because the information in the comparable areas of two prints is in sufficient agreement.
An identification does not necessarily eliminate the possibility another person in the world could
leave a print with areas of similar agreement. It means that within the examiner’s experience and
knowledge, no other prints with this much similarity have come from different people.
Verification is the independent application of the Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation phases
of the ACE-V process to a friction ridge print by another examiner.
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The presence of a friction ridge print on an item of evidence indicates that contact was made
between the source and the item of evidence. The presence of a friction ridge print alone does not
necessarily indicate the significance of the contact or the time frame during which the contact
occurred.
Due to the many factors involved in the deposition of a friction ridge print, neither the absence of
a friction ridge print on evidence nor the exclusion of a friction ridge print with a given source
necessarily precludes that source from having touched the evidence.
Verifications of the identifications were conducted by Fingerprint Analyst Robert Johnson,
knowing the outcome of the original examination, on October 18, 2011. There were no conflicts
of opinion.
On October 19, 2011, Fingerprint Analyst James Bishop conducted a blind verification of the
identification with JANE JONES. (In blind verifications, the verifying examiner is unaware of
the original examiner’s conclusion.) A conflict of opinion occurred during this blind verification
of the identification with JANE JONES. Initially, the verifier deemed the comparison
inconclusive due to poor quality exemplars. Upon consultation with the primary analyst, the
blind verifier realized that he had not received all available exemplars. After comparing the
additional exemplars, the verifier concurred with the identification decision.
Additional documentation, including bench notes, annotated images of the latent prints for both
the primary analyst and verifier, and communications indicating the case information received by
the analyst and the date on which that information was received are retained as part of the case
record and can be provided upon request. The BI Laboratory Division’s Quality Assurance
Manual and Standard Operating Procedures can be found online at www.BI.org.
For questions about the content of this report, please contact Fingerprint Analyst Susanne Brown
at (202) 123-4567.
The specimens are being returned under separate cover.
          Susanne Brown
          Fingerprint Analyst
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Appendix	5-C:	Sample	Report	Summary	with	Qualified	Conclusions
Bureau of Investigation      123 Main Street
Laboratory Division, Latent Print Section    Washington, D.C. 20035
SAMPLE REPORT OF EXAMINATION
To:  BI Agent John Dunne      Date: October 20, 2011
 Los Angeles Field Office
Case Number: LA-123456
Case Title:  Bank of Los Angeles
  123 California Blvd.
  Los Angeles, CA
  Aug. 28, 2011
  Bank Robbery
Date specimens received: September 3, 2011
Fingerprint Analyst: Susanne Brown
The items listed below were examined in the Latent Print Section.
Item # Description
1 Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
3 Pen with chain 
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
Table 1: Items examined in Latent Print Section
Items of evidence submitted to the Latent Print Section for examination may be examined
visually, examined with various light sources, or processed with chemicals and powders to detect
the presence of latent friction ridge prints. The specific sequence of examinations and processes
depends upon the nature of the evidence.1 A complete list of the processes used in this
submission is maintained in the case record and can be furnished upon request.
1 See Bureau of Investigation, Processing Guide for Developing Latent Prints, Revised 2001.
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Results of Examinations
Friction ridge print examinations are conducted using the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
Verification (ACE-V) process. Analysis is the assessment of the quantity and quality of the
information present in the print to determine if sufficient reliable details are present to conduct a
comparison with another print. Comparison is the side-by-side observation of friction ridge
prints to determine the extent to which the information in two prints is in agreement. Evaluation
is the formulation of an opinion on the degree to which the information gathered during analysis
and comparison supports the hypothesis (S) of a common source for the exemplar and the latent
print or instead supports the hypothesis (D) that the exemplar and the latent come from different
individuals. An opinion of strong support for S does not necessarily eliminate the possibility
another person in the world could leave a print with areas of similar agreement. It means that
within the examiner’s experience and knowledge, prints from the same finger would be expected
to display this much similarity, whereas prints from different fingers would not be. Verification
is the independent application of the Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation phases of the ACE-V
process to a friction ridge print by another examiner.
Four latent fingerprints were detected on the items and compared to exemplar prints from
THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456, to provide evidence for or against the hypothesis that Thomas
Smith is the source of the latent fingerprints.
Item 
# Description
# of 
prints
Results of comparison with 
THOMAS SMITH, BI 
#123456
1 Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…” 2 Strong support for S
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form 1 Strong support for D
3 Pen with chain 0 N/A
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
1 Strong support for D
Table 2: Results of comparisons with THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456
The remaining unidentified latent fingerprints were searched in the BI automated fingerprint
identification system (AFIS) with the following results:
Item 
# Description
# of 
prints Results of AFIS search
2 Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form 1 No support for any candidate as 
the source
4 Lift indicated as coming from customer 
counter
1 Strong support for JANE 
JONES, BI #987654 as the 
source
Table 3: Results of AFIS searches
The remaining unidentified latent fingerprint (on item #2) is very different from the exemplar
from JANE JONES, BI #987654 and provides strong support for the hypothesis that she is not its
source.
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The presence of a friction ridge print on an item of evidence indicates contact was made between
the source and the item of evidence. The presence of a friction ridge print alone does not
necessarily indicate the significance of the contact or the time frame during which the contact
occurred.
Due to the many factors involved in the deposition of a friction ridge print, neither the absence of
a friction ridge print on evidence nor the absence of a friction ridge print consistent with a given
source necessarily precludes that source from having touched the evidence.
Blind verifications of all results were conducted by Fingerprint Analyst Robert Johnson on
October 18, 2011. There were no conflicts of opinion.
Additional documentation, including bench notes, annotated images of the latent prints for both
the primary analyst and verifier, and communications indicating the case information received by
the analyst and the date on which that information was received are retained as part of the case
record and can be provided upon request. The BI Laboratory Division’s Quality Assurance
Manual and Standard Operating Procedures can be found online at www.BI.org.
For questions about the content of this report, please contact Fingerprint Analyst Susanne Brown
at (202) 123-4567.
The specimens are being returned under separate cover.
          Susanne Brown
          Fingerprint Analyst
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Introduction and Scope
Latent print examinations are conducted not merely to assist criminal investigators but also to 
produce legally admissible evidence that can exonerate or implicate defendants. Fingerprint 
evidence has been used in American courts since 1910.327 Other pattern and impression evidence 
also has a venerable history.328 In recent years, however, forensic science testimony associating 
marks or impressions with specific sources has come under intense scrutiny—first, in the 
academic literature,329 then in the courtroom,330 and again in the 2009 National Research Council 
(NRC) report.331
Testifying is a quintessentially human activity, and latent print testimony is the product of a 
long series of actions in which human factors issues are prominent. Previous chapters focus on 
the pretrial stages of the production of latent print evidence. They examine the role of human 
perception and cognition in the production of this evidence and ways to maintain or improve 
the quality of the resulting evidence. This chapter concentrates on the interactions of latent 
print examiners with other participants in the criminal justice system at and shortly before trial. 
Human limitations and dispositions are as important in this phase of latent print examination 
work as they are in earlier phases. Developing and implementing procedures and practices that 
encourage experts to communicate their findings accurately and fairly to lawyers, judges, and 
juries and to detect and correct errors in this process is a crucial component of a system that 
reduces the opportunities for errors in the production and presentation of courtroom fingerprint 
evidence.332
This chapter therefore discusses pretrial communications between experts and lawyers and 
makes recommendations about preparation for trial and the information that experts should 
communicate to judges and juries. Although the discussion is confined to presenting the results 
of examinations of friction skin impressions for the purpose of associating latents (anonymous,
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unknown prints) with exemplars (identified, known prints) in criminal trials, and differences 
between the civil and criminal rules of discovery are not considered, much of the discussion also 
applies to civil cases involving private parties.
Sections 6.1 through 6.5 describe various aspects and functions of expert testimony as well 
as some of the most pertinent legal doctrines. Section 6.6 discusses the admissibility and 
desirability of different types of testimony about the possibility that an examiner’s finding 
that the items are (or are not) associated with one another is incorrect. Section 6.7 describes a 
spectrum of conceivable modes of conveying expert knowledge and findings about the possible 
association between a friction skin impression and its source. Finally, section 6.8 discusses 
quality assurance and quality control for testimony.
To situate testimony about identifications based upon the features of friction ridge skin within the 
broader range of forensic identification testimony, the discussion is not confined to the Analysis, 
Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V) process as currently practiced. As noted 
in earlier chapters, categorical conclusions within ACE-V are not the only way to make and 
communicate inferences from the comparison of latent prints and exemplars. In other areas of 
forensic science that investigate the possible association between known and unknown samples, 
witnesses present their findings differently, and one cannot simply assume that what is most 
familiar in one field is the only way to convey expert knowledge in the courtroom. This chapter 
therefore surveys a broad range of testimony that, at least in principle, might be provided at trial. 
At one pole, an expert might merely inform the judge or jury of the similarities or dissimilarities 
in the features of a pair of prints and not draw any inferences from these data. At the other pole, 
when the similarity is extensive, the expert might attribute the latent print to a specific finger 
(source attribution). In between these poles lie various other forms of qualitative or quantitative 
testimony. The Working Group reached no consensus on which one of the various alternative 
modes of presentation is best warranted by existing scientific research findings and other 
empirical knowledge. Neither does the Group purport to describe which form of testimony best 
satisfies the needs of the legal system. But for the reasons given in Chapter 3, the Working Group 
agrees that if source attributions are made, they should not be “to the exclusion of all others in 
the world” (Recommendation 3.7).
With respect to latent prints, two major concerns relevant to testimony are statements about 
error rates and individualization. This chapter does not attempt to settle the arguments among 
forensic scientists, psychologists, statisticians, legal scholars, and latent print examiners on 
fingerprint individualization and the risks of erroneous identifications or exclusions.333 Instead, 
it seeks to place fingerprint identification testimony in a broader context and to consider whether 
more modest claims of association and statements about errors would meet the law’s purposes 
without compromising the integrity of latent print examiners and without discarding important 
information.
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334 Federal Rules of Evidence 702. In full, the rule states that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
For more extensive discussions of expert testimony, see, for example, Faigman, Kaye, Saks, et al., op. cit.; Giannelli 
and Imwinkelried, op. cit.; Kaye, D., D. Bernstein, and J. Mnookin. The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: 
Expert Evidence. 2nd ed. Aspen Publishers, 2011; McCormick, op. cit.
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338 Using pictures of prints not involved in the case should not be necessary and may be objectionable under the rules 
of relevance.
6.1  Purpose, Form, and Preparation of Expert Testimony
Expert witnesses use or impart specialized knowledge and information generally unknown to 
the jury or judge to “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue … .”334 Expert testimony need not be delivered in the form of an opinion. Expert witnesses 
also can act as teachers, educating fact finders about pertinent principles or findings in their 
disciplines. For example, a latent print expert might explain why prints would not be found 
on a particular surface without offering a personal opinion on the reason for their absence in a 
particular case.
During a trial, counsel’s questioning frames the expert’s presentation. The expert may not simply 
decide what information to discuss but must answer counsel’s questions. This can create some 
tension between the goal of being complete and the need to be responsive. In resolving this 
tension, “ethical considerations and professional standards properly place a number of constraints 
on the expert’s behavior.”335 One such constraint is “a requirement of candor. While an expert is 
ordinarily under no legal obligation to volunteer information, professional ethics may compel 
this ... when the expert believes that withholding information will change dramatically the picture 
that his … analyses, properly understood, convey.”336 Thus, the “guiding principles” proposed by 
the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/
LAB) advise forensic scientists to “attempt to qualify their responses while testifying when asked 
a question with the requirement that a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer be given, if answering ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ would be misleading to the judge or the jury.”337
Pretrial preparation with the attorney who will be calling the expert is essential to effective trial 
presentation. Preparation includes educating the lawyer, who should understand the evidence 
involved, appreciating the limitations of the discipline and the forensic findings, and recognizing 
any exculpatory or qualifying information that must be disclosed. Lawyers should not present 
the testimony of examiners without first conferring about the expert’s report and anticipated 
testimony, including the use of visual aids.338
Recommendation 6.1: The trial preparation process should address the presentation of 
technical information in lay terms, the organization of the direct examination, possible 
cross-examination, and the possible use of visual aids.
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6.2  Pretrial Discovery
There is no legal barrier to defense counsel contacting a prosecution expert to discuss the case.339 
Of course, the mere fact that opposing counsel may contact an expert does not require the expert 
to cooperate, and there may be concerns about breaching the protection given to an attorney’s 
work product. However, openness may help ensure that opposing counsel understands the 
discipline, the evidence, and the opinion. It also enhances credibility if the expert on the witness 
stand discloses sharing information with opposing counsel.
Different considerations apply to a criminal defense expert. Unless and until a defense expert 
is designated a testifying witness, this expert may be considered part of the defense team, and 
defense counsel needs to protect confidential communications that come from clients.340 Once 
designated as a witness, however, this expert should have the same status as a prosecution expert.
6.3  Ethical and Professional Obligations
An expert witness who is a member of a learned profession has obligations to his profession 
as well as to his employer.341 More than 30 years ago, an NRC panel called on “professional 
organizations to develop standards for expert witnesses in legal proceedings … .”342 More 
recently, the NRC committee on forensic science proposed “a national code of ethics for all 
forensic science disciplines” such that “those forensic scientists who commit serious ethical 
violations” could be sanctioned “through a certification process for forensic scientists.”343 It 
observed that
many forensic science organizations—such as the American Academy of 
Forensic Sciences, the California Association of Criminalists, and ASCLD 
[American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors]—have codes of ethics or 
codes of professional practice imploring members to act with honesty, integrity, 
and objectivity; to work within the bounds of their professional competence; 
to present testimony and reports in a clear and objective manner; and to avoid 
conflicts of interest and potential bias, among other things.344
To avoid incomplete or one-sided presentations, ample disclosure of reasoning, limitations, and 
exculpatory material in pretrial reports, as discussed in section 6.1, is especially important, as is 
a shared professional ethic that is strong enough to resist pressure from lawyers who sometimes 
seek unduly oversimplified and exaggerated presentations of technical information. Thus, 
forensic scientists have urged that
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all crime laboratories, both public and private, should have a code of ethics/
conduct. These codes need to stress the best interests of society through 
government service and justice, government responsibility for professionalism 
and cost effectiveness, integrity (both professionally and regarding evidence), 
objectivity, staying within the bounds or limits of what the science can provide, 
maintaining confidentiality, complying to legal demands such as disclosure, and 
being truthful.345
In view of the status of experts who represent a learned and skilled profession and the latitude 
given to the form and bases of their testimony (see section 6.1), the Working Group recommends:
Recommendation 6.2: Forensic service providers should adopt codes of ethics that 
require testifying in a nonpartisan manner; answering questions from both the 
prosecution and the defense directly, accurately, and fully; and providing appropriate 
scientific	information	before,	during,	and	after	trial.
This precept already is widely accepted in the forensic community. The Scientific Working 
Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST) has a short aspirational 
code for friction ridge examiners that forbids knowing misrepresentations and specifies 
that “testimony shall be rendered in an impartial manner to promote the understanding of 
examinations and findings.”346 The guiding principles of ASCLD/LAB specifically state that 
“wording should not be such that inferences may be drawn which are not valid, or that slant the 
opinion to a particular direction.”347 As previously noted, to achieve impartial testimony, ASCLD/
LAB also advises forensic scientists to “attempt to qualify their responses while testifying when 
asked a question with the requirement that a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer be given, if answering 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ would be misleading to the judge or the jury.”348 The European Network of Forensic 
Science Institutes expects analysts to “deal with questions truthfully, impartially and flexibly in 
a language which is concise, unambiguous and admissible;” to “give explanations to specific 
questions in a manner that facilitates understanding by nonscientists;” to “consider additional 
information and alternative hypotheses that are presented to you;” to “consider and evaluate 
these and express relevant opinions taking into account the limitations on opinions which cannot 
be given without further examination and investigation;” and to “clearly differentiate between 
fact and opinion and ensure that the opinions you express are within your area of expertise.”349
Notwithstanding the valuable role that professional organizations can play in defining and 
enforcing ethical requirements, it must be noted that professional organizations can restrict
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ethically acceptable testimony as well as ethically dubious conduct. As noted in Chapters 1 
and 3, the International Association for Identification (IAI) passed a resolution in 1979 making 
it professional misconduct for any latent print examiner to provide courtroom testimony 
that labeled an identification “possible, probable, or likely,” rather than “certain.”350 Yet, the 
insistence on subjective certainty could produce a threshold that is too high—one that excludes 
testimony of an association that is less certain but still very useful to the trier of fact. Indeed, 
this norm has prompted the criticism that “fingerprint examiners are now unique among 
forensic analysts in that they are ethically bound to frame their conclusion in terms of absolute 
certainty.”351
In 2010, IAI rescinded its 1979 resolution as “not consistent with advancements since [its] 
passage.”352 The new resolution states “that Resolution 1979-7 and Resolution 1980-5 are hereby 
rescinded” and approves of “a clear and unambiguous presentation” of “associations based on 
… class characteristics (pattern type, ridge flow).” Whether the IAI will interpret this rescission 
as allowing its members to testify to degrees of confidence short of subjective certainty remains 
to be seen. Presumably, the “advancements” are “mathematically based models to assess the 
associative value of the evidence [that] may provide a scientifically sound basis for supporting 
the examiner’s opinion.”353 The resolution prevents an examiner from using a model that has 
not “been accepted as valid by the IAI” and warns that the “use of mathematically based models 
does not relieve the examiner of responsibility for their expert opinion.”354 Chapter 4 also 
discusses the importance of validating models and the need for the government to be open with 
data for validation studies.
6.4 Expressions of Certainty
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,355 the Supreme Court observed that “it 
would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be ‘known’ 
to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science.”356 Thus, courts do not normally 
demand absolute certainty from scientists (or any other experts), but they do require more than 
conjecture. They exclude expert opinions that are so weak or speculative that they would not be 
helpful to a jury relative to the time they could consume and the misunderstandings they might 
generate. This is a special application of the broad principle that the trial judge should exclude 
even relevant evidence when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
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unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”357
In the medical discipline, to signal that an opinion was sufficiently definitive to be helpful, the 
practice of having physicians testify to diagnoses or other opinions in terms of “a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty” developed in many jurisdictions.358 In time, this practice spread 
to other professions and has led to scientists testifying “to a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty.”359
Outside the courtroom, however, scientists do not communicate their findings in this fashion. 
An astronomer who reports the discovery of an exoplanet does not characterize the finding as 
satisfying some “reasonable degree of scientific certainty.” A chemist who deduces the identity 
of a compound from its nuclear magnetic resonance spectrum has no table of degrees of 
scientific certainty with which to label the deduction. Scientists might refer to personal degrees 
of confidence in a finding or to the degree of controversy surrounding it, but there is no generally 
accepted or working definition of a “reasonable degree of certainty” in scientific discourse.360
The dissonance between the legal phrase and the scientific practice creates an issue for latent 
print examiners and forensic scientists of all types who are asked to use this phrase. When 
meeting with the attorney before trial, an expert not only should inform the attorney of the 
conclusion but also should specify the degree of confidence that can be expressed at trial. For 
example, an expert might explain to the attorney, and later in court, that although the discipline 
does not normally use the phrase “reasonable degree of scientific certainty,” he is very confident 
in his conclusions based on his experience and the standards of the field. It is the lawyer’s 
responsibility to advocate for the admission of such testimony. Although individual trial judges 
could be skeptical of admitting testimony without the familiar accompanying words, it is clear 
that no rule of evidence requires the use of a phrase such as “reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty.”361 To the contrary, modern courts would not “expect dogmatic diagnoses from a 
careful scientist.”362
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Furthermore, even if a scientist is comfortable with the phrase, problems can arise. Some courts 
have rejected such testimony as an antidote to what they have deemed to be unjustifiably strong 
claims of identity. For example, some courts have concluded that the scientific foundation 
for absolute identification of toolmarks is insecure, but they still treat the matches discerned 
by skilled examiners as highly probative. This line of authority rejects statements of unique 
identification “as a matter of scientific certainty,”363 but permits it “within a reasonable degree of 
certainty in the firearms examination field,”364 “to a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty,”365 or 
only as being “more likely than not.”366 Similar reasoning has been applied to exclude assertions 
of scientific certainty for latent fingerprint identification testimony,367 although it remains to be 
seen whether such restrictions will displace the widely accepted practice of allowing expressions 
of absolute confidence in source attributions.
6.5  Reliability, Validity, General Acceptance, and Prejudice
The courts that have constrained expressions of certainty about holistic pattern matching have 
done so to avoid outright exclusion of the evidence. Because scientific evidence might overly 
impress a jury, it is held to higher standards for admissibility than most other expert testimony.368 
These are the “general acceptance” and scientific “reliability” standards.369 The general 
acceptance standard originated in the 1923 case of Frye v. United States.370 In Frye, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the exclusion of testimony from a 
psychologist who used a blood-pressure cuff to determine that a defendant’s denial of a murder 
to which he had previously confessed was not the result of conscious deception. The Court of 
Appeals stated that
just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. … While courts will 
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized 
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must 
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field 
in which it belongs.371
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Over the years, Frye became the dominant test for scientific expert testimony in the United 
States.372 In the 1970s or so, however, an alternative standard that simply required scientific 
evidence to be especially reliable emerged in a significant minority of jurisdictions.373
In 1993, the Supreme Court confirmed and accelerated this trend. In Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,374 plaintiffs alleged that a drug was a teratogen, but the Court of 
Appeals held that this theory lacked general acceptance because no published, peer-reviewed 
epidemiological studies demonstrated a statistically significant association between the drug and 
the type of birth defects experienced by the plaintiffs’ children. The Supreme Court held that, 
although the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence were silent about whether they were perpetuating 
or abandoning Frye, they implicitly repudiated general acceptance as the sole requirement for 
scientific evidence. The Court wrote that while trial judges could continue to consider whether 
existing research has produced general scientific acceptance, this factor is not necessarily 
dispositive. Rather, the trial court should assess such additional factors as the extent to which the 
theory had been tested, the content of peer-reviewed publications, the existence of controlling 
standards in applying the technique, and the known error rate of the system.375 Only if this 
wide-ranging inquiry revealed that the theory and its implementation were “reliable” would 
the evidence satisfy Rule 702. Many state courts now apply the Daubert standard, but the Frye 
standard remains intact in other states.
Finally, in 1999, the Supreme Court addressed a question left open in Daubert: whether 
nonscientific expert evidence was to be assessed with the factors articulated for the testimony 
of physicians, toxicologists, and epidemiologists at issue in Daubert itself. In Kumho Tire Co. 
v. Carmichael,376 the Court upheld the District Court’s exclusion of an engineer’s determination 
that a tire blew out because of a manufacturing defect as resting on an inadequately validated 
form of “visual and tactile inspection.” In doing so, it squarely rejected the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit’s view that “a Daubert analysis” applies only where an expert relies “on the 
application of scientific principles,” rather than “on skill- or experience-based observation.”377 
The Kumho Court held that the trial court had the discretion to evaluate technical or experiential 
expert testimony in light of the factors listed in Daubert, but it added that “the test of reliability 
is ‘flexible,’ and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to 
all experts or in every case.”378 The Court explained that
Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the trial judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’ 
obligation—applies not only to testimony based on “scientific” knowledge, but 
also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge. See 
Fed. Rule Evid. 702. We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more 
of the more specific factors that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help 
determine that testimony’s reliability. But, as the Court stated in Daubert, the test
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of reliability is ‘flexible,’ and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily 
nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.379
Daubert inspired many attacks on identification procedures that police laboratories routinely 
performed and that criminal courts universally accepted. If these procedures were held to the 
standards required for the approval of new drugs, or for a consensus among epidemiologists 
that a substance is a human carcinogen, it seemed that they might be tossed out of court. Latent 
fingerprint identification, long considered the gold standard for forensic identification techniques, 
was not immune from these challenges. In fact, in one noted case, a federal district judge—and a 
former dean of the law schools at the University of Pennsylvania and Yale University—ruled that 
because the ACE-V process failed to meet the Daubert test for scientific evidence, an examiner 
could not testify to an individualization (but could fulfill the teaching function of an expert by 
demonstrating to the jury the remarkable congruence in the images being compared); however, 
the court promptly reconsidered and vacated the order, reasoning that fingerprint testimony was 
as good as many other forms of skilled expert testimony.380 Judge Pollak wrote that
I am not persuaded that courts should defer admission of testimony with respect 
to fingerprinting— ... ‘the bedrock forensic identifier of the 20th century’—until 
academic investigators ... have made substantial headway on a ‘verification 
and validation’ research agenda. Such research would be all to the good. But to 
postpone present in-court utilization of this ‘bedrock forensic identifier’ pending 
such research would be to make the best the enemy of the good.381
In other words, the judge emphasized the “flexibility” of Kumho over the earlier search for more 
extensive scientific validation.
More recently, as noted in section 6.4, a small number of courts have curtailed the certainty with 
which a judgment of individualization of toolmarks may be expressed. They reason that enough 
scientific research and experience has been accumulated to establish the value of holistic pattern 
matching of toolmarks as a contribution of skilled witnesses, but these courts do not allow the 
prosecution or the expert witness to portray an individualization as the product of a rigorous, 
scientific technique.382
By insisting that holistic comparisons are rigorous scientific experiments, practitioners 
have invited challenges based upon the most demanding legal standards. Many latent print 
examiners are prone to emphasize that they follow the “scientific method.” A Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) publication, for example, maintains that “the ACE-V ... methodology, is a 
series of steps found within the scientific method,”383 and SWGFAST defines ACE-V as “the
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acronym for a scientific method.”384 Naturally, some witnesses express this view in their 
testimony. In State v. Foreman,385 a latent print examiner from Connecticut’s state forensic 
laboratory with “extensive qualifications” testified that “our comparisons are conducted 
through a scientific methodology known as ACE-V.”386 During cross-examination, he reiterated 
that “based on our training, education, experience, based on fact and history of fingerprints, 
fingerprints is a science. As I explained earlier, the comparison methodology using ACE-V 
methodology is a scientific methodology.”387
As we have seen, however, when confronted with serious controversy over the scientific nature 
of inferences from a technique or procedure that is portrayed or perceived as highly scientific, 
the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate sufficient scientific studies to establish the 
technique’s validity or its general acceptance (depending on the jurisdiction). When the process 
is more intuitively accessible and is not heavily wrapped in the rhetoric of science, courts 
dispense with a showing of scientific validation or general scientific acceptance.388 In particular, 
courts impressed with the Daubert objections to toolmark and fingerprint identification have 
emphasized the flexibility provided by Kumho to admit the evidence, at least where the expert 
does not attest to scientific certainty.389 Testimony that the evaluation process is strictly scientific 
or produces scientifically certain results thus undermines the theory that some courts have used 
to overcome Rule 702 objections.
Proponents of expert testimony may need to be aware of two other issues. First, evidence must 
be such that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.390 The 
proponent must also assess whether a debate over how to label the expert’s approach—as a 
“scientific” method—could divert the jury’s attention from the adequacy of the examiner’s 
conclusions in the particular case. As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, ACE-V maps the steps of a 
process, but it does not provide specific functional guidance on how to carry out that process nor 
does it detail what the substantive content of those various steps should be. As a result, the legal 
and scientific literature contains assertions that “merely following the steps of ACE-V does not 
imply that one is proceeding in a scientific manner,”391 that the invocation of the scientific
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method is only an “analogy,”392 that “ACE-V is an acronym, not a methodology,”393 that it is 
“a broadly stated framework”394 better described as “common sense,”395 and that “the ACE-V 
protocol remains obscure”396 because it rests on “an ill-defined, flexible, and explicitly subjective 
criterion.”397 Such statements are listed not to endorse them and not to decide the semantic or 
philosophical question of whether ACE-V is scientific.398 Instead, these statements suggest that 
objections based on the premise that it is prejudicial to describe ACE-V as “science” can be 
avoided by referring to ACE-V as a systematic and widely used process for determining whether 
two patterns have a common origin.
Second, advances in computer pattern matching for fingerprint identification can be expected 
to come before the courts, and these surely will have to be evaluated under the Frye or Daubert 
standard for pure scientific evidence. For example, as explained in Chapter 4, automated systems 
can measure the distance (in an abstract mathematical space) between certain features in two 
images. They can generate probabilities for such distances under the assumption that the image 
of the unknown print comes from a finger known to have produced an exemplar and that it came 
from a finger of a randomly selected individual represented in a reference set of exemplars from 
many individuals. Such conditional probabilities (also known as “likelihoods”), if they rest on 
adequate data and valid models, might be used in their own right or to reinforce (or contradict) 
the judgments of a human examiner. Before this can happen in a jurisdiction that applies the 
general acceptance standard, scientific studies validating the automated system must convince 
the scientific community that it is reliable and accurate for this particular use. In jurisdictions that 
follow Daubert, a court should assess factors such as the extent of peer-reviewed publications 
and the known error rate of the system to assure itself that the theory and its implementation are 
scientifically sound.
6.6  Errors and Error Rates
Chapter 2 describes the major types of errors in examining two impressions to determine whether 
they came from the same source. It notes cases in which expert witnesses assured courts that 
the ACE-V process, if followed faithfully, could not err, and it covers the resulting criticisms 
from commentators, courts, and even within the latent print community. Assertions that false 
identifications occur at a rate of less than one in a million comparisons have not fared well either. 
Precise estimates of error rates, based on empirical research with a large number of cases in 
which ground truth was established, were not available. Yet, virtually all courts accepted expert 
testimony that fingerprint identifications and exclusions were absolutely certain to be correct.
In several other fields, where controlled experiments or field studies have been conducted, many 
court opinions treat the observed error rates of scientific tests as a consideration affecting the 
admissibility of these tests or the weight to be given to the results in a particular case. For
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example, a significant body of controlled experiments and field studies of the accuracy of 
polygraphic lie detection has informed opinions on the admissibility of this type of evidence.399 
A smaller set of laboratory experiments of visual spectrographic speaker identification also is 
available.400
Until very recently, almost no experimental studies of the accuracy of the latent print 
examination process existed.401 In 2011, the results of a major experiment, known as the Noblis-
FBI experiment, were published.402 Because of the size and careful design and execution of 
the study, it is sure to play a role in litigation on the admissibility of latent print evidence. As 
explained in Chapter 2 (Box 2.4), 169 latent print examiners each were presented with 100 
pairs of latent and exemplar prints. In the more than 10,000 presentations deemed of value for 
individualization, 97% of the examiners made no false identifications; the remaining 5 examiners 
made a total of 6 false identifications, for a false positive rate of about 0.1%. The examiners 
made 450 false exclusions for prints deemed of value for identification or exclusion, for a false 
negative rate of about 7.5%.403 However, the examiners who volunteered for the experiment 
were not a random sample of all examiners, and although the latent prints were chosen to be 
representative of casework, the pairings as a group could have been more (or less) challenging 
than typical casework. Thus, there is room for additional research on errors and for caution in 
applying the measurements of error rates in this study to the performance of particular examiners 
in specific cases.
Some observers have proposed using existing proficiency test results (or more rigorous, blind 
tests) to produce estimates of or bounds on error rates for a particular examiner, for a given 
laboratory, or for the field as a whole.404 As noted in Chapter 3, whether this procedure can 
produce reasonably precise estimates of the probability of a false positive or negative in a 
particular case is questionable. The issue is hardly new.405 Although the 2009 NRC report is silent 
about the value of proficiency test results as an indication of case-specific error rates, two
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previous NRC reports on DNA evidence discuss the topic. A 1992 committee favored the 
production of proficiency test results as trial evidence.406 A 1996 committee did not go this far, 
but it supported the disclosure of test results in reports.407 Building on these ideas, defendants 
have argued that evidence of a DNA match should be inadmissible unless this information 
accompanied it. The courts consistently rejected the argument.408
A defendant might seek to introduce statistics to show that examiners as a group do not have 
perfect scores on proficiency tests or that the specific witness has made false positive or negative 
findings in the past.409 In response to this defensive use of error rates, it has been argued that 
the use of an average statistic is “not meaningful” because not all examiners are equal and that 
“cumulative error over time is not a meaningful mechanism for assessing current error rate” in 
that steps inevitably will be taken to correct errors.410
Both statements are problematic. First, the mean is generally a reasonable estimator of the scores 
of the members of a group. If other information on individuals is available, adjustments can be 
made to the mean for those individuals.411 If no other information is available, using the sample 
mean is still more accurate than random guessing. Second, even if a process is improving over 
time, using a recent average is likely to be more accurate than random guessing. Therefore, the 
statistics cannot be dismissed as meaningless, but their utility remains debatable. As one group of 
latent print examiners argue,
calculating human error rates is a complex undertaking, because unlike 
instruments, human beings change, learn, and adapt, particularly when faced 
with errors and the quality assurance systems designed to overcome these errors 
and improve practices. As a result, the chance that human errors will be made or 
repeated is constantly changing.412
No published appellate opinions seem to have considered the admissibility of error-rate statistics 
under the principles of Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404.413 In Williams v. State,414 
Maryland’s highest court reversed a conviction because “the trial judge erred in restricting 
Williams from fully cross examining [the DNA analyst] concerning the prevalence of testing 
errors and contamination during PCR [polymerase chain reaction] testing at Cellmark.”415 The
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court specifically rejected “the State’s contention that ‘It does not matter if fifty percent of their 
cases were contaminated. What matters is this one.’”416 Of course, whatever the result as to the 
admissibility of errors in other cases, the trial judge has discretion to exclude past errors that are 
not very probative. Indeed, exclusion would seem to be required if the past errors could not have 
recurred as a result of corrective action.
Given the emphasis on error rates in post-Daubert opinions, an expert who testifies to an 
individualization should understand that a false positive error could arise, in theory, for at 
least two logically distinct reasons.417 One is the possibility that somewhere in the world, 
another individual has a finger that could have produced a latent print with the same distinctive 
features noted in the latent print in the case. The other is that the examiner erred in identifying 
the distinctive features or gauging their distinctiveness. A witness can concede that these are 
logical possibilities—that there are no absolute certainties—without altering an opinion that the 
defendant is very likely to be the source of a high-quality latent print. Indeed, in presenting the 
opinion, it might be wise to describe the steps taken to avoid observational and judgmental error. 
Consequently, the Working Group recommends:
Recommendation 6.3: A testifying expert should be familiar with the literature related 
to error rates. A testifying expert should be prepared to describe the steps taken in 
the examination process to reduce the risk of observational and judgmental error. 
The expert should not state that errors are inherently impossible or that a method 
inherently has a zero error rate.
Recommendation 6.3 is not limited to individualization testimony. A witness who testifies to 
the strength of the evidence without stating that the defendant is the only possible source of the 
unknown print, as described below in section 6.7, can explain that the evidence is extremely 
strong, in part because of the protections against erroneous ascertainment of the relevant features, 
the verification by other examiners,418 and the fact that the images are available for verification 
by still more experts. However, care must be taken in testifying or arguing that a defendant failed 
to do an independent re-analysis. Suggesting that the defendant has an obligation to verify the 
findings would be constitutionally objectionable. Nonetheless, if the defendant raises the issue, 
the prosecution should be permitted to disclose the fact that other experts can confirm (or refute) 
a reported match.419
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6.7  Terminology
The 2009 NRC report observes that
many terms are used by forensic examiners in reports and in court testimony to 
describe findings, conclusions, and the degrees of association between evidentiary 
material (e.g., hairs, fingerprints, fibers) and particular people or objects. Such 
terms include but are not limited to “match,” “consistent with,” “identical,” 
“similar in all respects tested,” and “cannot be excluded as the source of.”420
According to the committee, the fact that “the forensic science disciplines have not reached 
agreement or consensus on the precise meaning of any of these terms” is a “critical” problem.
However, clarity would seem more important than uniformity. From the jurors’ standpoint, it is 
not obvious why every testifying expert in every field must use the same phrase to describe a 
given degree of association. When the expert defines words such as “match” or “identical” in the 
course of the testimony, the choice of one particular synonym over another should not confuse 
jurors. What is critical is that the degree of similarity be accurately ascertained and conveyed and 
that the implications of the observed degree of similarity be described fairly and clearly.
Unfortunately, disagreement exists regarding what terminology is most appropriate and 
warranted. Therefore, this section describes the traditional forms of testimony about an 
examiner’s findings, along with several possible alternatives that are at least as well founded 
in our current knowledge of the nature of latent prints and the cognitive capacities of human 
examiners. The purpose of explicating such alternative formulations is not to insist on the use 
of any single set of terms but to canvass the range of potentially admissible testimony about 
the implications of the observed similarities and differences between an unknown print and an 
exemplar.
6.7.1  Reporting an Exclusion, Match, or Inconclusive Result
All of the disciplines that strive to associate a trace with its source involve two logical steps: 
(1) measuring the similarities and differences between two samples, and (2) assessing the 
significance of the measurements.421 The measurements pertain to properties of the material or 
mark (e.g., the refractive index of glass, the color of hair, the sizes of DNA fragments, or the 
concentrations of elements). The significance of finding corresponding characteristics in a pair of 
samples depends on how often the combination of those characteristics arises when the samples 
come from the same source as opposed to when they originate from different sources.
A quantity that captures this idea is the likelihood ratio. As previously explained (Chapters 1 
and 4), the likelihood ratio states how many times more probable the measurements are when 
the hypothesis of a common source (s) is true than they are when the hypothesis of a disparate 
sources (d) is true. When the likelihood ratio is exactly one—when the measured similarities in a
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pair of items is as probable for a common source as a disparate one—the analysis is of no value 
in informing a decision between these two possibilities. The evidence is logically and legally 
irrelevant.422 On the other hand, when the measurements are far more probable for a common 
source than for different sources, they are strongly probative of identity (s).
Testimony from examiners who perform pattern matching for identification normally reflects 
these two steps of measurement and inference. All the phrases quoted in the NRC report—
“match,” “consistent with,” “identical,” “similar in all respects tested,” and “cannot be excluded 
as the source of”—merely express a finding that the measured features in the two samples 
being compared show a degree of correspondence. Conversely, when the measurements 
do not correspond, an examiner may testify to an “exclusion.” An exclusion means that the 
measurements on the two items are so different that they would never (or almost never) arise 
when the items have a common source, while the measurements could easily be this different 
when the items come from different sources. Thus, when two fingerprints are so different that 
they almost certainly could not have come from the same finger, an examiner, via the ultimately 
subjective process of “evaluation” described in Chapter 3, may conclude that the finger that 
produced the known print did not produce the questioned print. Finally, a forensic analyst may 
decline to reach a conclusion about the origin of a trace, such as when an examiner decides 
that a latent print is not even worth comparing (“not suitable”) or that a pair of impressions is 
worth studying further but that they have too few clear similarities or dissimilarities to warrant a 
reasonable judgment of inclusion or exclusion (“inconclusive”).
6.7.2		 Describing	the	Significance	of	a	Match:	Global	Individualization
The second aspect of pattern matching—describing the significance of the observed degree of 
matching—has proven contentious in all fields of forensic identification.423 For this reason, it 
is important to consider a spectrum of possible modes of presentation, ranging from the very 
powerful assertion that every finger leaves marks that are distinguishable from those of every 
other finger (when the marks are of sufficient quality and extent) to the very weak claim that 
an observed degree of similarity is at least slightly more likely if the items being compared 
originated from the same source than if they came from different sources.
The traditional form of testimony in the field of latent print identification is source attribution 
based on the theory of universal individualization (Chapter 1). One survey of the field explains 
that
in the friction ridge discipline, an individualization is often reported as, “One 
latent fingerprint detected on a demand note has been identified as a fingerprint 
of JOHN DOE.” Similarly, when testifying, an examiner often describes the 
individualization conclusion with a statement such as, “The latent print on 
Government’s Exhibit 10, a revolver, and the fingerprint recorded in the right 
index finger block on the fingerprint card bearing the name ‘John Doe’ originated 
from the same source.”424
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Some witnesses combine statements of individualization with expressions of absolute certainty, 
as in United States v. Hugh,425 where “the government’s fingerprint expert … testified that he was 
‘100 percent, without a doubt’ certain that ‘the latent print is that of Nolan Hugh.’”
Such testimony has the virtue of stating clearly and unequivocally the examiner’s opinion 
of what the observed degree of similarity establishes: that the suspect’s finger is the source 
of the latent print. Opinions of “universal individualization” like this one rest on a theory 
of “universal general uniqueness.”426 In a Massachusetts case, for example, the expert 
“stated that the prints had been ‘individualized’ to a Samantha Rivera, and defined the word 
‘individualized’ as meaning ‘to the exclusion of all others.’”427 This is the classical understanding 
of “individualization” in forensic science, although, as noted in Chapters 1 and 3, there has been 
some movement toward using the term to mean any definitive identification of a single individual 
as the source of a latent print.
Until published studies address the criticisms of universal individualization outlined in Chapter 
1, challenges under Rule 702 to the admissibility of absolute statements of individualization 
will continue. Except for a handful of unreported decisions,428 challenges to the admissibility 
of individualization under the existing ACE-V process have failed,429 but the NRC report lends 
new fuel to attacks on universal individualization testimony. In addition to characterizing 
ACE-V as un-validated and of doubtful reliability,430 the report endorses the view that “in 
order to pass scrutiny under Daubert, fingerprint experts should exhibit a greater degree of 
epistemological humility. Claims of ‘absolute’ and ‘positive’ identification should be replaced by 
more modest claims about the meaning and significance of a ‘match.’”431 To consider how this 
could be accomplished, the next several sections consider some alternatives to the traditional 
individualization testimony that was based on the theory of global general uniqueness.
6.7.3		 Describing	the	Significance	of	a	Match:	Specific	Individualization
In a particular case, same-source testimony might be justified even if the claim of universal 
general uniqueness were rejected. Imagine a particular case in which only two individuals could 
have left the latent print, and an exemplar for one of these two individuals (but not the other) is
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available. Furthermore, there is an excellent match between the latent and the exemplar, and the 
probability of this degree of matching in a finger from a randomly selected individual is a mere 
one in one trillion. Then the chance that the other (untested) individual also matches is one in one 
trillion. Now, if the potential suspect population were even slightly larger, say, three individuals, 
then the chance of a match to either the second or the third untested individual also would be 
larger—about two in one trillion. If the suspect population were larger still—say, one thousand 
people—then the chance of a match to at least one of these one thousand people would be 
roughly one thousand out of one trillion (i.e., one in one billion). In all these small populations, 
the chance of a duplicate fingerprint is so small that one can be confident that no other match 
would be found.
The FBI uses such reasoning to make source attributions for DNA evidence when the estimated 
random-match probability for the specific DNA profile is very small relative to the suspect 
population.432 Courts have upheld these source attributions despite defense arguments that 
untested relatives might match or that the laboratory could have erred.433 The assertion is not that 
every identifying DNA profile is unique in all populations, but only that the probability of finding 
no other matching profiles in a smaller population (such as that of the United States) is close 
to one. For a one-in-one-trillion probability of a random match to a particular DNA profile, for 
example, the probability that no unrelated resident of the United States would match that profile 
is approximately 1 – (3 × 108) × 10–12 = 0.997.
This reasoning differs from the theory of global individualization of fingerprints in two respects. 
First, the DNA computation pertains only to the population of the United States and not to the 
much larger population of the entire world. Second, the DNA computation does not purport 
to show that every DNA profile in the smaller population is unique to an individual (and any 
identical twin of that individual). Rather, the computation merely gives the probability that the 
one profile that has been observed to match the suspect is duplicated in a population of unrelated 
individuals. The latter difference is often analogized to the famous Birthday Paradox. You can be 
pretty sure that if you are in a room with 22 other people, your birthday is unique to you. If every 
birthday is equally frequent in the population and if leap years are ignored, the probability is [1 – 
(1/365)]23 = 0.94. But it is more probable than not (p = 0.5073) that at least one pair of people in 
the room has the same birthday. A specific birthday probably is unique in the room, but birthdates 
are probably not a unique identifier, even in this small population.434
For single-source testimony to be admissible under the theory that the random-match probability 
is so small that the duplication probability in a particular region is negligible, the expert would 
need to have a reasonable estimate of the random-match probability, or at least an upper bound 
on this quantity. Statistical models of fingerprint features date back to Galton, but the early 
models suffer from reliance on untested assumptions of independence and the failure to take into
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account the spatial relationships of features, distortion, and variability among examiners.435 
Recent work is intended to address these limitations, and it is possible that a basis for opinions of 
the individuality for some latent prints in various populations can be established.436
6.7.4		 Describing	the	Significance	of	a	Match:	Random-Match	Probabilities
Although specific-individualization testimony has been held admissible for DNA typing, the 
usual testimony is that there is a high degree of similarity and a low probability of such similarity 
when the defendant is not the source (but coincidentally possesses similar physical features). 
When good estimates of the frequency of the feature set exist, a numerical probability statement 
is admissible in court.437
The statistical models for DNA frequencies, being based upon theories of population genetics 
and data from many samples, are not of much help with more complex patterns such as 
fingerprints that result from different random processes. However, data-driven statistical analyses 
of feature combinations could provide highly conservative estimates that should be admissible. 
When such “improbability testimony” was presented in the past, however, it rested on an 
inadequate scientific foundation. For example, in Commonwealth v. Drayton,438
a fingerprint expert, duly qualified, testified that fingerprints found on the wooden 
box and prints taken from the defendant showed twelve “points of similarity,” and 
stated his opinion that the fingerprints on the box were those of the defendant. On 
redirect examination, the prosecutor asked the witness to give his opinion on the 
statistical probability that prints with twelve points of similarity could be made by 
two different people. The witness replied that “there is a figure of one out of 387 
trillion.”439
On appeal from the resulting conviction, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held 
that although the probability should have been excluded because it “lacked foundation and 
exceeded the witness’s expertise,”440 the “brief, cumulative statement concerning statistics was 
harmless.”441
Modern databases and computer technology are capable of providing more defensible probability 
estimates. One prominent researcher noted that
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systematic research on the selectivity of fingerprint features [points] towards an 
extreme selectivity of these features, even when partial and limited information 
is considered. ... For example … even very limited configurations of fingerprint 
minutiae can provide very powerful evidence with match probabilities in the 
order of 1 in a billion, even without considering the statistical contribution of 
level 1 features (general pattern, ridge counts, etc.) or other fingerprint features if 
available.442
In the words of one forensic science textbook, “no standard model for random-match 
probabilities has been adopted for forensic fingerprint casework, but that day is coming.”443
6.7.5		 Describing	the	Significance	of	a	Match:	Strength	of	Evidence
In the types of testimony considered so far, the expert expresses a categorical opinion about 
who is the source of a latent print or the probability of a match if an individual other than the 
matching suspect is the source. A substantial body of literature urges forensic scientists to eschew 
both of these approaches and to confine their testimony to statements about how probable the 
evidence is when the defendant, as opposed to another (perhaps randomly selected) individual, is 
the source—that is, to presenting likelihoods or likelihood ratios.444
In this likelihood approach, the forensic scientist or analyst never gives an opinion about the 
prosecution’s claim that the defendant is the source. Rather, the expert describes in words or 
numbers the chances of seeing the evidence in two situations: (1) when the defendant is the 
source and (2) when someone else is. As noted earlier, the ratio of these quantities, the likelihood 
ratio, measures the strength of the evidence in favor of identity. The NRC report implicitly 
endorses this mode of reporting when it states that
although some disciplines have developed vocabulary and scales to be used in 
reporting results, they have not become standard practice. This imprecision in 
vocabulary stems in part from the paucity of research in forensic science and 
the corresponding limitations in interpreting the results of forensic analyses. 
Publications such as Evett et al., Aitken and Taroni, and Evett provide the 
essential building blocks for the proper assessment and communication of 
forensic findings.445
Evett and other forensic scientists propose the following table for “reporting the value of the 
support of the evidence.”
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Range of Likelihood Ratio Strength of Evidence
1 < LR ≤ 10 Limited evidence to support
10 < LR ≤ 100 Moderate evidence to support
100 < LR ≤ 1000 Moderately strong evidence to support
1000 < LR ≤ 10000 Strong evidence to support
10000 < LR Very strong evidence to support
Table 6.1: Strength of likelihood ratios in support of evidence446
Decades ago, a similar mapping, ranging from “not useful” (LR < 4) to “practically proved” (LR 
≥ 499), became the norm in the parentage testing community.447
Modern proponents of likelihood-based presentations argue that “the fingerprint profession has 
to recognize that conclusions of identification to the exclusion of all others are essentially outside 
the realm of the expert witness. … Testimony should limit itself to expressing the contribution 
of the findings in favor of one proposition (identity of sources) versus another (nonidentity 
of sources).”448 In Europe, the Association of Forensic Science Providers has described how 
practitioners can implement this approach to expert evaluations of evidence.449 Even when 
precise values of the likelihood ratio for a type of evidence is not available, an expert can rely on 
subjective probabilities in a table, such as the one above, to describe the weight of the evidence 
without taking the further step of drawing a conclusion about what the evidence proves. In a 
fingerprint case, an examiner using this framework might testify that the degree of similarity (a 
“match”) is “very strong” evidence that the latent print originated from the defendant’s finger450 
because, based on what is known in the field, it is far more probable that this degree of similarity 
would occur when comparing the latent print with the defendant’s fingers than with someone 
else’s fingers. This is certainly a more modest claim than an absolute source attribution based 
on the theory of global general uniqueness. Furthermore, in the case of a competent and careful 
comparison, it would be far less vulnerable to the charge of over-claiming. Judicial acceptance 
of such testimony need not await the admission of likelihood ratios from the automated systems 
described in Chapter 4.
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452 Gill, P., J. Curran, C. Neumann, et al. “Interpretation of Complex DNA Profiles Using Empirical Models and a 
Method to Measure Their Robustness.” Forensic Science International, 2 (2008): 9.
453 See, e.g., Morrison, G. “Measuring the Validity and Reliability of Forensic Likelihood-Ratio Systems.” Science 
& Justice, 51 (2011): 91 – 98. Some researchers have suggested that Tippett plots could be used to compute such 
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see Evett, I. and J. Buckleton. “Statistical Analysis of STR Data.” Advances in Forensic Haemogenetics, 6 (1996): 
79; Srihari, S., C. Huang, and H. Srinivasan. “On the Discriminability of the Handwriting of Twins.” Journal 
of Forensic Science, 53 (2008): 430. For an example of Tippett plots for fingerprint analysis, see Egli, N., C. 
Champod, and P. Margot. “Evidence Evaluation in Fingerprint Comparison and Automated Fingerprint Identification 
Systems—Modelling Within Finger Variability.” Forensic Science International, 167 (2007): 189–95.
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S. Morris. “Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace 
Evidence with a Relatively Small Random-Match Probability.” Journal of Legal Studies, 34 (2005): 395. However, 
no study has included the use of likelihoods. Kaye, D., V. Hans, B. Dann, et al. “Statistics in the Jury Box: How 
Jurors Respond to Mitochondrial DNA Probabilities.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 4 (2007): 797.
455 Kaye, The Double Helix and the Law of Evidence, 2010, op. cit.; cases cited Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. 
cit.
Nevertheless, the strength-of-evidence approach is easier to use when more objective estimates 
of likelihoods can be computed, and statistical models to estimate likelihood ratios for fingerprint 
evidence have been developed. They have the potential to replace rigid, categorical opinions with 
more finely graded, numerical expressions of the probative value of the evidence (see Chapter 
4). Some experts favor directly presenting the numerical value of the likelihood ratio to the jury, 
as is done in some DNA cases.451 Others have proposed comparing the likelihood ratio derived 
from the latent and exemplar in the case at hand to simulated ratios for pairings of the latent print 
with unrelated exemplars.452 The strength of the evidence then can be stated as the proportion 
of known cases with a lower likelihood ratio than that for the case at hand. For instance, the 
prosecution could point out that the likelihood ratio is higher than it is for 75% of cases in which 
two prints came from the same finger; the defense could reply that the same ratio was lower than 
it is for 25% of cases in which the prints came from the same finger.453
Of course, for numerical likelihood ratios to be admissible as evidence, the models must be 
adequately validated and accepted in the scientific community, and the courts must be persuaded 
that expressing the strength of evidence in the form of a likelihood ratio is not too confusing for 
juries.454 The same concerns were raised with the presentation of likelihood ratios in DNA cases, 
and this form of testimony has been admitted in that area.455
6.7.6		 Describing	the	Significance	of	a	Match:	Posterior	Probabilities
One argument for using the likelihood ratio to grade the strength of the evidence comes from a 
basic formula of probability theory known as Bayes’s rule (see Chapter 1). The formula describes 
the impact of an item of evidence on the odds that a proposition is true. It states that the odds 
in favor of the proposition are its prior odds adjusted (multiplicatively) by the likelihood ratio: 
posterior odds = likelihood ratio × prior odds. For example, if, before considering a fingerprint 
match to a suspect, it is assumed that the odds that the suspect left the latent print are 1 to 300 
million (roughly the size of the U.S. population), then, for a match with a likelihood ratio of 1 
billion, the posterior odds that the suspect is the source is 109 × 1/(3 × 106) = 333:1.
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456 The case law is analyzed in Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit., § 12.8.5. 
457 State v. McGrew, 682 N.E.2d 1289 (Ind. 1997).
458 Ibid., p. 1291.
459 Cases are cited in National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Scientific 
Assessment of Bullet Lead Elemental Composition Comparison. Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence. 
National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 91 – 94.
Computations of this type have been introduced into court, primarily in parentage testing cases 
arbitrarily using prior odds of one-to-one. In other areas, courts in America and England have 
been less accommodating.456 There are obvious problems in defining the prior probability 
distribution. Assuming that everyone in the U.S. could have committed a particular crime, as in 
the example above, is plainly unrealistic.
6.7.7		 Describing	the	Significance	of	a	Match:	No	Inference
When the distinguishing features of trace evidence are extremely rare, the evidence is highly 
probative—a particular set of features is many times more probable when the unknown trace 
sample and the known sample have a common source than when they do not. But for most 
identification technologies, scientific research to quantify the rarity of the set of identifying 
features is not feasible or available. Examples include hair morphology, compositional analysis 
of bullet lead, handwriting, and toolmarks. Analysis of these characteristics is surely informative, 
but it is difficult to provide a sharp estimate of probative value because of the absence of a 
typology of features that lends itself to estimates of population frequencies and the inability to 
compute a likelihood ratio from public data. In this situation, analysts in some fields do not even 
venture an opinion about the significance of the similarities they detect. Thus, in microscopic 
hair comparisons, unadorned “consistent with” testimony is the norm. In State v. McGrew,457 for 
example, the hair examiner testified as follows:
Court: In regard to the examination. It is simply a physical, visual examination of 
the hair.
Analyst: Yes sir.
Court: You simply say that one hair looks like another one or it doesn’t look like 
another one.
Analyst: I say it’s sufficiently similar to have come from that person or it is 
dissimilar.
Court: And if you say that it ... [is] similar to come from that person ... that 
doesn’t mean that it comes from that person.
Analyst: It just simply means that it could have come from that person.
Court: And you do not know the statistical percentages of how many people 
would have similar hair?
Analyst: There are no statistics. It’s hard to say.458
Similar testimony appears in some cases involving tests for the concentration of elements in 
bullet fragments and bullets found in a defendant’s possession.459
Some courts have followed this no-inference approach in cases involving the comparisons of 
documents and toolmarks.460 In United States v. McVeigh461 and United States v. Nichols,462 the
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463 See, e.g., Mnookin, J. “The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science.” Brooklyn Law Review, 75, no. 
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468 United States v. Zajac, No. 2:06-cr-00811 CW (D. Utah Sept. 16, 2010).
469 E.g., Stoney, 2001, op. cit., p. 327.
government sought to show that a padlock at a quarry from which explosives were stolen 
had been opened by drilling with a drill bit found in Nichols’s home. In the former case, an 
FBI toolmark examiner testified that “this drill bit produced marks that were contained in the 
padlock.” In the latter case, when the same witness testified that he had attempted to “determine 
whether or not that drill bit made the impressions contained on that lock cylinder,” the district 
court struck the testimony “because what is permitted here is to show [only] what he saw through 
the microscope and the comparison microscope and then with his experience and training the 
similarities that he pointed out.” Thus, the toolmark examiner was allowed to testify to the 
marks, but no more than that. Similarly, a few courts confined testimony to comparing features in 
handwriting cases and, for a brief moment, in a fingerprint case.463
A slight enhancement to pure “consistent with” testimony is a statement that “the probability of 
a match is greater if the bullets came from the same CIVL [compositionally indistinguishable 
volume of lead] than if they came from different CIVLs, and the odds that the bullets came from 
the same CIVL are greater with the matching evidence than without it.”464 In other words, the 
expert can report that the likelihood ratio is greater than one, but not how much greater.
Although the forensic examiners’ experience suggests that the failure to exclude a suspect 
based upon the evidence is relevant, the jury has no experience of its own with which to judge 
how probative the findings are. Hair and toolmarks, for example, do differ from one instance to 
another,465 but it is difficult for the jury to know what to make of testimony that the defendant (or 
the material in the defendant’s possession) is consistent with the evidence collected at the crime 
scene.466 Nonetheless, compared to complete exclusion of the match, this truncated presentation 
makes sense when it is known that the similar characteristics show substantial variation in the 
population and when an untutored jury is not likely to overestimate the variability.467 Thus, one 
court recently limited a latent print examiner to explaining the basis for a conclusion that “the 
latent fingerprint … is consistent with the known print” by describing “the specific characteristics 
and markers in the prints” and adding that “based on his experience, certain markers are more 
common or less common.”468
The details of fingerprints are extremely variable,469 but those who question the premises of 
universal individualization would still object that even with no-inference testimony, the jury will 
overvalue the finding of a match. At the other pole, those who believe that a latent print can
137 Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis
470 Even the current terminology of identification, exclusion, or inconclusive to describe the outcome of the 
Evaluation phase of ACE-V could be redefined using the concept of relative likelihood. For example, the definition 
of these terms in the first two sample reports in the Appendix to Chapter 5 could be rephrased as follows:
Evaluation is the formulation of a conclusion based upon the information gathered during analysis and 
comparison. The evaluation can result in three outcomes: (1) an exclusion is an opinion that the level of 
disagreement in comparable areas is far more likely to be observed if the two prints did not originate from 
the same source than if they came from the same finger; (2) an identification is an opinion that the level of 
agreement in comparable areas is far more likely if the two prints originated from the same finger than if they 
came from different sources; or (3) an inconclusive result occurs when the information in comparable areas is 
inadequate for an identification or an exclusion.
match only a single individual in the history of life on Earth would object that the absence of 
testimony to that effect deprives the jury of useful information.
In sum, the existing practice of latent print experts is to provide a firm opinion regarding whether 
a named individual is the source of a questioned print (either a universal individualization or 
an exclusion) or to give no opinion (by stating that the unknown impression is insufficient for 
a definitive comparison or that the comparison is inconclusive). But other ways to describe the 
possible association include statements about the strength of the evidence (the likelihoods) or 
the posterior probability. With appropriate data and validated modeling, such statements could 
be quantitative (see Chapter 4), but less precise qualitative descriptions of the strength of the 
evidence or the source probability also are possible. If expert knowledge permits opinions that 
a latent print came from a single individual and could not have come from anyone else in the 
world then, a fortiori, it supports opinions such as the following: it is unlikely that the print 
came from anyone else in a particular locale, it is much more likely to observe such similar 
prints from the same source than from different people, and the similarities in the prints support 
the prosecution’s hypothesis that the defendant is the source of the questioned print much more 
than they support the defendant’s hypothesis that they originated from different fingers.470 Given 
the current state of scientific and professional knowledge, however, it is best to avoid testimony 
based on the theory of global general uniqueness. Recommendation 3.7, that examiners not 
testify to an identification to the exclusion of all other individuals in the world, requires other, 
more conservative methods for conveying the probative value of a match. For that reason, this 
chapter identifies a broad spectrum of alternatives. The Working Group did not reach a consensus 
on which of these alternatives to universal-individualization testimony is best.
6.8  Internal Review of Reports and Testimony
Chapters 4 and 5 emphasize the role of forensic scientists and examiners in communicating their 
findings to a variety of audiences, including criminal investigators, lawyers, and judges and 
juries. The recommendations include practices to facilitate the accurate and fair transmission of 
forensic investigations to these groups. The final recommendation is that a system be instituted 
to monitor the reports and testimony of practitioners. Performance reviews can ensure that the 
latent print unit’s policies for reporting and testifying are followed and can provide feedback to 
sustain and improve performance of these tasks.
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471 Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Quality Assurance Guidelines for 
Latent Print Examiners. Guideline 5.5.1, Version 3.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study 
and Technology, September 2006; Peterson, Dreyfus, Gische, et al., op. cit.
Recommendation 6.4: An agency that employs latent print examiners should establish 
requirements and guidelines for reporting, documentation, and testimony. The agency 
should review a sample of every examiner’s case reports, documentation, and testimony 
and	affidavits	at	least	annually	to	verify	compliance	with	these	requirements	and	
guidelines.
SWGFAST and the FBI give similar advice, but their recommendations allow a survey form and 
statements from court officials to substitute for direct observation of live, recorded, or transcribed 
testimony.471 Presumably “court officials” means judges or lawyers, but review by laboratory 
managers and accrediting bodies as part of periodic inspections or in response to complaints 
from lawyers or their clients would be more appropriate to identify adherence to professional 
canons and organizational policies.
6.9  Summary
This chapter describes the nature and role of expert testimony, pretrial communications between 
experts and lawyers, and the legal and ethical principles applicable to expert testimony. It 
considers the admissibility of different types of testimony about the possibility of erroneous 
identifications or exclusions. It also presents a spectrum of conceivable modes of conveying 
expert knowledge and findings about the possible association between a friction skin impression 
and its source. These range from a bare description of the relevant similarities, to statements 
about the strength of evidence (likelihoods), to outright conclusions about the source (source 
attributions or probabilities). Finally, the chapter discusses quality assurance and control for 
testimony.
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Chapter 7: A Systems Approach to the Work Environment
Introduction and Scope
The environment in which latent print examiners work encompasses physiological and cognitive 
factors; management and leadership culture, communications, and collaboration opportunities; 
and the physical workspace. Well-designed work environments can improve productivity, 
increase user satisfaction, and reduce the risk of errors and injuries. Conversely, poorly designed 
environments contribute to poor performance. When an error occurs, most people tend to 
blame other humans rather than to consider the design, environmental working conditions, or 
management culture of the total system.472 Yet errors are often the consequence of an entire 
system.473
A study of human factors examines human operators’ physical and psychological needs, 
capabilities, and limitations in both normal and emergency operations. A thorough analysis of 
workstations, job demands, mental workload, organizational characteristics, training needs, and 
supervisory systems is necessary to facilitate and enhance performance. Large-scale disasters, 
such as the accidents at the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear power plants, the Bhopal 
pesticide plant, and the Challenger space shuttle dramatically highlight the need for such 
analyses.474
Figure 7.1 sketches an example of a human factors framework that, if not properly understood, 
can lead to adverse events. This chapter addresses issues displayed in Tiers 1–3 of the figure 
and analyzes the latent print examiners’ work environments to identify factors that could affect 
their performance. It enumerates the factors that contribute to an effective latent print analysis 
work environment, and it describes the anatomical, physiological, and psychological aspects of 
latent print examiners in their environment. It also suggests ways for managers to reduce injuries 
and errors; to increase productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness; and to improve the comfort of 
latent print examiners.
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Figure 7.1: A human factors framework475
475 Image adapted from Henriksen, K., E. Dayton, M. Keyes, et al. “Understanding Adverse Events: A Human
Factors Framework.” In Patient Safety and Quality: An Evidence-Based Handbook for Nurses edited by Ronda G.
Hughes. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2008.
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7.1 Human Factors and the Work Environment
The study of human factors focuses on
the interaction between human and
products, decisions, procedures,
workspaces, and the overall environment
encountered at work and in daily
living.477 As the Institute of Medicine
explains, most factors that give rise to
preventable adverse events are
systemic.478 These events are not just the
result of isolated or idiosyncratic
behavior.
Often, people are required to work in
poorly designed environments that have
not had human strengths and limitations
incorporated into the design process. A
work environment can be disruptive,
stressful, and unsafe, leading to
unnecessary fatigue. It is well understood
in various industries, including
“high-risk industries” such as the
medical profession, that a physical work
environment purposefully designed for
the nature of the work to be performed
will result in improved efficiency and
productivity.479 Proper design of the
physical workspace, standardization of
facility systems and equipment,
ventilation systems for pathogen control,
appropriate and adjustable lighting, and
noise reduction are necessary for
lowering stress and improving
performance.
Box 7.1: Three Mile Island Accident
The Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident is the 
most investigated accident in the history of the commercial 
nuclear industry. Because human factors considerations 
were not included in the design of the control room, 
operators experienced problems locating or accessing the 
tools and information they needed.
• System controls were not located near the 
instruments that displayed the condition of the 
system. For example, operators could not view 
the indicator display for the high-pressure system 
while operating the throttle valve to adjust 
pressure.
• Some instruments looked very similar and were 
located near one another but controlled different 
functions.
• Other instruments were difficult to read due to 
glare from poor lighting or obstruction by other 
controls.
• Throughout the control room, there was no 
consistent meaning of indicators (such as lights 
and alarms) or function of instruments (such as 
levers and knobs) between controls.
• At the time of the accident, operators in the control 
room heard 3 alarms and saw more than 1,600 
blinking lights.
• Operators had not received adequate stress training 
to enable them to cope with such a large-scale, 
multiple systems failure.476
These design problems illustrate the range of situations 
and conditions that the human factors approach should 
consider.
476 Meshkati, N. “Human Factors in Large-Scale Technological Systems’ Accidents: Three-Mile Island, Bhopal,
Chernobyl.” Organization & Environment, 5, no. 2 (June 1991): 133–54.
477 Sanders, J. and E. McCormick. Human Factors Engineering and Design. McGraw-Hill
Science/Engineering/Math, 1993.
478 NAS, Institute of Medicine, op. cit.
479 Ulrich, R., X. Quan, C. Zimring, et al. “The Role of the Physical Environment in the Hospital of the 21st
Century: A Once-In-A-Lifetime Opportunity.” In Designing the 21st Century Hospital Project, The Center for
Health Design. May 2005. See also Chapanis, A., W. Garner, and C. Morgan. Applied Experimental Psychology:
Human Factors Engineering Design. Wiley, 1985 (“It is in the system design of the work environment as a whole
where efficiencies and productivity will be realized.”).
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Sound workplace design begins with a thorough understanding of user requirements. Since 
the early 1970s, architects have used methods, similar to function and task analysis techniques 
developed by human factors practitioners, that inventory all of the activities that will be 
performed in an environment to ensure that the appropriate requirements are defined and 
implemented. 480
The International Organization of Standardization’s standard on ergonomic requirements (ISO
9241) defines usability as “the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to
achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a specified context of
use.” 481
In its narrowest sense, usability involves the evaluation of a system; in its broadest sense,
usability involves users throughout the system lifecycle (i.e., through the requirements definition,
design, development, and evaluation phases).482 The most successful designs involve users
iteratively starting with the early stages of design to develop and refine the designs.483 This 
usercentered design process involves:
• Early focus on users, their tasks, and their environments;
• Active involvement of users;
• Appropriate allocation of function between user and system;
• Incorporation of user-derived feedback into the design; and
• Iterative design, where a prototype is designed, tested, and modified.484
By contributing to the design of a usable work environment, latent print examiners can enhance
ease of use, improve user performance and satisfaction, and reduce system complexity and
support and training costs. The goal of designing a work environment following usability
principles is to improve performance, to increase accuracy, to decrease time to prepare latent
prints for search, to decrease support and training costs, and to increase user acceptance.
Appendix A provides additional information on user-centered design.
Recommendation 7.1: A structured approach that involves users throughout the entire
design and implementation process should be followed when designing technology
systems and the physical work environment. In addition, forensic service providers
should perform usability testing to optimize user performance and user satisfaction
before deployment.
480 Zimring, C., M. Rashid, and K. Kampschroer. “Facility Performance Evaluation (FPE).” Whole Building Design
Guide. National Institute of Building Sciences. 2010.
481 International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomic Requirements for Office Work with Visual Display
Terminals (VDTs)—Part 11: Guidance on Usability, ISO 9241-11:1998. International Organization for
Standardization, 1998.
482 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology. Usability & Biometrics:
Ensuring Successful Biometric Systems. National Institute of Standards and Technology, June 11, 2008.
483 Nielsen, J. Usability Engineering. Morgan Kaufmann, 1993.
484 Maguire, M. “Context of Use Within Usability Activities.” International Journal of Human-Computer Studies,
55 (2001): 453–83
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7.2 A Human Factors Approach to Latent Print Practices
A truly usable work environment considers the needs of the latent print examiners throughout 
the design, development, and evaluation process. This process requires environmental designers 
to define the context of use (including the users’ individual characteristics), to define the user’s 
and the organization’s requirements for the space, to develop a design solution to meet those 
requirements, and to conduct user evaluations to ensure that the environment is meeting all 
requirements as efficiently as possible.485
7.2.1 Methodology
A human factors approach focuses on users’ needs and expectations and integrates direct user 
feedback throughout the design process. To achieve this goal, human factors experts may observe 
or interview users to better understand their needs, work processes, and the methodologies they 
apply in completing their work.
To better understand latent print examiners’ methodologies and processes as well as their 
environments, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Visualization and 
Usability Group interviewed a total of 16 latent print examiners from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Secret Service, 
and the New York State Department of Criminal Justice Services. Following these initial 
interviews, the team spent 2 days observing latent examiner teams at the Maryland State Forensic 
Laboratory, FBI, and United States Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) while 
they performed their usual work tasks in their usual work environments.
After approximately 21 hours of interviews and 32 hours of observation sessions, the team 
discovered that each organization uses a well-defined process to decide who performs which 
task, how they complete each task, and how they transition between tasks. The agencies 
also require specific documentation for each task and utilize procedures for transitioning the 
documentation through the steps. Each organization and its examiners are very comfortable with 
their processes and, to some extent, proud of them. These processes are tailored or unique to each 
organization.
The physical layout of each facility is very different and seems to depend on the size of the 
organization. Of the surveyed organizations, many have a separate workspace for the chemical 
processing of the evidence. Most examiners have a small desk, and in the larger organizations, 
the examiners’ desks are in small cubicles. Most of the desks are covered with stacks of paper, 
including photos and printouts. Printing and scanning are consistently important activities, and 
many desks include printers and scanners. The impression from all of the interviews is that the 
organizations are “paper bound.” Structured forms seem to be essential to all organizations.
Some organizations use “shops” or task-specific stations. For example, examiners use one 
workstation exclusively for case management, another for accessing the state automated
485 International Organization for Standardization. Human-Centered Design Process for Interactive Systems, ISO 
13407:1999. Withdrawn, 1999. Revised by International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomics of Human- 
System Interaction—Part 210: Human-Centered Design for Interactive Systems, ISO 9241-210:2010. International 
Organization for Standardization, 2010.
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fingerprint identification system (AFIS) database, another for accessing the local AFIS database, 
and another for linking to the FBI’s Integrated AFIS database. The examiner moves the physical 
evidence and associated documentation from station to station when working through the steps 
of the process.
In short, there is no one specific or even general solution to the design and specification of 
the laboratory environment. Design specifications must be tailored to individual departments. 
However, although each organization has a somewhat different process for examining latent 
prints, the NIST usability team recognized general similarities.
Common Features of the Manual Examination Process
Examiners use a manual process when the latent prints are not of AFIS quality or when there is 
a known suspect and it is necessary to eliminate victim prints. The manual examination process 
generally includes the following steps:
1. Prepare package (includes lift cards and latent photos);
2. Confirm package contents;
3. Assign card numbers to lift cards and latent photos;
4. Determine suitability of prints;
5. Mark latent print with symbols to document possible anatomical regions and print 
orientation;
6. Pull exemplar prints for comparison;
7. Begin comparison process on suitable prints;
8. Document results of the comparison; and
9. Conduct verification and technical review.
Common Features of the AFIS Process
When using AFIS, the examiners at the agencies studied generally perform the following steps:
1. Select a latent print to search;
2. Scan the print into the system or obtain a digital print;
3. Process the digital image in external image processing software;
4. Enter case data;
5. Encode unique ridge characteristics;
6. Set search criteria;
7. Launch AFIS search;
8. Examine the resulting candidate images;
9. Conduct verification and technical review; and
10. Document additional case data.
7.2.2 Work Environment Usability Goals
Environment designers, including software developers, should apply the user-centered design 
process to identify the requirements of the organization. Then, they should translate usability 
goals into measurable objectives for the latent print examiner environment. Environment 
designers can use these metrics to assess an environment’s usability. Examples of commonly 
used usability criteria include:
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• Success rate (effectiveness): Can users successfully work in the environment?
• Time on task (efficiency): Can users perform their tasks quickly in the environment?
• Time to learn a task (learnability): How long does it take a user to learn a product or the 
system?
• Memorability: Can users remember how to use the system, and does it aid the user in 
reducing the potential for error?
• Satisfaction: Are users comfortable in the environment?486
The tables and additional information in Appendix A provide a short description of each of these
usability goals and include some questions for environment designers to consider.
7.2.3 Design Approach for Latent Print Examination Environment
A user-centered design process involves users throughout the product lifecycle. When used for
latent print examiners, the approach includes:
• Identifying the types of users who will be using the workspaces (e.g., latent print 
examiners, forensic specialists, lab managers);
• Defining the context of use, including the operational environment (physical 
environment), user characteristics (anthropometrics), tasks, and social environment;
• Determining the user and organizational requirements, including business requirements, 
visual requirements, environmental requirements, and technical requirements;
• Developing the design solution, including the physical space (e.g., lighting, air quality, 
workspace, and noise), system design, and user interface; and
• Conducting an evaluation, including usability testing of the visual and environmental 
requirements of latent print examination tasks.487
The design process reflects the fact that all aspects of the workflow and environment are
interrelated. An examination of a forensic service provider’s process map and an independent
detailed analysis of how work is actually performed can reveal procedures that can lead to error.
Consideration should be given to the nature and demands of the work, the tools and technologies
used, the physical environment, and the organizational conditions, such as the level of
communication and collaboration among the individuals who perform the work or use the end
product. These elements are interdependent; a change in one work element has implications for
the other elements.
7.3 Observations of Impact Factors
Latent print comparisons require concentration. The environment in which an examiner works
influences his or her ability to maintain the necessary level of attentiveness. It is not enough to
consider only how the examiner will fit and function in the space from a physical perspective.
486 Nielsen, op. cit.
487 Maguire, op cit.; ISO 13407:1999 (withdrawn), op. cit.
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Attention to the impact that the physical workspace may have on cognitive processes, including
attentiveness, awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgment, is critical.
The following factors, which are discussed below, could influence the latent print examiner’s
work: occupational health and safety; medical surveillance; workstation configurations; software
applications and systems; screen interfaces; the placement, type, and format of instructions,
assistance, and help documentation; air quality, including temperature and humidity; lighting;
noise; interruptions or distractions; location of the workstation; and stress.
7.3.1 Occupational Health and Safety Issues
Occupational health and safety within the forensic laboratory system is mandatory. However,
workplace safety is not always a conscious or primary concern of latent print examiners. They
are generally busy with casework, trial preparation, proficiency testing, and other concerns.
The latent print examiner has the potential to come in contact with most types of physical
evidence submitted to the forensic service provider. Hazards may originate from the item of
evidence through sharp edges, chemical and biological contamination, or other hazards; the
evidence may also include firearms, ammunition, or explosives. Of special concern are items
contaminated or stained with human bodily fluids, which may contain blood-borne pathogens.
Additionally, latent print processing may employ hazardous chemicals, particulates, and intense
light sources. Chemical exposure is a serious concern. During the processing of latent prints,
examiners could be exposed to fumes, dust, and toxic or caustic chemicals. Additionally, 
postanalysis protection of certain latent examinations on physical evidence must be employed to
eliminate the chance of contamination to persons in the evidence chain of possession. This
typically is accomplished by storing the evidence in a container that prevents trace reagent
exposure.
An accident can have an effect on an examiner’s efficiency and performance quality. For
example, a malfunctioning fume hood could expose the examiner to vapors that impair
performance. Likewise, an employee who slips and falls in the work area could sprain a muscle
or fracture a bone, requiring medical attention and possibly resulting in long-term pain or limited
range of motion or dexterity. An injured examiner may have to compensate during the
examination procedure, and this could affect the results.
Many standards are relevant here, including Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) Standards, 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910, 1960, 1904; OSHA’s
bloodborne pathogens standard (29 CFR 1910.1030); and OSHA’s requirements for personal
protective equipment (29 CFR, 1910 Subpart I). Guidelines for safety committees are found in
29 CFR 1960. Airborne contaminant limits are described in 29 CFR 1910.1000.
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7.3.2 Medical Surveillance
Vision testing is important for latent print examiners. Studies indicate that age, environment, 
and task-specific activity can cause vision to deteriorate.488 It is not clear which tests are the 
most appropriate for evaluating vision challenges for latent print analysis.489 Table 7.1 indicates 
the American Optometric Association’s recommended frequency for eye examinations for adult 
patients. Individuals at risk “include those with diabetes, hypertension, or a family history of 
ocular disease (e.g., glaucoma, macular degeneration) … ; those working in occupations that are 
highly demanding visually or eye hazardous; those taking prescription or nonprescription drugs 
with ocular side effects; those wearing contact lenses; and those with other health concerns or 
conditions.”490
Examination Interval
Patient Age Asymptomatic (Risk Free) At Risk
18 to 40 years Every 2 years Every 1 to 2 years or as recommended
41 to 60 years Every 2 years Every 1 to 2 years or as recommended
61 years and older Every 1 year Every 1 year or as recommended
Table 7.1: Recommended eye examination frequency for adult patients491
Various tests are available to examine visual performance. For example, the Snellen chart is often 
used to measure visual acuity. Likewise, the Amsler Grid, a square grid with a black dot in the 
center, is used to detect changes in the central visual field. Proper use of the grid can detect very 
subtle changes in vision caused by a small amount of fluid under the retina.
Contrast sensitivity tests check for the ability to differentiate between light and dark. Regular use 
of the Hamilton Veale contrast sensitivity test, illustrated in Figure 7.2, is one effective way to
488 Sunness, J., G. Rubin, C. Applegate, et al. “Visual Function Abnormalities and Prognosis in Eyes with Age- 
Related Geographic Atrophy of the Macula and Good Visual Acuity.” Ophthalmology, 104 (1997): 1677.; Sunness, 
J., G. Rubin, A. Broman, et al. “Low Luminance Visual Dysfunction as a Predictor of Subsequent Visual Acuity 
Loss from Geographic Atrophy in Age-Related Macular Degeneration.” Ophthalmology, 115 (2008): 1480; 
Midena, E., A. Degli, M. Blarzino, et al. “Macular Function Impairment in Eyes with Early Age-Related Macular 
Degeneration.” Investigative Ophthalmology & Visual Science, 38 (February 1997): 469; Abramov, I. and J. Gordon. 
“Color Vision Panel Tests: A Metric for Interpreting Numeric Analytic Indices.” Optometry & Vision Science, 
86 (2009): 146; Montés-Micó, R. and T. Ferrer-Blasco. “Contrast Sensitivity Loss in the Peripheral Visual Field 
Following Laser in Situ Keratomileusis.” Journal of Cataract and Refractive Surgery, 33 (2007): 1120; Kon, C. and 
D. De Alwis. “A New Colour Vision Test for Clinical Use.” Eye (London, England), 10, pt. 1 (1996): 65-74.
489 Powers, M. “Paper Tools for Assessing Visual Function.” Optometry & Vision Science, 86 (2009): 613.; Bartlett, 
H., L. Davies, and F. Eperjesi. “The Macular Mapping Test: A Reliability Study.” BMC Ophthalmology, 10 (2005): 
18; Leat, S. and G. Woo. “The Validity of Current Clinical Tests of Contrast Sensitivity and Their Ability to Predict 
Reading Speed in Low Vision.” Eye (London, England), 11, pt. 6 (1997): 893; Witmer, M., C. Margo, and M. 
Drucker. “Tilted Optic Disks.” Survey of Ophthalmology, 10 (2010): 403; Barnhardt, C., S. Clock, B. Demmer, et 
al. “Color Vision Screening for Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities: A Comparison Between the Neitz Test of 
Color Vision and Color Vision Testing Made Easy.” Optometry, 77 (2006): 211; Isaac, D., M. Avila, and A. Cialdini. 
“Comparison of the Original Amsler Grid with the Preferential Hyperacuity Perimeter for Detecting
Choroidal Neovascularization in Age-Related Macular Degeneration.” Optometry, 79 (2008): 397.
490 American Optometric Association. Comprehensive Adult Eye and Vision Examination. American Optometric
Association, 2005.
491 Adapted from American Optometric Association, op. cit.
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monitor contrast sensitivity function over time.492 Forensic service 
providers should perform other vision tests regularly so that 
examiners know when they need to seek corrections to their sight 
to maintain high visual acuity.
Recommendation 7.2: Forensic service providers should 
institute medical surveillance for examiners with respect to 
activities	specific	to	friction	ridge	examination.	Corrective	
measures should be taken when appropriate and recorded. 
The program should include a baseline visual examination 
followed by annual vision testing to detect vision 
deficiencies	that	may	affect	interpretation	of	the	evidence.	
The federal government should support research 
to determine the most appropriate tests of visual 
function for friction ridge examiners.
7.3.3	 Workstation	Configuration
Workstation considerations include the physical location and 
design of the workstation as well as the desk height, counter 
height, and other spatial layout requirements. Latent print 
examinations require sufficient space for the latent prints, 
exemplars, documentation worksheets, magnifying glasses, 
pointers, writing instruments, and desktop task lighting. The 
space should permit the required materials to be laid out for the 
sequential process and to be accessible without undue attention or 
effort. Clutter is a potential source of frustration and error.
Examiners experience physical problems, such as repetitive 
motion injuries, from a lack of ergonomic workstation design. 
Complicating this design issue is the fact that many examiners 
are required to share workstations across shifts. Inadequacies can 
include nonadjustable keyboards; awkward positioning of the mouse; chairs, desks, and monitors 
that are not adjustable to accommodate for different user heights; inadequate desk space for 
papers, work products, and equipment; insufficient leg and knee room under the desk; furniture 
that impedes equipment access; and lighting that cannot be adjusted for using magnifiers.
The working environment and user work posture are critical in preventing repetitive motion 
injuries. The impact of ergonomics on individual productivity in domains such as automobile 
manufacture, food processing, and healthcare is well documented.493 Good ergonomic designs 
Figure 7.2: The Hamilton Veale
contrast sensitivity test
Figure 7.3: An example of
a poorly designed
workstation
492 The Hamilton Veale contrast sensitivity chart should be used in conjunction with an Amsler Grid to detect visual 
function loss in all cases with macular degeneration.
493 Cocci, S., K. Namaisvayam, and P. Bordi. “An Investigation of Ergonomic Design and Productivity 
Improvements in Foodservice Production Tables.” Foodservice Research International, 16 (2005): 53; Kolich, M. 
and S. Taboun. “Ergonomics Modeling and Evaluation of Automobile Seat Comfort.” Ergonomics, 47, no. 8 (June 
22, 2004): 841–63; Stone, R. and R. McCloy. “Ergonomics in Medicine and Surgery.” BMJ, 328, no. 7448 (May 6,
2004).
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increase output per worker and reduce errors, accidents, injuries, illnesses, training time, 
maintenance time, absenteeism, and turnover. Although no studies have focused on latent 
print examiners, there is no reason to believe that the results would not generalize from related 
occupations.
At a minimum, an examiner’s workstation should have keyboard shelves that are adjustable 
to accommodate different heights; computer mice that can be repositioned; chairs that are 
adjustable for height, arms, and back support; desktops that have mechanisms for adjusting 
tilt and height; monitors that are adjustable both in height and user proximity; and a desk 
with sufficient workspace, legroom, and knee space. Applicable standards include ISO 9241- 
302:2008.494
7.3.4 Software Applications and Systems
It is critical to include latent print examiners in 
the design of all solutions, especially technology 
solutions. Eliciting requirements from latent 
examiners and having them participate in 
usability testing is necessary to create successful 
and usable products and processes. The usability 
testing and evaluation process permits the user 
to provide data about what works and what does 
not. The iterative nature of the process allows 
changes to produce an optimized software 
application or solution. Too often, usability 
evaluations are carried out, if at all, only after 
a product has been designed, developed, and 
deployed. Applicable standards are ISO/IEC 
9126,495 ISO 9241-210,496 and ISO/IEC 25062497 
(software engineering, software product quality 
requirements and evaluation, and common 
industry format for usability test reports).
Figure 7.4: An example of a poorly designed
user interface
494 International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomics of Human-System Interaction—Part 302: 
Terminology for Electronic Visual Displays, ISO 9241-302:2008. International Organization for Standardization, 
2008; International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomics of Human-System Interaction—Part 305: Optical 
Laboratory Test Methods for Electronic Visual Displays, ISO 9241-305:2008. International Organization for 
Standardization, 2008. Both of these standards replace the withdrawn International Organization for Standardization. 
Ergonomic Requirements for Work with Visual Displays Based on Flat Panels), ISO 13406:1999 (withdrawn). 
International Organization for Standardization, 1999.
495 International Organization for Standardization. Software Engineering—Product Quality, ISO/IEC 9126:2001. 
International Organization for Standardization, 2001.
496 International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomics of Human-System Interaction—Part 210: Human- 
Centered Design for Interactive Systems, ISO 9241-210:2010. International Organization for Standardization, 2010. 
Replaces the withdrawn standard ISO 13407:1999, op. cit.
497 International Organization for Standardization. Software Engineering—Software Product Quality Requirements 
and Evaluation (SQuaRE)—Common Industry Format (CIF) for Usability Test Reports, ISO/IEC 25062:2006. 
International Organization for Standardization, 2006.
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7.3.5 Screen Interfaces
Poorly designed software interfaces were observed in some laboratories. For example, in Figure 
7.4, the color combination (i.e., red background with blue text) is difficult to read, causes 
eyestrain, and has the potential to increase errors. The applicable standards are ISO/IEC 9126,498 
ISO 10075-2,499 ISO 9241-210,500; and ISO/IEC 14598.501
7.3.6 Instructions, Assistance, and Help
Examiners work across disparate application interfaces, which can be confusing. Managers 
should place instructions of all types and formats in locations accessible and visible to 
employees. Posted instructions should include icons and font sizes that are large enough to 
see. Forensic service providers should also consider the best ways to present error feedback, 
assistance, and helpful information to examiners. Although the NIST team did not document 
instructional training process or online help functions, any instructions or help should follow 
human factors guidelines and standards.
Online documentation, training, and help can be beneficial. Unfortunately, most of the current 
online documentation is little more than paper documentation displayed on a computer screen. 
Designers of online instruction and documentation should consider the delivery technique and 
should utilize indexes, searches, and other navigational tools, including text, graphics, and icons, 
to help users find relevant content.502 Research on both hard-copy and online documentation 
suggests that users seldom read the entire document.503 Learning styles also influence the user’s 
preference in accessing information.504
Many icons used in instructions for examiners do not easily describe the tasks they represent. For
some especially obscure icons, even pop-up label descriptions do not assist in comprehension.505 
Designers should use standard icons whenever possible and should conduct usability testing 
before launching the prodcut. Applicable standards are ISO/IEC/IEEE 26512506 and ISO/IEC 
11581.507
498 ISO/IEC 9126:2001, op cit.
499 International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomic Principles Related to Mental Workload—Part 2: 
Design Principles, ISO 10075-2:1996. International Organization for Standardization, 1996.
500 ISO 9241-210:2010, op cit.
501 International Organization for Standardization. Information Technology—Software Product Evaluation, ISO/IEC 
14598:1999. International Organization for Standardization, 1999.
502 Moallem, A. “Usability of Software Online Documentation: A User Study.” HCI International, 1 (2003): 549.
503 Rettig, M. “Nobody Reads Documentation.” Communications of the ACM, 34 (1991): 19.
504 Kolb, D. Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development. Prentice Hall, 1984; 
Felder, R. “Reaching the Second Tier: Learning and Teaching Styles in College Science Education.” Journal of 
College Science Teaching, 23 (1993): 286.
505 Zammit, K. “Computer Icons: A Picture Says a Thousand Words. Or Does It?” Journal of Educational Computing 
Research, 23 (2000): 217.
506 International Organization for Standardization. Systems and Software Engineering—Requirements for Acquirers 
and Suppliers of User Documentation, ISO/IEC/IEEE 26512:2011. International Organization for Standardization, 
2001. Replaces the withdrawn standard I International Organization for Standardization. Information Technology— 
Software User Documentation Process, ISO/IEC 15910:1999 (withdrawn). International Organization for 
Standardization, 1999.
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7.3.7 Environmental Factors
Air Quality
Air quality refers to the average or extreme temperature and humidity of the location along with
any contaminants. It is often difficult to control air temperature and airflow, especially in open
office spaces. Examiners’ movements between offices and the additional heat resulting from that
movement complicate control over air quality. Fortunately, temperature can be controlled with
some degree of accuracy depending on the building’s heating, ventilating, and air conditioning
(HVAC) system. Indoor temperature affects comfort, perceived air quality, sick building
syndrome symptoms, and performance.508
Suboptimal ventilation rates and higher occupancy density are associated with lower work
performance.509 Improved perceived air quality reduces the intensity of sick building syndrome
symptoms and improves performance.510 Latent print unit managers should monitor the airflow
and temperature in all examiner workspaces and, if needed, should install desktop task or
ambient conditioning systems or air purifying systems. The standards applicable to air quality are
OSHA Section III Chapter 2 (general recommendations for indoor air quality problems including
ventilation, air treatment, and source controls)511 and ISO 16814 (specifying methods to express
the quality of indoor air suitable for human occupancy allowing several acceptable target levels
of indoor air quality depending on local requirements, constraints, and expectations).512
Lighting
Examiners may experience vision problems, eyestrain, and injury with insufficient or
inappropriate lighting. Placing monitors in front of windows increases glare. Glare from 
nonadjustable and non-directional lighting fixtures and lamps results in squinting. Inadequate 
levels of light for the task, inconsistent background luminosity, a lack of natural lighting, a lack 
of window fixtures to control natural light, as well as nonadjustable lamps for use during
magnification all can cause glare. However, studies have found that a view out a window is
associated with better worker performance, less fatigue, and better self-reported health
507 International Organization for Standardization. Information Technology—User System Interfaces and Symbols—
Icon Symbols and Functions, ISO/IEC 11581:2000. International Organization for Standardization, 2000.
508 Seppänen, O., W. Fisk, and Q. Lei. Effect of Temperatures on Task Performance in Office Environment. Helsinki
Univ. of Technology, Laboratory of Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning, July 2006.
509 Federspeil, C., G. Lui, M. Lahiff, et al. “Worker Performance and Ventilation: Analyses of Individual Data for
Call-Center Workers.” Indoor Air, 14 (2002): 41.
510 Wargocki, P., D. Wyon, J. Sundell, et al. “The Effects of Outdoor Air Supply Rate in an Office on Perceived Air
Quality, Sick Building Syndrome (SBS) Symptoms and Productivity.” Indoor Air, 10, no. 4 (2000): 222–36; Fang,
L., D. Wyon, G. Clausen, et al. “Impact of Indoor Air Temperature and Humidity in an Office on Perceived Air
Quality, SBS Symptoms and Performance.” Indoor Air, 14, supp. 7 (2004): 74–81.
511 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration. OSHA Technical Manual, Section III,
Chapter 2, Indoor Air Quality Investigation. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 1999.
512 International Organization for Standardization. Building Environment Design—Indoor Air Quality—Methods of
Expressing the Quality of Indoor Air for Human Occupancy, ISO 16814:2008. International Organization for
Standardization, 2008.
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conditions.513 Higher levels of daylight illumination have a positive impact on attention span and
short-term memory tests.514 
Lighting conditions affect individual performance via the visual, circadian, and perceptual 
systems.515 The lighting conditions determine the capabilities of the visual system. The state of 
the circadian system (sleep-wake cycle) is influenced by the light-dark cycle. And the “message” 
delivered by the perceptual system is influenced by many factors, including light.516 Because the 
need for varying levels of light greatly affects examiners’ ability to complete their tasks quickly, 
efficiently, and correctly, managers and environment designers should take the following actions:
• Place monitors away from windows to reduce glare and reflections;
• Provide monitor anti-glare screens;
• Tilt the monitor screen to avoid reflections;
• Adjust screen or character background colors (e.g., black characters on a white screen
• will produce less glare than white characters on a blue background);
• Use ceiling fixtures that provide controlled, indirect lighting;
• Install adjustable light level switches;
• Install and use window blinds to control outside light;
• Use task lights positioned to avoid shadows;
• Provide optimal lighting for examiners using loupes; and
• Reduce other brightness sources, such as glossy, reflective paints on walls or highly 
reflective work surfaces.
Applicable standards include ISO 8995 (interior lighting, including workplace, emergency, and
safety lighting).517
Noise
Noise interferes with worker performance.518 Noise can prevent workers from hearing signals and 
can interfere with a worker’s mental and physical condition. Indeed, noise can be a health hazard. 
It can produce serious physical and mental performance problems and psychological stress. 
Workers in departments with high noise levels have more disciplinary actions and absenteeism 
and less productivity. Noise also appears to affect the quality of work and accident
513 Collins, B. Windows and People: A Literature Survey, Psychological Reaction to Environments With and
Without Windows. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards, 1975; Kaplan, R. and S. Kaplan. The
Experience of Nature: A Psychological Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 1989.
514 Heschong Mahone Group. Windows and Offices: A Study of Office Worker Performance and the Indoor
Environment – CEC PIER 2003. 2003.
515 Leslie, R. “Capturing the Daylight Dividend in Buildings: Why and How?” Building and Environment, 38, no. 2
(February 2003): 381–85.
516 Boyce, P., C. Hunter, and O. Howlette. The Benefits of Daylight Through Windows. Lighting Research Center,
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 2003; Juslen, H. and A. Tenner. “Mechanisms Involved in Enhancing Human
Performance by Changing the Lighting in The Industrial Workplace.” International Journal of Industrial
Ergonomics, 35 (2005): 843.
517 International Organization for Standardization, Lighting of Work Places, ISO 8995:2002. International
Organization for Standardization, 2002.
518 Morrison, W., E. Haas, D. Shaffner, et al. “Noise, Stress, and Annoyance in a Pediatric Intensive Care Unit.”
Critical Care Medicine, 31, no. 1 (2003): 113; Topf, M. “Hospital Noise Pollution: An Environmental Stress Model
to Guide Research and Clinical Interventions.” Journal of Advanced Nursing, 31 (2000): 520.
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rates.519 Although humans often adjust by ignoring noise, the ear does not stop processing 
sound.520 Distracting noise sources can range from overhead paging systems and equipment 
alarms to HVAC systems, plumbing, and other employees.
In a majority of the organizations studied, the NIST team observed staff members playing music 
and having conversations that could be distracting. Materials that absorb sound, such as ceiling 
and wall materials and carpeting, can mitigate the impact of noise at a modest cost.521 Applicable 
standards are ISO 11201522 and OSHA 1910.523
7.3.8 Distractions
Interruptions
Interruptions of the examination process can introduce error. Interruptions can come from 
any number or sources, but the design of the workspace can mitigate some of them.524 Such 
interruptions can halt the examination process or can result in the examiner attempting to manage 
the interruption while continuing with the examination. After an interruption, an examination 
might not continue at the same point as it ended.
Conversations are a common form of interruption. Research reveals that in only limited 
circumstances are people able to perform two tasks concurrently.525 Conversations actually 
demand a high level of cognitive processing to be attentive and to formulate a response. An 
examiner whose attention is diverted from the primary task becomes vulnerable to making a 
mistake.526
Latent print comparison workstations can be designed as an open space, a semi-private office, 
or a private office. In the open space or semi-private office design, the examiner is likely to be 
subject to unsolicited conversation either directed to him or overheard from others in the same 
area. In a majority of incidents involving cockpit crew errors studied by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), the crews reported having been distracted by conversation at
519 Noweir, M. “Noise Exposure as Related to Productivity, Disciplinary Actions, Absenteeism, and Accidents 
Among Textile Workers.” Journal of Safety Research, 15 (1984): 163; Muzammil, M., A. Khan, F. Hasan, et al. 
“Effect of Noise on Human Performance Under Variable Load in a Die Casting Industry – A Case Study.” Journal of 
Environmental Science Engineering, 46 (2004): 49.
520 Olaosum, A., O. Ogundiran, and J. Tobih. “Health Hazards of Noise: A Review Article.” Research Journal of
Medical Sciences, 3 (2009): 115.
521 National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Board on Health Care Services. Keeping Patients Safe: 
Transforming the Work Environment for Nurses. National Academies Press, 2004.
522 International Organization for Standardization. Acoustics—Noise Emitted by Machinery and Equipment— 
Determination of Emission Sound Pressure Levels at a Work Station and at Other Specified Positions in an 
Essentially Free Field over a Reflecting Plane with Negligible Environmental Corrections, ISO 11201:2010. 
International Organization for Standardization, 2010.
523 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration. Regulations (Standards—29 CFR), 
Part 1910.95: Occupational Noise Exposure. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 1991.
524 Carayon, P., C. Alvarado, and A. Hundt. Reducing Workload and Increasing Patient Safety through Work and 
Workspace Design. Center for Quality and Productivity Improvement, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2003.
525 Rosekind, M., P. Gander, L. Cornell, et al. Crew Factors in Flight Operations X: Alertness Management in Flight 
Operations Education Module. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2001.
526 Ibid.
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the time of the incidents.527 The use of private office space significantly reduces the occurrences 
of interruption due to conversation. While not the preferred arrangement, semi-private designs 
can offer some protection when arranged so that examiners do not directly face each other.
Examples of other forms of communication that can interrupt the cognitive process include 
phones, paging systems, and email. It is possible to control each of these in the office 
design. In this case, operational policies should address when it is permissible to mute such 
communications systems. The NIST team observed that although examiners were more likely to 
comment on the distracting effect of telephone and paging systems, greater attention was given 
to the Internet when it was available.
The fact that an examiner has many responsibilities complicates the issue of interruptions. 
Serving in a training, supervisory, or management role, being called as a witness for the court, 
and being on-call to respond to crime scenes may sometimes affect an ongoing examination.  
Careful management can mitigate the effects through appropriate scheduling. In addition, 
examiners who also serve as crime scene technicians should be neither required nor permitted to 
monitor a dispatch radio for purposes of taking calls for service. Many individuals who become 
accustomed to being on call fail to recognize the cognitive effort required to be attentive to 
what is being broadcast. Managers should rely on alternative forms of notification, including a 
screening process by staff members outside the examination work area.
Location
Location refers to the environmental and physical characteristics of the workspace. Of concern is 
how the physical environment influences system design and usage. The NIST team observed the 
impact of location on various aspects, including:
• Too many disparate systems located on multiple workstations and platforms make 
it difficult to design the system to meet the user’s anthropometric and ergonomic 
requirements;
• Not all examiners work in a laboratory environment—some work in cubicles, others 
share office space, and some have private offices—which complicates a consistent 
ergonomic design; and
• Laboratories have increased levels of noise and movement due to multiple processes 
occurring over multiple workstations.
Since latent print examination is not always limited to a side-by-side comparison capable of 
being performed in a single confined space, such as a desktop, examiners must interface with 
multiple systems during the workday. Examiners often use AFIS and digital imaging systems 
that are not well integrated and that reside on disparate workstations. As a result, routine task 
completion requires a great deal of movement between workstations, across multiple interfaces, 
and sometimes between rooms. This activity causes the examiner to move from one space to 
another carrying case files and evidence, which reduces efficiency and increases the potential for 
error.
527 Dismukes, K., G. Young, and R. Sumwalt. Cockpit Interruptions and Distractions: Effective Management
Requires A Careful Balancing Act. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1998.
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Office designs that situate all necessary equipment and workstations within a single area will
mitigate these concerns.
Managers, in consultation with human factors experts, should consider gathering information 
on the frequency and pattern of examiner movement and behaviors while completing tasks. 
This could assist in integrating systems through middleware to allow operation via a single 
interface or station wherever possible. If this is not possible, managers should consider the use 
of keyboard and monitor switches to allow access to multiple terminals from one workstation to 
reduce movement across offices.
Stress
When individuals assess their circumstances as causing stress, their bodies automatically begin a 
series of stress-response mechanisms comprised of physiological, behavioral, and psychological 
efforts to adapt to the environmental demands.528
Depending on the resources available within a particular agency, it is common for examiners to 
spend significant time in ancillary activities, such as maintaining equipment, managing office 
supplies, performing data entry tasks, preparing case file folders, inventorying and preparing 
case files for archived storage, and serving as phone operators. Such responsibilities can lead to 
inefficiency, decreased worker satisfaction, and frustration.
During the NIST team observations, examiners frequently mentioned that they were responsible 
for managing information technology (IT) file backups, system or component selection and 
installation, integration, and troubleshooting. They also noted that IT support staff member 
scheduled routine systems maintenance at peak work periods. This activity led to reduced 
productivity, frustration, and potential errors due to the unexpected interruptions while casework 
was being performed. The impact of these interruptions led to one examiner’s decision to move 
to another laboratory. Managers should interview examiners to determine what workplace 
characteristics are considered distracting and stressful and should eliminate any unnecessary 
stressors from the work environment.
7.4 Summary
Workspace design has a substantial impact on employees’ productivity, errors, and injuries. A 
usable latent print examination environment takes into consideration the needs of each examiner 
to develop an environment that improves productivity, reduces the complexity of the work, 
increases satisfaction, and reduces the risks of errors and injury.529 Examiners’ office spaces 
must reflect good ergonomic design. The workspace and equipment must meet the individual 
examiner’s physical and cognitive needs. Systems should be integrated and standardized to 
reduce the amount of learning required to complete routine tasks over systems interfaces and 
office locations. The work environment cannot be designed with a one-size-fits-all approach. 
However, implementing the recommendations in this chapter, employing good ergonomic design 
528 Cohen, S. and M. Rodriguez. “Pathways Linking Affective Disturbances and Physical Disorders.” Health
Psychology, 14 (1995): 374.
529 Hendrick, H. “Determining the Cost-Benefits of Ergonomics Projects and Factors That Lead to Their Success.”
Applied Ergonomics, 34 (2003): 419.
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principles, and adhering to usability guidelines and standards will improve the environment for 
the examiners.
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Appendix 7-A: Design Processes
A.1 User-Centered Design Process
At its core, user-centered design is based upon the concept of developing usable, useful products. 
Each user and his context of use must define the user needs. Optimizing safety, comfort, 
efficiency, effectiveness, and user satisfaction requires an understanding and application of 
usability and the user-centered design process.
Table 7.2 lists usability goals and provides a short description of each, as adapted from Nielsen’s 
definition of usability quality metrics. It also provides some questions for latent print examiner 
environment designers to consider. When designing any usable system, it is important to consider 
these aspects of the user experience.
Usability Goals Definition Latent Print Examiner-Targeted Questions
Effectiveness Measure of how well a user can 
perform a task
Can examiners successfully encode a print for 
submission to AFIS?
Can examiners accurately determine the 
orientation of the print? 
Efficiency Measure of how quickly a 
user can perform work and the 
accompanying error rate
Are examiners able to quickly accomplish 
goals?
Can examiners perform tasks with few errors?
Satisfaction Measure of user attitudes, 
perceptions, feelings, and opinions 
regarding the environment
How well does the environment avoid inducing 
examiner discomfort and frustration?
Are examiners intimidated by the 
environment?
Learnability Measure of how quickly a user can 
become productive
Can examiners learn how to use the tools and 
systems?
How long should it take an examiner to learn 
the tools and system?
Are examiners able to use the tools and 
systems (to some defined level of competence) 
after instructions or training?
Memorability Measure of how well a returning 
user forms a mental model of the 
environment and remembers how 
to use it
If an examiner has used the tool or process 
before, can he remember enough to use it 
effectively the next time, or does he have to 
re-learn it? 
How do experienced examiners differ from 
infrequent/novice examiners?
After not using the tool or process for a 
period of time, how long should it take for the 
examiner to become familiar with it again?
Table 7.2: Definitions of usability goals and questions that apply specifically to latent print
examiners530
530 Nielsen, op. cit.
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A.2 Iterative Process
Users who are included in the early stages of the design phase can provide feedback and 
recommendations that designers can incorporate into the initial prototypes. Designers of 
the most successful environments continually refine their prototypes through an iterative, 
evolutionary process with users. This iterative process must be user-centered, research-based, 
and performance-driven.
User-Centered:
• Identifies the types of users who will be using the workspaces, including latent print 
examiners, forensic specialists, and laboratory managers
• Ensures that the needs of the users are considered in the design and development of the 
environment
Research-Based:
• Employs research to learn about users and their needs, tasks, environments, level of 
expertise, etc.
• Conducts ongoing research with examiners by observing them interacting with the 
workspaces, systems, and hardware
Performance-Driven:
• Utilizes information gathered from users and measures user performance to ensure that 
design improvements have a measurable impact on users’ effectiveness, efficiency, and 
satisfaction
A.3 Context of Use
During the first stage of the user-centered design process, the environmental designer must 
consider the “context of use.” The actual conditions under which latent print examination 
environments are used must be considered to ensure that the design of the environment will meet 
the needs of users and the objectives of the organization.
Throughout the development process (and especially during the early stages of the design 
process), designers must be aware of contextual factors that include the business, operational, 
and social environments in which the system will be used.
A.4	 Defining	the	Users
The central objective of designing a usable environment is to meet the needs of users within 
their operational context. The design of the environment should focus on users’ needs and 
expectations, involve users throughout, and integrate feedback from users into the design. 
Recognizing the full range of users, designers should define the role each user will have within 
the examiner environment. Designers should try to understand the users’ needs, interests, and 
goals. Table 7.3 lists information about users that can be relevant to the design of the latent print 
examiner’s workspace.
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Questions	to	Consider	when	Defining	Users’	Requirements
Characteristics Characteristic	Specifics User Requirements
Age What is the age range of this user group? Does age impact the use of 
technology (e.g., marking digital 
images versus photographs)?
Anthropometrics What are the heights of the users? 
What are the heights of the workstations?
Are the workstations’ heights 
adjustable?
Are the chairs’ heights adjustable?
Can the users reach the tools required 
for the tasks?  
Education What is the typical education level of the 
users?
How does education affect system 
usage?  
Experience and 
Knowledge Level
How much computer experience do the 
users have?
How many of the users have experience 
with AFIS databases?
How many of the users are new to the 
system?
How have users been trained on the 
system?
Do the needs of first-time users differ 
from those of more frequent users? 
Does the system need to 
accommodate users with training 
needs?
Visual Attributes Do any of the users have color blindness?
Do any of the users have contrast 
sensitivity?
Do any of the users have dyslexia?
Do users have other characteristics with 
respect to visual acuity or other factors?
How do these attributes affect the 
environmental design?  
Table 7.3: Characteristics to consider when designing latent print examiners’ work
environments
A.5 Designing the User Environment
Once the characteristics have been defined, designers can begin to consider other environmental
factors. For example:
• When and where will users analyze prints, compare prints, evaluate prints, and verify 
prints?
• When and where will they interact with AFIS databases or other software systems?
• What are the characteristics of the environment, including physical infrastructure; 
configuration of workstation; placement of workstation; seating; height, angle, and 
distance from user; lighting; noise levels; frequency of tours; temperature and humidity; 
placement, type, and format of training materials, policies, procedures, and safety 
equipment; and the types of help that are available?
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Designers can use Table 7.4 to help them identify how the environment will be used, to define
possible user requirements and to ask design questions relating to each element of the workspace
and environment.
Questions to Consider
Characteristics Characteristic	Specifics Potential Effects
Location In what environment will the 
workstation be located? 
What are the physical characteristics 
of this location?  
Within the location, how will the 
workstation be situated?
How does the physical 
environment of this location 
affect or influence the design and 
usage of the system?  
How does the placement of the 
workstation affect use of and 
access to the system? 
What spatial requirements are 
necessary to facilitate frequent 
use?
Temperature and Humidity What is the average temperature for 
the location?  
What are the extreme temperatures? Is 
the area humid? 
How do temperature and humidity 
affect the users?  
How does the outside 
environment affect performance? 
Lighting What types of lighting are utilized? 
Will the system be utilized at night as 
well as during the day?
How does the level of lighting 
affect readability and visibility? 
Noise What is the average noise level? How does the noise level affect an 
individual’s ability to perform?
Instructions/Warnings Where are instructions placed? 
What is the format of instructions 
(e.g., signs, labels, icons)? 
Are the instructions large enough? 
Are the instructions obstructed? 
What is the appropriate height to 
place instructional guides?
Assistance What types of help and assistance are 
provided?
Given the environment, what 
is the best way to present error 
feedback and helpful information?
Table 7.4: Characteristics regarding each element of an environment
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A.6	 Defining	User	Goals	and	Tasks
After identifying user characteristics and task requirements, designers should conduct a user and
task analysis by answering questions such as:
• What is the user’s purpose?
• What are the user’s needs, interests, and goals?
• How will the user interact with the environment?
• What are the key tasks the user must perform?
• Which tasks will the user perform frequently?
• Which tasks are critical to the user’s success in the environment?
• Which tasks are critical to the success of the organization?
Designers should consider how human factors issues affect each task. Important tasks that could
be affected by human factors issues should be evaluated first. Designers should consider these
questions for each group of users identified in the previous section.
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Chapter 8: Training and Education
Introduction and Scope
This chapter reviews the history and current state of latent print examiner training programs, 
standards, and requirements. It identifies shortcomings in the current system and offers 
recommendations to improve training through research into and development of effective 
mentoring programs and comprehensive training materials. The chapter also discusses existing 
standards of professional organizations, requirements for accreditation, and benefits of 
certification. It recommends mandatory certification and accreditation to improve the latent print 
field as a whole.
8.1 A History of Training in the United States
The first formal training for latent print examiners in the United States took place during the 
1904 World’s Fair in St. Louis when Sergeant John K. Ferrier of Scotland Yard’s Fingerprint 
Bureau provided brief “instructions to hundreds of police officers and prison officials.”531 He then 
conducted a 7-month training session for 9 people on the comparison of unknown fingerprint 
specimens to known exemplars and the classification of fingerprint records.532 
By 1915, the International Association for Criminal Identification (later, the International 
Association for Identification, or IAI) was formed. One objective was “to provide training, 
education, and the publication of information in all forensic disciplines represented by this 
Association.”533 The Association also instituted an annual training seminar.534 
In 1916, T. G. Cooke and W. K. Evans created a school in Chicago to offer a home-study course. 
The school had several names until, in 1926, it became the Institute of Applied Science (IAS). 
The IAS course proceeded through various functional areas with reading and competency testing. 
Graduation usually required a year and a half of “study monitored and directed by personal and 
highly professional, albeit long distance, tutelage. … By 1937, and continuing for many years 
after, nearly one half of the individuals in charge of fingerprint bureaus in North America were 
IAS graduates.”535
In 1924, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created an Identification Division. It offered 
a 2-week fingerprint examiner training program for law enforcement agencies throughout the 
country.536 The first week of the program dealt with recognizing fingerprint types, identifying 
characteristics, and classifying fingerprint records. The second week focused on comparing
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unknown fingerprint specimens to known fingerprint records. The program concentrated on the 
development of the skills needed for comparing fingerprints and for developing latent prints. 
It did not concern itself with the underlying science that made the work plausible or with 
instruction in scientific methodology.
“Ridgeology,”537 a holistic approach to the latent print comparison process that goes beyond the 
counting and arrangement of friction ridge minutiae, required latent print examiners to learn 
more about friction ridge skin, its discriminating features, and the comparison process. Some 
larger agencies created their own training programs, but most small providers relied on existing 
examiners to train new ones informally. Without the leadership of a central authority, no formal 
training program emerged.
The IAI and the Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology 
(SWGFAST) have published suggestions concerning training programs for latent print 
examiners.538 Although these documents outline the training needs for examiners, neither 
organization provides training materials (see section 8.4).
Today, forensic examiners receive training through a wide variety of programs and 
approaches, and they follow a range of educational pathways that lead to careers in latent 
print examination.539 Latent print examiners may receive some training as part of a formal 
undergraduate or graduate program in forensic science or criminal justice, or they may have 
acquired their professional skills through on-the-job training.540 Latent print examiners usually 
work at law enforcement agencies where training comes from internal mentorships, sometimes 
supplemented by external programs and formal training. In this traditional approach, one 
generation of trainers transmits its knowledge and skill to the next.541
8.2 Concerns about the Current Training System
Today’s variegated system of training has some benefits, but it lacks uniformity and raises 
concerns about quality. For example, the 2009 National Research Council report on forensic 
science in the United States observes that latent print training varies from agency to agency and 
may include “a formalized training program, may use an informal mentoring process, or may
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send new examiners to a 1- to 2-week course.”542 This lack of standardized training can lead to 
a wide range of practices. Informal training programs vary in length from weeks to years, and 
testing for competency may not exist within each department.
Recent years have brought notable efforts to standardize formal academic programs in forensic 
science;543 however, much of the analysis of education and training has focused on forensic 
science degree-granting programs, neglecting training specific to latent print examination. The 
absence of enforceable standards has led to heterogeneity in curricula, instructors, pedagogy, 
documentation, and mentorships. Some agencies do not have staff members available to mentor 
trainees adequately, and even when mentors are available, it is not clear how they are selected or 
trained.
Smaller agencies with only a handful of examiners often find it particularly challenging to 
provide adequate training. Training might be limited to the most practical aspects of the job, as 
pressures are in place to apprentice and to manage the caseload. Because of the lack of industry-
wide standards, training is limited to the level of expertise of the trainer, which can lead to 
perpetuation of improper or inappropriate methods. Limited career paths in smaller agencies can 
create high turnover rates that make it constantly necessary to train new examiners.
A few professional and private organizations supply advanced training and education. However, 
there has been little to no effort to evaluate the content of the training to show its effectiveness.544 
Furthermore, only a fraction of all examiners participate in these courses, leaving the field 
without uniform standards and requirements for education and training, consistently qualified 
instructors, and comprehensive and updated curricula.
8.3 Recommendations for Training
To improve the training system, it is necessary first to understand what skills and knowledge 
are necessary for latent print examination. Examiners must have the proper cognitive abilities 
to conduct latent print examinations and to communicate their findings. Specific abilities in 
perception and judgment are required for the analysis, comparison, and evaluation of friction 
ridge impressions. These go beyond screening for form blindness, color blindness, and visual 
acuity.
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Recommendation 8.1: The federal government should consider funding research to 
determine what educational and cognitive abilities should be prerequisites for training 
a latent print examiner. Forensic service providers should have systematic training 
programs	that	develop	these	abilities	as	well	as	educate	examiners	in	the	scientific	
method,	the	relevant	scientific	literature,	communication	skills,	and	methods	for	
logically developing conclusions.
Once a systematic training program on all aspects of latent print examination is developed, it 
must be affordable to forensic service providers. Budgetary constraints limit the number of 
trainees who can be hired, and training through formal programs outside the agency can be 
costly. Previous federally funded incentive programs, such as the Law Enforcement Education 
Program (LEEP) and its successor, the U.S. Department of Justice Police Corps program, 
were designed to address similar concerns from a broader law enforcement perspective. The 
Police Corps program provided scholarships or tuition reimbursements in return for a 4-year 
commitment to work as patrol officers in a state or local law enforcement agency. Federal funds 
went to states to develop and provide training. In addition, the federal government provided local 
and state agencies that hired Police Corps officers $10,000 a year for 4 years of service. Similar 
incentives to support training, education, and salaries of latent print examiner trainees would 
encourage agencies to create positions or fill vacancies.
Recommendation 8.2: The federal government should develop a forensic latent print 
examiner scholarship program to:
a. Fund the post-hire training program and, upon successful completion, provide 
tuition	reimbursement,	loan	forgiveness,	or	other	financial	assistance	to	degreed	
latent	print	examiner	trainees	working	in	state,	local,	or	private	(not-for-profit)	
forensic laboratories; and
b. Reimburse the employer for a percentage of the salaries during the training 
period.
By learning what specific skills and knowledge are essential to successful latent print 
examinations and by implementing programs that allow all examiners to receive proper training, 
forensic service providers can ensure that their examiners have the tools they need and can pass 
this information on to newer employees.
On-the-job relationships play a critical role in the professional development of new examiners. 
Such relationships provide opportunities to receive feedback, counseling, coaching, skill 
building, advancement, role modeling, and reinforcement.545 Informal relationships often occur 
naturally between co-workers. However, formal mentoring programs allow agencies to foster 
developmental relationships between junior and senior staff members by taking an active 
role in their initiation by assigning mentors and monitoring this relationship’s effectiveness. 
Organizational benefits of establishing formal mentoring programs include transferring 
organizational culture and institutional knowledge, reinforcing and encouraging teamwork, 
reducing stress, and decreasing turnover.546 Research shows that successful mentoring programs
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include voluntary participation, matching mentors and protégés who are two to three levels apart, 
careful selection of mentors, flexible duration, one-on-one mentoring, a no-fault exit provision, 
a high priority on program evaluation, and the clear communication of mentoring objectives.547 
Poor coordination of mentorship programs can lead to conflicts between the mentoring and 
supervisory roles of the mentor, breaches of confidentiality, mentor bias, lack of active listening, 
and role confusion.548 Agencies must take care to minimize these risks.
Recommendation	8.3:	Agencies	should	establish	formal	mentoring	programs	that	define	
the roles and responsibilities of the mentor, trainee, and supervisor.
The Working Group appreciates that agencies with limited staff may find it difficult to provide 
their own mentoring programs, but these agencies may develop cooperative agreements with 
neighboring jurisdictions to support the program. As in all educational programs, the mentors 
should be highly qualified. Mentors and instructors, whether in the workplace or in formal 
training and educational programs, should possess expert subject-matter knowledge that they can 
convey clearly and effectively.
8.4  Recommendations for Curriculum and Information Resources
Although various training materials549 and texts550 for latent print examiners are published and 
available, there is a lack of centralized, easily accessible, and readily understandable sources of 
valid information. This gap leads to a related recommendation.
Recommendation 8.4: The federal government should establish an expert group to 
develop a latent print educational textbook, practical exercises, and assessment tests 
(print and online) in consultation with professional organizations, senior latent print 
examiners, researchers with content knowledge, experienced trainers, and professionals 
experienced in curriculum development.
In developing new curricula, trainers should consider the expertise of the targeted audience and 
the teaching and testing methods used.551 Content should be based upon published standards, 
peer-reviewed articles, and reference works. Terminology should be consistent throughout the 
materials. The content should extend beyond the biology and analysis of friction ridge skin. 
Authors should not be confined to experts in latent print examination, but should include experts
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on cognitive issues, statistics, and forensic science. Hands-on exercises relating to bias and 
cognitive processing should be included. Ideally, the effectiveness of the materials should be 
evaluated before and after they are deployed.
Recommendation 8.5: Training materials should include topics beyond the technical 
aspects of friction ridge analysis, such as:
a. Documentation of work and case notes and written and oral communication;
b. Professional ethics;
c. Human	factors	issues	such	as	fatigue,	bias,	cognitive	influences,	perceptual	
influences,	and	error;
d. Research methods; and
e. Legal aspects of expert testimony.
Existing clearinghouses are an important resource for those undertaking educational and 
training activities. For example, the National Clearinghouse for Science, Technology and the 
Law (NCSTL) assembles into a publicly searchable database relevant scientific, technological, 
and legal resources and a bibliography specific to forensic science content areas, such as 
the reliability of automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS).552 Indeed, a resource 
comparable to the National Library of Medicine’s PubMed for forensic science could provide 
further benefits to researchers, especially given the limited accessibility of some forensic science 
publications.553
Recommendation 8.6: The federal government should support a clearinghouse of 
materials from existing training programs as well as publications on latent print 
identification.
8.5  Existing Standards and Accreditation Requirements
Whatever training programs and materials are developed to supplement the current system, 
developing national standards and accreditation requirements are essential to demonstrating 
the effectiveness of training. Currently, professional organizations offer a mix of standards, 
recommendations, and requirements, but there is no single, national accreditation that indicates 
quality.
8.5.1  Standards
Mandatory national standards for educational requirements and for a training curriculum for 
the forensic discipline of latent print examination do not exist, although the IAI and SWGFAST 
outline the minimum requirements of a training program.
In 1977, the IAI developed its Latent Print Certification Program, which includes education, 
training, and experience requirements leading to written and practical examinations. The IAI
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requires a bachelor’s degree or years of experience as a prerequisite to certification in latent print 
examination. Various training courses are offered to help examiners prepare for the exam, but 
only one provider is affiliated with the IAI. Each IAI local division sponsors its own conferences 
and training.
In addition, SWGFAST documents provide guidance for training programs, examiner 
qualifications, proficiency testing, and standardized practices and terminology.554 SWGFAST 
has established recommendations for training program content and participation competency. 
SWGFAST has also issued standards for friction ridge automation training that focus on image 
capturing and the history, theory, and operation of AFIS.555
There have been calls for new examiners to have a science background. SWGFAST also 
recommends that latent print examiners possess a bachelor’s degree with some “science-related 
coursework.”556 It has been argued that forensic service providers must spend more time and 
resources to train applicants who lack this background.557
8.5.2 Requirements for Accreditation
The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/
LAB), Forensic Quality Services, the American Association for Laboratory Accreditation, and 
other private organizations accredit forensic service providers. In response to a 2004 report 
from the National Institute of Justice,558 the American Academy of Forensic Sciences created 
a standing committee known as the Forensic Science Education Programs Accreditation 
Commission (FEPAC).559 This Commission “accredits forensic science education programs that 
lead to a bachelor’s or master’s degree in forensic science or in natural science with a forensic 
science concentration.”560 The degree programs must be “located in a regionally accredited 
institution of higher education.”561
ASCLD/LAB requires agencies to have a documented training program and to follow it; 
however, there is no guidance as to what the training curriculum should encompass. In a 
2009 survey, 75% of the agencies responding reported a formal written training program in 
compliance with accreditation requirements.562 The survey found no significant differences 
between accredited and non-accredited agencies with regard to aspects of training, such as the 
number of comparisons needed, the period of supervised case review, pass-fail policies, and the 
existence of a dedicated trainer. However, the low response rate for the survey and the possible 
lack of statistical power make these results difficult to interpret.
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8.6		 Recommendations	for	Certification	and	Continuing	Education
Professional certification and accreditation programs typically require some form of continuing 
education. Continuing education opportunities in the forensic sciences include courses, 
professional conferences and seminars, distance learning, apprenticeships, residency, internships, 
teaching, and independent learning.563 Latent print examiners should be encouraged to pursue 
opportunities for such continuing professional education.
Ongoing education that enhances and improves current latent print work activities could include 
an introduction to cognitive processes, statistical data on fingerprint features, basic probability 
theory, technological developments, and the ethical and legal responsibilities of latent print 
examiners. Management should be aware of the skills and expertise of examiners in order to 
identify gaps that could be eliminated through continuing education and training.
Two major impediments to continuing education programs are cost and access. If programs are 
not located nearby, or if the costs of enrollment are too high, some examiners will be precluded 
from continuing education opportunities. To address this issue, the National Institute of Justice 
provides funding for the development and delivery of online continuing education for forensic 
scientists and professionals at various levels of knowledge and practice.564
Recommendation 8.7: Forensic service providers should require personnel to 
participate	in	continuing	education	and	to	become	certified	through	an	accredited	
program.	Certifying	bodies	should	review	current	certification	tests	with	the	aid	of	
professionals in test design and psychometrics.
Some jurisdictions have moved toward requiring certification of examiners and accreditation of 
laboratories.565 By earning certification, examiners demonstrate their professional competence 
and set a knowledge and experience base for themselves, for their employers, and for the public 
at large. Additionally, certification has benefits beyond those provided to the individual examiner.
• Team performance increases each time a new team member is certified;
• The level of skill that a team has directly affects its performance;
• Certification standardizes practices within the industry and leads to more cooperation 
among organizations;
• Individuals who earn certification have shown their dedication to personal 
accomplishment and improvement and may increase their career opportunities; and
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• The public has more confidence in individuals who are certified as meeting some quality 
standard.566
By requiring certification of examiners, forensic service providers can ensure and demonstrate 
that their employees are competent, knowledgeable, and skilled at all aspects of the latent print 
examination process.
8.7  Evaluation of Training Programs
Although FEPAC evaluates and accredits forensic science curriculum in degree-granting 
academic institutions, other forensic science training programs do not receive review or 
evaluation. Laboratory accreditation and examiner certification programs include educational and 
training requirements. However, these requirements only verify that education and training have 
occurred; they do not assess the quality of the training programs.567
Certifying and accrediting bodies should evaluate training material and training programs. 
Evaluation methods could include student surveys, measurements against defined learning 
objectives, or documentation of outcomes. Professional organizations offering training should 
actively seek a means for external evaluation of their programs.
Recommendation 8.8: Certifying bodies should ensure that examiners have been 
trained to competency. Laboratory accrediting bodies should evaluate the effectiveness 
of an agency’s training program.
8.8  Summary
Although some training programs and informational resources exist to educate latent print 
examiners, improvement will require a shift to a single, national standard training system that 
covers more than the technical tasks involved in latent print examination. A comprehensive 
training program should include information about report writing, testifying, maintaining 
professional and personal ethics, understanding the influence of cognitive bias, and calculating 
statistics. Certification and accreditation organizations should review the effectiveness of 
new training programs, and forensic science providers should require their examiners to earn 
certification to demonstrate their commitment to quality.
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Chapter 9: Human Factors Issues for Management
Introduction
The primary responsibility of management is to develop policies and to promote a culture for 
successful completion of tasks. Other chapters in this report focus on factors that affect the 
quality of the work in a latent print unit. These include the work environment (Chapter 7), skills 
and expertise in interpreting prints (Chapter 3), technology (Chapter 4), reporting and testimony 
(Chapters 5 and 6), and personnel training (Chapter 8). Management plays a central role in all 
those areas by establishing strategies and a culture that recognizes and responds to human factors 
in latent print examination.
Managers must be committed to developing, maintaining, and improving quality assurance 
(QA) and quality control (QC) processes. QA includes procedures to ensure that final results are 
valid, and QC includes monitoring to verify that procedures are working.568 Taken together, QA 
and QC constitute a quality management system. This chapter focuses on the responsibilities 
of management in creating an environment that enhances quality through certification, 
accreditation, and proficiency testing as well as a systems approach to reducing errors.
9.1     A Management Perspective on Errors
Chapter 2 describes the types of errors that can occur in the complex endeavor of latent 
print examination. That chapter used four categories for the possible outcomes of a latent 
print examination—identification, inconclusive, exclusion, and not suitable for comparison 
(insufficient data). However, forensic service providers differ in the number and names of 
possible outcomes of latent print examinations. This chapter uses a more elaborate typology with 
five categories: identification, inclusion, inconclusive, exclusion, and not suitable.
In casework, examiners do not start with knowledge of the truth. They reach conclusions based 
upon knowledge, training, and experience. The quality management system should continually 
evaluate performance. Part of this system is the review of the examiner’s results by another 
qualified examiner. If there is conflict, the agency must employ a pre-determined procedure 
for resolving the conflict. Having determined the result judged to be “correct,” the agency 
would attribute an “error” to one of the examiners. For example, the two images in Figure 9.1 
would produce a very complex comparison that could generate different results from different 
examiners.
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Figure 9.1: Latent print from an ashtray and an exemplar print569
Presented with this pair of prints, five different examiners might each report a different 
conclusion, as shown in Table 9.1.
Examiner Result Explanation
1 Identification The examiner determined that there is enough similarity between the 
latent and exemplar to make an identification.
2 Inclusion The examiner found detail in agreement; however, due to the limited 
quality of the latent print, a conclusive identification was not possible. 
The examiner also determined that selection of additional print details 
would not result in a more definitive conclusion.
3 Inconclusive The examiner could not determine if there was sufficient agreement 
between the latent print and the exemplar print but believes that 
additional exemplars could aid in the assessment.
4 Exclusion The examiner found similarities between the latent print and the 
exemplar print but interpreted the distortion artifacts in the latent print 
as actual friction ridge detail and determined that these two impressions 
came from different sources.
5 Not Suitable The examiner determined the latent print was not suitable for comparison 
and therefore never compared the latent print to any exemplars.
Table 9.1: Five possible outcomes of the comparison of the latent and exemplar prints in Figure 9.1
If the two prints come from the same source, the conclusions of examiners 3, 4, and 5 may 
preclude the conviction of a criminal. If the impressions did not originate from the same source, 
then the conclusions reported by examiners 1 and 2 may contribute to the arrest and prosecution 
of an innocent person. Procedures that permit an agency to determine which results are most 
Latent print                         Exemplar print
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likely to be correct, to detect departures from those results, and to investigate the factors that led 
to the deviations are critical to the quality management process.
Table 9.2 enumerates the various possible erroneous outcomes in the above example. “Error” in 
the table is defined relative to the outcome judged to be most acceptable rather than relative to 
the unknown states of nature (see Chapters 2 and 3).
Result Judged To Be Correct
Identification Inclusion Inconclusive Exclusion Not Suitable
E
xa
m
in
er
’s
 R
es
ul
t
Identification CORRECT Erroneous 
Identification
Erroneous 
Identification
Erroneous 
Identification
Erroneous 
Identification
Inclusion Failure to 
Identify
CORRECT Erroneous 
Inclusion
Erroneous 
Inclusion
Erroneous 
Inclusion
Inconclusive Failure to 
Identify
Failure to 
Include
CORRECT Failure to 
Exclude
Erroneous 
Suitability 
Determination
Exclusion Erroneous 
Exclusion 
Erroneous 
Exclusion 
Erroneous 
Exclusion 
CORRECT Erroneous 
Exclusion 
Not Suitable Failure to 
Identify
Failure to 
Include
Erroneous 
Suitability 
Determination
Failure to 
Exclude
CORRECT
Table 9.2: Concordance table listing possible “errors” for conclusions in Table 9.1
The agency’s quality management system should track the errors listed above. When errors 
(either in the sense defined above or relative to ground truth) are detected, it is critical 
to understand the factors (see appendices) that led to them. By strengthening the quality 
management system to guard against those factors, the risk of errors can be reduced.
9.2 A Systems Approach to Improving Accuracy
From the systems perspective outlined in Chapter 2, human error in the workplace is not an 
isolated action of a given individual. Rather, it is the result of a chain of events that cumulate in 
the adverse event. Since Heinrich’s 1931 publication, industry has embraced a sequential theory 
of human error.570 James Reason’s 1990 “Swiss cheese” model examines error systematically. 
It assumes that there are fundamental elements of all organizations that must work together 
harmoniously to achieve efficient and safe operations.571 Taken together, these elements comprise 
a “productive system” as depicted in Figure 9.2, an adaptation of Reason’s model.
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Figure 9.2: Components of a productive system adapted to a latent print unit572
For our purposes, the four slices from Reason’s original model have been renamed as Examiner 
Actions, Conditions that Affect Performance, Supervisory Issues, and Organizational Influences. 
Examiner actions are the mistakes or violations by the examiner. They are what the examiner 
did. Conditions that affect performance are factors related to the condition of the examiner, 
communication, or the environment that influenced the examiner. Supervisory issues are any 
failures in the supervision of the examiner. Lastly, organizational influences are management 
decisions and the organizational climate that affect the examiner. All require analysis and 
discussion, and Appendix A lists examples of actions in each category.
Based upon this model, forensic analysis can be viewed as a complex system whose product 
is the interpretation of forensic evidence. Productive activities within a latent print unit require 
reliable, well-maintained equipment and a well-trained professional workforce. These are 
included in the Conditions that Affect Performance slice in Figure 9.2. Examiners also need good 
management and effective supervision, and managers need appropriate guidance, personnel, and 
funding to perform their duties, which is represented in the Supervisory Issues slice. The support 
of management comes from decision-makers who set goals and manage available resources, 
represented by the Organizational Influences slice. They must balance oft-competing goals of 
throughput, due diligence, and resources. These executive decisions typically are based upon 
social, economic, and political input from outside the organization as well as on feedback from 
managers and workers within it.
Accidents occur when there are breakdowns in the interaction among the components in the 
production process.573 These failures, shown as holes in the different slices, make the system 
more vulnerable to error, especially when there are multiple failures at each level. Using the
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“Swiss cheese” model of error causation, an error occurs when the holes from each slice are 
aligned.
There are two necessary ingredients to identifying weaknesses in a forensic system: (1) a human 
error model to capture and organize the information and (2) forensic experts to analyze the 
examination process and to identify the human and other factors that can affect the outcome. 
The literature contains many human error models.574 If the underlying assumptions regarding 
the nature and cause of error are considered, there are six different perspectives to error 
investigation: cognitive, ergonomic, behavioral, medical, psychosocial, and organizational.575 
Each perspective on human error investigation has its advantages. Many industries therefore 
have employed a multi-perspective approach, using models such as root cause analysis, failure 
mode and effects analysis, a management oversight risk tree, a safety management organization 
review technique, and the human factors and analysis classifications system (HFACS). This 
chapter uses HFACS as a framework for discussion,576 but other error models would elucidate the 
same factors
9.2.1 Examiner Actions
Problematic actions of the examiner can be loosely classified as either mistakes or violations. 
Mistakes represent normal behavior that fails to produce the desired outcome. Violations refer to 
the willful disregard of accepted practices. These mistakes and violations should be considered in 
more detail.
Decision-, Skill-, and Perception-Based Mistakes
Decisions are based primarily on three factors: information, knowledge, and experience (see 
Chapter 3). In latent print examination, information lies in the latent and exemplar prints, which 
must be of sufficient quality and quantity to compare and evaluate. In addition, the examiner 
should be provided with other information, such as the surface from which the latent prints 
were recovered, the technique used to develop and recover the latent prints, and the method 
used to capture the exemplar prints. The examiner applies training, background knowledge, and 
experience comparing a broad range of pairs of latent and exemplar prints to assess the available 
information. When important information, knowledge, or experience is lacking, mistakes can 
occur. Often referred to as honest mistakes, these mistakes typically present themselves as 
poorly executed procedures, improper choices, or the misinterpretation or misuse of relevant 
information.
Other mistakes occur with little or no conscious thought. For instance, during latent print 
examination, examiners can orient many latent prints without conscious attention. Tasks such as 
these highly practiced and automatic behaviors are particularly affected by attention or memory 
failures. Distractions in the laboratory (see Chapter 7) may lead to a loss of concentration, 
erroneous documentation, and other mistakes.
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Additionally, mistakes can 
occur as a result of the manner 
in which the examiners store 
and compare latent print data. 
For instance, when latent 
and exemplar prints have 
only limited corresponding 
information, the examiner 
must search different regions 
of the latent print separately, 
breaking up the pattern of data 
and searching each component. 
Examiners who are inclined 
to search the latent print as a 
complete image (searching 
for the whole pattern) can fail 
to identify the latent print or 
can erroneously exclude the 
exemplar.
Examples of these types 
of mistakes in latent print 
examination are failures to 
find target data, to properly 
weight the data, to recognize 
distortion, and to compare 
enough corresponding features. 
These types of mistakes can lead 
to a conclusion exceeding the 
abilityof the examiner, a failure 
to search all exemplars, a hurried 
or insufficiently thorough 
examination, insufficient data to 
support the conclusion, a mis-
prioritized level of effort, and 
improperly deeming a print to be 
suitable or unsuitable.
Box 9.1: Learning from Others: Benchmarking in 
Forensic Science
Forensic laboratories and latent print examiners can learn from 
each other and from other industries to improve procedures and 
human factors considerations. This process, called benchmarking, 
is primarily associated with actions that Xerox took in the early 
1980s to remain competitive with companies that were producing 
less expensive and higher quality copiers. Xerox not only studied 
its competitors’ products and processes, but the company also 
looked at other industries’ processes and translated those best 
practices into the Xerox standard procedures. Xerox defines 
benchmarking as “the continuous process of measuring our 
products, services, and practices against our toughest competitors
or those companies known as leaders.”577 This model is comprised 
of ten steps in four phases:
Planning phase
Select a subject to benchmark
Identify the best practitioners in the field of study
Determine the data-collection method and collect the data
Analysis phase
Determine the current gap
Project future performance
Integration phase
Communicate the results of analysis
Establish functional goals
Action phase
Develop action plans
Implement plans and monitor results
Recalibrate benchmark578
In the field of emergency medicine, efforts are underway 
to incorporate benchmarking.579 The non-profit Emergency 
Department Benchmarking Alliance spearheads this effort by 
maintaining a database of performance metrics, by hosting 
conferences and meetings, and by providing community-building 
services to their member organizations.580 According to the 
Alliance’s data, benchmarking seems to be working. Wait times in 
emergency departments from 2008 to 2009 fell for the first time in 
four decades.581
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Violations
Two types of violations deserve mention: willful noncompliance and exceptional violations. 
Often referred to as “bending the rules,” willful noncompliance tends to be habitual and is 
enabled by a system of supervision and management that tolerates departures from standard 
procedures. Just as some drivers may go 5 miles per hour over the speed limit, some examiners 
may engage in shortcuts to come to a conclusion. Exceptional violations are willful and 
particularly egregious, and they are neither tolerated by management nor routinely observed in 
the forensic laboratory. An exceptional violation would be akin to driving 30 miles per hour over 
the speed limit.
Examples of violations include deeming a latent print not suitable to avoid having to compare 
it, disregarding aspects of the QA/QC process (for example, skipping the Verification phase), 
intentionally misidentifying a latent print, making an identification or exclusion of a latent print 
that the examiner knows is not suitable for comparison, reporting results without conducting a 
comparison, and coercing a verifier into agreeing with a rendered conclusion.
9.2.2 Conditions that Affect Performance
Conditions of the examiner, of communication, and of the environment can affect an examiner’s 
performance.
Physical and Mental State
An examiner’s mental state, physiological state, and physical or mental limitations all can 
affect performance. Adverse mental states include temporary conditions such as exhaustion 
and stress. The examiner and management should take appropriate action when the examiner is 
not fit for duty. In most forensic units, examiners confront large backlogs. Some examiners are 
held to quotas or unrealistic turn-around times. In this environment, examiners could become 
more concerned with case output than the quality of the work. As a result, examiners may 
hurry through cases, taking shortcuts in the analysis and documentation, and failing to reach 
an appropriate conclusion. Plainly, many factors can affect the mental state of the examiner. 
Examples are anger, apprehension about reaching conclusions, boredom and complacency, 
distraction, expectancy, fatigue, overconfidence, peer pressure, and personal problems.
In addition, the examiner’s physiological state can affect the examination process. For example, 
the typical latent print examiner is usually bending over a desk or workbench for long stretches 
of time, looking through a magnifier, and making numerous comparisons. These working 
conditions produce strain on the neck, back, and eyes. Glare from computer displays and the 
sheer number of comparisons can result in headaches or eyestrain (see Chapter 7 for more 
information about healthy workplace design).
Performance can also suffer due to lack of sleep. In many agencies, an examiner could be 
called to a crime scene in the middle of the night and then be expected to work a normal latent 
print caseload the next day without rest. Illness can have detrimental effects, and medications 
can influence a person’s quality of sleep and daytime alertness. Other factors bearing on 
physiological states include alcohol and drug use, nutrition, and injuries.
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Finally, physical or mental limitations affect the condition of the examiner. Deteriorating 
eyesight is a physical limitation, while an inability to maintain competency is a mental limitation. 
If the physical or mental limitation cannot be compensated for, the examiner may no longer 
be qualified to perform latent print examinations. Other physical or mental limitations include 
chronic psychological disorders, dyslexia, inadequate training or experience, incompatible 
aptitude, and visual limitations such as poor acuity, poor contrast sensitivity, and color blindness.
Communication
An examiner must work with other examiners, management, investigators, attorneys, and 
administrative personnel. While verbal communication is certainly important, communication 
via case documentation is also imperative. Only with sufficient documentation and reporting 
can other examiners and supervisors adequately provide technical and administrative review. 
For instance, understanding the location, orientation, surface, and development technique of the 
latent print can be  critical for interpreting print distortion. Additionally, understanding how the 
examiner searched the latent print (distal orientation and anatomical region) can provide critical 
information if an error has occurred.
Communication can suffer from confusing or conflicting directions or demands, a failure to 
convey or obtain adequate information, lack of report-writing skills, lack of teamwork, poor case 
documentation, and departures from standard terminology.
Environment
Environmental factors can contribute to errors. Both the operational environment (e.g., 
workplace design or clutter) and the ambient environment (e.g., temperature, noise, and lighting) 
can degrade performance. For example, the intensity, type, and direction of lighting can influence 
what an examiner perceives as key data. Chapter 7 discusses such physical environmental 
conditions as clutter, excessive heat or cold, lighting, ventilation, and noise, as well as technical 
environmental factors such as equipment and software.
9.2.3 Supervisory Issues
If an error has occurred, the investigation of the cause(s) starts with the examiner’s actions, 
proceeds through the conditions that may have contributed to the error, and continues on to 
supervisory actions and possibly organizational oversights or failures.
Leadership
Effective management provides examiners with adequate training, professional guidance, 
oversight, and operational leadership. Without this leadership, the chance of errors is greater. 
Managers can become so overwhelmed with meetings and paperwork that they fail to provide 
sufficient oversight. Yet, some supervisors take oversight to extremes, becoming too controlling 
and more concerned with minute details than the accuracy of the work. Micromanaging 
examiners can delay decision-making, restrict information flow, and diminish confidence and 
efficiency.
Effective leadership helps avoid errors by ensuring appropriate training; setting a proper 
example; tracking and assessing job qualifications or skills; monitoring work; providing 
appropriate feedback, mentoring, and incentives; and maintaining realistic expectations. 
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Operational Planning
Management is responsible for planning the operations of the forensic unit. Scheduling should 
include breaks and should take caseloads and deadlines into account. The supervisor who assigns 
a large complex case to a less experienced examiner may inadvertently set up the examiner for 
failure. Conversely, burdening the top performers with excessive work can keep them from 
performing optimally and can limit the opportunities for less experienced examiners to learn.
Many latent print units are so overwhelmed that supervisors must divide casework into rush 
cases and routine ones. Examiners with many rush cases can feel overwhelmed, frustrated, and 
confused. Supervisors and managers need ways to allocate casework to maintain productivity 
without causing frustration. Allowing examiners to finish one batch of cases before assigning 
another batch can be helpful. Also, management can sometimes request a certain amount of time 
from the court for rush cases to ensure that examiners can work the case properly. Trials can even 
be rescheduled, if necessary. Other examples of operational planning failures are not allowing 
adequate rest breaks; setting conflicting objectives, goals, or standards; and giving unclear or 
conflicting assignments.
Problem Correction
When problems are known, they should be corrected. Consistent failure to correct or discipline 
inappropriate behavior may foster a dysfunctional work environment. This caution also applies 
to issues associated with equipment and supplies. When necessary repairs are overlooked or 
supplies do not meet specifications, errors can result.
Supervisory Violations
Supervisory violations encompass the disregard of existing rules and regulations. An obvious 
example of poor supervisory behavior is putting undue influence on an examiner to reach 
a desired result. A more subtle violation is permitting an unqualified examiner to perform 
casework. Likewise, pushing an examiner to work unreasonably fast or encouraging “bending 
the rules” and procedures in the interest of completing a case are poor supervisory actions.
9.2.4	 Organizational	Influences
Organizational influences are the fourth and final layer—the last slice of Swiss cheese—to 
investigate when evaluating the factors that led to an error. Three areas of organizational failures 
fall into this category: resource management, organizational climate, and operational processes.
Resource Management
Resource management refers to the management, allocation, and maintenance of organizational 
resources, including human resource management (selection, training, staffing), budgets, 
logistics, and equipment design. Management decisions about such resources should focus on 
both quality and cost-effectiveness. Unfortunately, quality improvements and training are often 
the first items to be cut when experiencing financial difficulty. Resource management issues 
include maintaining hiring, evaluation, and promotion policies; matching qualifications to job 
assignments; reducing costs and managing unfunded directives; providing logistical support; and 
making suitable equipment available.
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Organizational Climate
Organizational climate influences 
examiner performance. The structure 
of the organization includes the chain 
of command, delegation of authority 
and responsibility, communication 
channels, and formal accountability 
for actions. Agency policies that are 
ill defined, adversarial, conflicting, 
or supplanted by unofficial rules 
and values can cause confusion, 
reduce quality, and lead to a negative 
organizational climate. Inaccessibility 
of upper management, inadequate 
accountability for actions, poorly 
defined or articulated organizational 
values, inappropriate allocation of 
resources, and unclear or conflicting 
assignments of responsibility can 
also lead to a negative organizational 
climate.
Many analysts work in fear of 
retribution from management, 
coworkers, and the International 
Association for Identification 
(IAI) Certification Board should 
they misidentify a print. The IAI 
Certification Program Operations 
Manual states that a technical error 
may result in suspension or revocation of certification and that the IAI can publish the results of 
any disciplinary  action.588 Consequently, some examiners may be unable or unwilling to make 
difficult identifications. Worse yet, examiners may feel compelled to conceal mistakes.
Box 9.2: High-Reliability Organizations
High-reliability organizations (HROs) are those with tightly
coupled, complex systems that have many potential points of
failure, any of which could result in catastrophic damage.582
Traditionally, these organizations are thought to include
nuclear power plants, air traffic control centers, aircraft
carriers, and submarines,583 but many habits of HRO
managers can benefit forensic science. While operating in a
highly complex environment, notably few catastrophic
failures occur in a successful HRO. For example, hospitals
consist of many individuals at many hierarchical levels
contributing to life-or-death decisions. To improve this
process in all hospitals, the Agency for Healthcare and
Research Quality has established an HRO network to allow
personnel to learn from each other’s expertise.584
Effective HROs empower employees at all levels with 
“a way of looking at your job and your environment in 
a ‘mindful’ way, which basically means that you both 
anticipate potential problems and that you are also prepared 
for them should they occur.”585 In other words, staff 
members should consider things that could go wrong and 
strive to improve on the status quo.586 Staff members must 
be trained to recognize and address anomalies in the system 
and should be rewarded for doing so. The overall mission, 
communicated clearly throughout the organization, must 
be willing to balance short-term gains with long-term 
reliability.587 Management cannot take steps to “cut corners” 
without expecting a system failure.
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Effective management is vital to delivering high-quality forensic services. Because human 
error in interpreting forensic science evidence can have devastating effects, examiners should 
be encouraged to come forward to help understand when and why errors occur. Management 
must foster a culture that promotes openness and acceptance when errors are committed without 
fostering a nonchalant attitude. The Working Group recommends:
Recommendation 9.1: Management should foster a culture in which it is understood 
that some human error is inevitable and that openness about errors leads to 
improvements in practice.
Operational Processes
Operational processes refer to formal processes (e.g., operational tempo, time pressures, 
production quotas, incentive systems, and schedules), procedures (e.g., performance standards, 
objectives, documentation, and instructions about procedures), and oversight within the agency 
(e.g., organizational self-study, risk management, and establishment and implementation of 
a QA/QC process). Poor upper-level management decisions concerning each of these factors 
can also have a negative effect on the examiners’ performance. Operational process factors 
include accreditation; appropriate standards, policies, or guidelines; documentation for standard 
operational procedures; overextension of resources; procedures that are not integrated into the 
training process; and, again, work and production schedules that produce risky decisions. 
Recommendation 9.2: Management should employ a system to identify and track errors 
and their causes.
Appendix A gives a sample taxonomy of human factors issues and errors, including those 
discussed above. Appendix B includes an example of a Corrective Action Report, and Appendix 
C shows how the human factors described in the chapter apply to that particular error.
9.3 Accreditation as a Means to Quality Improvement
Accreditation is a multi-faceted process that ensures that the forensic laboratories follow a 
documented quality management system and adhere to standards of operation promulgated 
through standard-developing organizations. An accrediting body’s routine onsite surveillance 
visits, required annual self-audit reports, and an externally monitored proficiency testing 
program assures periodic monitoring of the unit’s compliance with the accreditation program’s 
requirements.
Through accreditation, a forensic service provider demonstrates compliance with nationally 
and internationally recognized standards. Accreditation also ensures that the forensic unit has 
procedures in place to take appropriate corrective actions when indications of a significant 
problem appear. Unfortunately, there is a lack of uniformity in the application of existing 
accreditation standards in the United States, and different accrediting organizations apply 
different requirements (see Chapter 8).
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9.3.1 Personnel Requirements
Personnel requirements for accreditation  
include minimum standards for education, 
training, competency testing, and ongoing 
proficiency testing. Before assuming 
casework responsibility, each examiner 
should complete an established training 
program and should be tested for 
competency, at least in the most relevant 
work areas. Examiners should be routinely 
reviewed through annual proficiency testing, 
technical review of reports and examination 
records, and annual courtroom testimony 
monitoring (see Recommendation 6.4). 
Ongoing professional development for each 
examiner is an important element of the 
accreditation process. 
Under the International Organization for 
Standardization’s international standard 
ISO/IEC 17025, a forensic unit “must have 
arrangements to ensure that its management 
and personnel are free from any undue 
internal and external commercial, financial, 
and other pressures and influences that may 
adversely affect the quality of their work.”590
9.3.2 Management Procedures
Accreditation requires documented quality management procedures for the operation of the unit. 
The management system must designate a quality manager responsible for ensuring that the unit 
operates in conformity with the quality management system. Procedures must include steps to 
ensure that evidence is protected from loss, cross-transfer, contamination, or deleterious change. 
The procedures must ensure that evidence is properly marked and tracked throughout the period 
the unit controls the evidence.
9.3.3 Technical Procedures
Technical procedures must be documented, validated, and accepted in the scientific community. 
An accrediting agency conducts onsite assessments to ensure that the unit follows its documented 
procedures, adheres to the required standards, and uses proper controls. 
Box 9.3: Accreditation in the European Union
In late November 2009, the European Union (EU) 
approved a measure known as the Framework 
Decision to standardize forensic laboratory 
accreditation in member states. Because of the high 
likelihood for cross-border crimes in the EU, judicial 
systems in each country must have confidence in 
laboratory results from other countries.
The standards require national accreditation bodies 
in each member state to grant accreditation to 
forensic laboratories that comply with ISO/IEC 
17025, General requirements for the competence 
of testing and calibration laboratories. The 
accreditation standard specifically applies to 
laboratories that produce DNA profiles or work with 
latent print data. Each member state is responsible 
for ensuring compliance, for granting accreditation 
to their own laboratories, and for providing any 
funding necessary to achieve accreditation. The EU 
requires all latent print labs to comply with ISO/IEC 
17025 by November 30, 2015.589
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9.3.4 Facility Safety and Security
The forensic unit should have a well-designed, efficient laboratory with adequate ventilation and 
safety equipment. All forensic units should follow applicable Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration standards, state and local health agency guidelines, and other safety regulations 
and should offer a mandatory safety training program (see Chapter 7). 
The facility must have security to limit access to evidence, whether stored or under examination, 
and access to authorized individuals. The accreditation process evaluates the physical plant to 
ensure these standards are met.
Recommendation 9.3: All forensic service providers should be accredited by a 
recognized accrediting body.
9.4	 Case	Review,	Conflict	Resolution,	and	Corrective	Action
Assuring the quality of forensic work, particularly in those disciplines in which the examiner is 
the sole provider of the results, can be challenging. Examiners can be influenced by a range of 
factors, including experience, fatigue, and stress. Not only are no two examiners exactly alike, 
but also an individual examiner’s performance level can vary throughout the day. Thus, case 
review is an integral component of quality management.591
Case review involves verification, technical review, and administrative review. During the 
Verification phase of the Analysis, Evaluation, Comparison, and Verification process, a second 
examiner re-examines the latent prints to confirm or refute the conclusion of the case examiner. 
During technical review, another expert reviews the case file and report “to ensure the validity 
of scientific results and conclusions.”592 During administrative review, an expert examines the 
case file “for consistency with laboratory policy and for editorial correctness.”593 If discrepancies 
arise, the laboratory must have policies and procedures in place to address them.594 Numerous 
discrepancies can arise, but the remainder of this section focuses on disagreements during 
Verification, methods to resolve conflicting results, and corrective action.
9.4.1	 Verification
Agencies should have a clear policy indicating which results will undergo verification. The 
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST) 
quality assurance guidelines state that source attributions “shall be verified prior to reporting”  
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but that “exclusion or inconclusive results may be verified.”595 Verifying all results would be 
ideal (and some agencies do so). To conserve resources, however, agencies may verify all 
identifications but only a portion of the exclusions and inconclusive results.
The verifier typically receives the latent prints, the exemplar prints, the conclusions of the 
case examiner, and other information. In a blind verification, however, the verifier does not 
know the outcome of the first examination (see Chapters 1, 3, and 5). For blind verification to 
be meaningfully conducted, a sufficient proportion of all case conclusions must be reviewed. 
SWGFAST has released a Standard for the Application of Blind Verification of Friction Ridge 
Examinations596 to assist agencies instituting blind verification.597Additional research into the 
costs and benefits of blind verification would be valuable.
9.4.2	 Conflict	Resolution
Once the agency establishes procedures for verifications, it also must adopt procedures for 
handling and documenting conflicting decisions. Conflict can occur because examiners have 
varying degrees of knowledge, skills, training, and experience. The agency must have a method 
to determine the result that will be reported as correct. Some agencies have a technical leader 
who makes the final decision. Others use a panel of examiners. Still others send conflicting 
results to another forensic service provider, which helps to mitigate some internal concerns (e.g., 
systemic error, personality conflicts, and bias) but is not practical for all agencies. Regardless 
of the procedure implemented by the agency, the existence of the disagreement should be 
noted in the report, and the basis for the final consensus should be stated in the report or 
other documentation. (For additional discussion of conflict resolution and how it differs from 
consultation, see Chapter 5, section 5.3.5.)
9.4.3 Corrective Action
Once the conflict has been resolved, an “error” will have to be attributed to either the case 
examiner or the verifier, and corrective action may be appropriate.598 For instance, failing to 
identify a single latent print on an item when the subject has been identified as leaving other 
prints on the item may not be critical. An occasional non-critical failure to identify does not 
necessitate a formal corrective action; however, routine failures to identify should result in a 
formal corrective action, as it may indicate a contributing issue such as training, medical issues, 
or the work environment. Regardless of any formal corrective actions, management should track 
errors to determine if there are chronic problems.
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The response of management to an error must be commensurate with the potential impact and
frequency of the error.599 When errors occur, resolution may involve a simple consultation 
between the examiners or a formal corrective action. ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation standards 
state that (1) a laboratory must have policies and procedures regarding the implementation of 
corrective action, (2) the procedures must include an investigation to determine root causes, 
and (3) the laboratory must take preventive measures to mitigate the problem.600 Appendix B 
provides a sample Corrective Action Report, which describes the circumstances of an error, the 
corrective action, and the preventive measures.
Appendix C lists the human factors issues from all levels (examiner, conditional, supervisory, 
organizational) that contributed to the error in Appendix B. By compiling statistics on the various 
human factors issues related to each error, evaluating the data from multiple errors, and looking 
for common themes, management can become aware of critical failures in the system that 
could be setting the examiners up for failure. This systems approach could improve examiner 
performance not only within an agency but also throughout the profession.
Recommendation 9.4: Management should establish policies and procedures for case 
review	and	conflict	resolution,	corrective	action,	and	preventive	measures.
9.5	 Competency,	Certification,	and	Proficiency	Testing
Certification and testing for competency and proficiency are components of a strong quality 
management system. Testing is one way to measure the examiner’s knowledge, skills, and 
abilities. It can be used to demonstrate the examiner’s minimum competency, achievement of 
proficiency, and continued proficiency. A competency test evaluates “a person’s knowledge and 
ability prior to performing independent casework.”601 A proficiency test evaluates “the capability 
and performance of analysts, technical support personnel, and the laboratory; in open tests, the 
analysts and technical support personnel are aware that they are being tested; in blind tests, they 
are unaware.”602
Many professions (e.g., language training, medicine, accountancy, and law) use testing and 
certification to demonstrate and acknowledge that an individual has met established minimum 
standards of skills and knowledge. In these professions, the testing process is typically called 
competency testing, and the official acknowledgement is called certification. Various professions 
handle certification and proficiency testing in different ways.
Chapter 9: Human Factors Issues for Management  186 
The process of competency
testing, certification, and 
proficiency testing in the latent 
print discipline is largely ad 
hoc by jurisdiction and agency. 
It may be difficult to gain 
consensus on what competency, 
certification, and proficiency 
mean, let alone how they will 
be attained or documented. Yet, 
accreditation standards require 
competency testing prior to 
performing casework and the 
successful completion of a 
proficiency test by each examiner 
annually.
Recommendation 9.5: The 
latent print community 
should develop and 
implement a comprehensive 
testing program that 
includes competency 
testing,	certification	testing,	
and	proficiency	testing.
A standardized national testing 
program would be very useful 
in achieving this goal. To 
implement such a program, 
however, major tasks would need 
to be accomplished. Research 
should evaluate current training programs to discern similarities, weaknesses, and effectiveness 
(see Chapter 8). Training standards and standardized training material, including practical 
exercises, should be written, and criteria for selecting qualified trainers should be developed. A 
standardized test should be written with input from specialists in test design and validation. This 
test (or others) could be part of the framework for comprehensive testing described below.
9.5.1 Competency Training
During the training program, the new examiner should work toward a minimum level of 
knowledge and skill. To show that this level has been achieved, the examiner should pass a 
standardized competency test. Because examiners typically perform additional agency-specific 
functions (e.g., automatic fingerprint identification system entry, latent print development, 
and latent print photography), the agency or a national body should develop competency tests 
tailored to the examiner’s duties.
Box	9.4:	Certification	and	Testing	for	the	Practice	of	
Medicine
Upon graduation from an accredited medical school, all medical 
school graduates are required to pass a national licensing 
examination before practicing medicine. The test is sponsored by 
the Federation of State Medical Boards and the National Board 
of Medical Examiners. The first part (on anatomy, physiology, 
biochemistry, pharmacology, pathology, microbiology, and 
behavioral sciences) typically is taken at the end of the second 
year of medical school. The second part (on clinical knowledge), 
includes demonstrations of clinical skills via simulated patient 
encounters and typically is taken in the fourth year of medical 
school. The final part is taken at the end of the student’s formal 
medical school training and before internship and residency. This 
2-day test measures the student’s knowledge of basic science and 
medicine and assesses his or her ability to manage patient care via 
case simulations that include prescribing medications.
After completing formal medical education at an accredited 
medical university and passing the competency examinations, 
U.S. medical students are required to complete a 1-year 
internship. This internship is typically part of the student’s 
postgraduate residency in a chosen specialty (e.g., orthopedics, 
radiology, family practice). The internship is the minimum 
training requirement for a license to practice medicine in the 
U.S. and for taking most state medical board certification tests. 
All state medical specialties require periodic proof of continued 
professional competency. Continued professional competency 
often includes continuing medical education, recertification 
examinations, and some measure of clinical skills as approved by 
the certification board.
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After succeeding in the competency tests, an examiner can perform casework. A certified 
examiner should review the new examiner’s casework at this stage. All conclusions should be 
verified, and each case should undergo technical review. This verification and technical review 
should continue until the agency determines that the examiner can work successfully under the 
agency’s routine verification and technical review process. The examiner should not perform 
verification or technical reviews before becoming certified.
9.5.2	 Certification	Testing
A standardized certification test demonstrates that the examiner has become proficient in 
casework and meets or exceeds minimum competency to perform latent print examinations. 
To retain certification, an examiner should complete continuing education requirements and 
demonstrate proficiency in periodic proficiency tests.
9.5.3	 Proficiency	Testing
Periodic proficiency tests are a means to ensure that examiners maintain their skills. Agencies 
should administer proficiency tests at least annually that reflect the type of casework performed 
by the examiner. A standardized proficiency test for each examiner not only could demonstrate 
the necessary ability to continue as an examiner, but it also could inform training needs across 
the discipline. For instance, a high erroneous exclusion rate on latent palm prints that lack a clear 
distal orientation and anatomical region could indicate that training programs need to place more  
emphasis on palm prints or that examiners need periodic refresher training on palm prints.603
9.6 Summary
This chapter offers recommendations about the principles, policies, and practices of management 
and describes strategies to prevent human errors in latent print examinations. Management 
within any forensic operation must be committed to developing, maintaining, and improving 
quality assurance and quality control. Latent print units should report accurate and timely results. 
The examiners have the responsibility to provide results and testimony based upon scientific or 
technical knowledge, training, and experience. Management must create the proper environment 
for this to occur. This includes creating an impeccable QA/QC process; meeting standards of 
certification, accreditation, and proficiency testing; and adopting a systems approach to reducing 
errors.
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Appendix 9-A: Sample Taxonomy of Errors and Human Factors
The following tables contain a classification scheme that outlines potential sources of error. 
Additional factors at every level could always occur and should be documented and tracked. 
Examiner Actions
Decision-Based Mistakes
Conclusion exceeded ability of examiner
Failure to recognize exemplars as inadequate
Failure to search all exemplars
Failure to use available technology
Hurried or insufficiently thorough examination
Improper anatomical source of data
Improper orientation of images
Incomplete search
Insufficient data to support conclusion
Misprioritized level of effort
Poor target group selection
Print improperly deemed suitable
Print improperly deemed unsuitable
Perception-Based Mistakes
Not all data perceived
Data perceived and compared inadequately
Skill-Based Mistakes
Failure to find target data
Failure to properly weight the significance of the  
data
Failure to recognize distortion
Inability to reach a conclusion
Incomplete comparison
Misinterpreted data
Not all data understood
Poor search technique
Examiner Violations
Deeming a latent print not suitable intentionally
Disregarding QA/QC procedures (e.g., verification)
Disregarding discrepant information
Erroneously identifying a latent print (intentionally)
Identifying an unsuitable latent print (intentionally)
Including a subject inappropriately (intentionally)
Misrepresentation of information
Not comparing a latent print and reporting exclusion 
 or inconclusive results
Seeking/coercing another examiner to verify a  
complex comparison
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Conditions that Affect Performance
Adverse Mental States of the Examiner
Anger
Apprehension to reach a conclusion
Bias 
Boredom
Channelized attention
Complacency
Compromised integrity or ethics
Distraction
Expectancy
Frustration
Haste
Lack of confidence
Mental fatigue
Misplaced motivation
Overconfidence
Peer pressure
Preoccupation with personal problems
Task overload
Stress
Adverse Physiological States of the Examiner
Alcohol use (intoxicated or hung-over)
Eyestrain
Illicit drug use
Inadequate nutrition (poor dietary practices)
Lack of sleep
Medical illness
Physical fatigue (e.g., postural fatigue)
Physical injuries
Medication side effects
Physical or Mental Limitations of the Examiner
Chronic psychological disorder
Color vision deficiency
Dyslexia
Inadequate training
Incompatible intelligence/aptitude
Limited experience
Visual limitations (e.g., acuity or contrast sensitivity)
Communication
Confusing or conflicting directions or demands
Failure to convey adequate information
Failure to use all available sources of information
Inadequate communication among examiners
Inadequate communication with management
Inadequate report writing skills
Inadequate teamwork
Inadequate case documentation
Standard terminology not used
Physical Environment
Clutter
Excessive heat or cold
Inadequate lighting
Inadequate ventilation
Poor workplace design
Noise interference
Technical Environment
Defective equipment
Defective tools
Inadequate/outdated software or equipment
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Supervisory Issues
Leadership Failures
Change induced without training
Failure to provide professional guidance and 
oversight
Failure to set proper example
Failure to track job qualifications or skills
Inadequate assessment of required skill
Inadequate leadership job knowledge
Inadequate monitoring of work
Inadequate or incorrect performance feedback
Inadequate performance measurement or evaluation
Insufficient initial or ongoing training provided
Inadequate or inappropriate incentives
Inadequate coaching or mentoring on skill
Inadequate measurement of training effectiveness
Personality conflicts 
Unrealistic expectations
Operational Planning Failures
Excessive workload
Failure to provide adequate rest breaks
Improper or insufficient delegation of work
Inadequate communication of policy, procedure, 
practices, or guidelines
Inadequate documentation
Inadequate matching of individual qualifications and 
job or task requirements
Setting objectives, goals, or standards that conflict
Unclear or conflicting assignment of responsibility
Unrealistic deadlines or quotas
Failure to Correct Known Problems
Failure to correct inappropriate behavior
Failure to correct reported problem
Failure to correct workplace hazards
Failure to initiate corrective action
Failure to update standard operating procedures
Rewarding or tolerating improper performance
Supervisory Violations
Enabling excessive risk-taking
Failure to enforce rules and regulations
Supervisor encouragement of rule bending
Fraudulent documentation
Management-induced haste
Unrealistic production goals
Undue influence toward a desired outcome
Violation of standard operating procedures by 
supervisor
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Organizational	Influences
Resource Management Failures
Failure to correct known design flaws
Inadequate evaluation and promotion policies
Inadequate hiring, firing, and promotion processes
Inadequate matching of qualifications for the job 
Ineffective cost-cutting
Lack of logistical support
Purchasing unsuitable equipment/parts
Inadequate selection of personnel
Inadequate staffing
Use of inadequate contractor or vendor
Unfunded directives
Organizational Climate Failures
Inadequate accessibility or visibility of upper 
management
Inadequate allocation of resources
Inadequate formal accountability for actions
Dysfunctional organizational culture
Organizational values not clearly defined and 
articulated
Unclear or conflicting assignments of responsibility
Operational Process Failures
Failure to maintain accreditation 
Lack of appropriate standards, policies, or guidelines
Inadequate documentation for standard operating 
procedures
Organizationally induced time pressure
Overextending resources
Procedures not integrated into training process
Quality process not adequately implemented or 
maintained
Unrealistic quotas established by the organization
Work or production schedules that produce risky 
decisions
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Appendix 9-B: Corrective Action Report Sample
FORENSIC LAB CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT
Place “N/A” in blanks that are not applicable.
APPLICABLE #(S)  (e.g., Event #, CTS #) RELEVANT INSTRUMENT:
Case: 12356-78 Instrument type: N/A
Manufacturer:  N/A
Model #:  N/A
Serial #: N/A
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT/EFFECT OF DISCREPANCY
 
Forensic scientist (FS) Jane Doe was assigned homicide case #123456-78. FS Doe worked the case 
during November and early December 2009. FS Doe completed the initial formal report in December 
2009. She developed latent prints on 4 items of evidence and recovered 16 latent prints. She deemed 
two of these suitable for comparison.
FS Doe also examined 3 latent print packets submitted by Crime Scene Examiners (CSA), collectively 
containing 56 lifts/photos. On these lifts/photos, 75 suitable latent prints were present.
FS Doe compared the 77 suitable latent prints to those of 5 suspects, 1 victim, and 1 other subject 
identified via the automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS). This amounts to 539 conclusions. 
One suspect was identified to one of the latent prints recovered from the evidence. Another suspect 
was identified to one latent print submitted by CSA. The AFIS subject was identified to 28 latent prints 
submitted by the CSA.
Manager Susan Smith verified these results on February 4, 2010. Manager Smith noted that two of the 
identifications recorded by FS Doe were to the incorrect finger of the correct subject (AFIS subject). FS 
Doe originally identified the two latent prints to the right thumb of the subject; however, one was made 
by the right middle finger, and the other was made by the right ring finger of the same subject.   
Manager Smith noted the correct conclusion in the case notes and asked FS Doe to review her conclu-
sions. FS Doe immediately noticed the errors. Manager Smith verbally notified the quality assurance 
(QA) manager and the laboratory director on February 8, 2010. The case was returned to FS Doe, and 
she created charted enlargements for her case file and annotated the notes appropriately. Manager Smith 
completed a technical review of the case on February 25, 2010, and issued the report.  
There was no effect of the discrepancy, as the errors were caught during the Verification phase. 
Date: 3/4/11 Reported By: Manager Smith
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ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION
The right thumb, middle, and ring fingers of the subject had similar ridge configurations in the core. 
The similar pattern, ridge count, and ridge configuration in these fingers likely contributed to the errors. 
In addition, FS Doe was under significant stress during this time period because of the terminal illness 
of a parent.   
FS Doe also indicated to Manager Smith that she was trying to increase her case productivity to help 
alleviate the backlog. The pressure FS Doe was placing upon herself to complete the case may also 
have contributed to the error.
FS Doe was increasing the use of fingerprint loupes into the analysis of her casework during this time 
period to prepare for the International Association of Identification (IAI) Latent Print Certification Test. 
This was a significant departure from her normal routine, which focuses on the use of digital imaging 
during her comparisons. (The IAI certification test does not permit use of digital imaging technology.) 
FS Doe normally charts her identifications via Photoshop, but she did not do so in this case because she 
used the loupes.
The cumulative effect of the stress of life events, similarity of the prints, time pressure, and technology 
adaptations ultimately resulted in these errors.
Determined By: Manager Smith
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES TAKEN
Corrective Action 
FS Doe was placed on supervised casework for a period of 30 days. Nine cases were fully reviewed 
and re-examined during this time. No errors were noted. Upon completion of the 30 days of supervised 
casework, FS Doe was assigned a Collaborative Testing Services test as in-house proficiency test on 
March 17, 2011. FS Doe successfully completed this test on April 1, 2011.
From November 1, 2010, to February 3, 2011, FS Doe completed ten cases. Seven of these cases were 
reviewed. No errors were noted on the identifications in these cases. The three cases that were not 
reviewed during this time were latent print development cases, and no comparable latent prints were 
recovered.
Preventive Measures 
FS Doe and Manager Smith analyzed and marked 30 difficult latent prints to evaluate FS Doe’s ability 
to interpret and detect minutiae. Once marked, FS Doe and Manager Smith compared the markings and 
discussed the results for each image. The goal of this exercise was to ensure that FS Doe was correctly 
assessing friction ridge detail. FS Doe successfully completed this exercise: Manager Smith did not 
note any problems with FS Doe’s interpretation of the friction ridge detail.
The Forensic Laboratory monitors the caseload and work product more carefully during high-stress 
times. Over time, examiners learn when they are not mentally able to perform the task and postpone the 
examination to a better time. Possibly, cases should be re-assigned in this situation.
If FS Doe chooses to use the fingerprint loupe in casework, the comparison will be repeated utilizing 
digital imaging to determine if the re-examination yields any inconsistencies.
Date: 05/3/2011 Approved By: QA Manager
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ROUTE TO IN LAB: (NAME & P #) SIGNATURE DATE
FS Jane Doe
Manager Smith
QA Manager
Laboratory Director
ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS, IF REQUIRED:
PERSON NOTIFIED: (NAME & TITLE / P #) DATE NOTIFIED
ASCLD/LAB Notified: □ Yes   X Not Required
NOTES:
Jane Doe has not made any erroneous identifications since this incident - QA Manager 08/26/20101
THIS SECTION WILL BE COMLPETED BY THE QUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGER
Was the problem corrected?  × Yes  □ No  (if no, complete section below)
FOLLOW-UP, IF REQUIRED:
N/A - QA Manager
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Appendix 9-C: Applying Human Factors to an Error
Human factors issues have an impact on examiner performance. The error described in the 
Corrective Action Report (CAR) in Appendix B was the culmination of a breakdown in the 
system, not just the fault of the examiner. The examiner involved is a dedicated professional 
and an excellent casework examiner. In reviewing the CAR, one can look at the various holes in 
the Swiss cheese model at each level: Examiner Actions, Conditions that Affect Performance, 
Supervisory Issues, and Organizational Influences.
Examiner Action: Decision-Based Mistakes Supervisory Issues: Leadership Failures
Failure to use available technology Inadequate assessment of required skill
Hurried or insufficiently thorough examination Inadequate monitoring of work
Misprioritized level of effort Inadequate coaching or mentoring on skill
Examiner Action: Skill-Based Mistake Organizational: Resource Management Failures
Misinterpreted data Inadequate staffing
Examiner Action: Perception-Based Mistake Organizational: Operational Process Failures
Not all data perceived Organizationally induced time pressure
Overextending resources
Conditions: Adverse Mental States
Preoccupation with personal problems
Stress
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Chapter 10: Summary of Recommendations
The recommendations and suggestions of the Working Group address issues ranging from the 
acquisition of impressions of friction ridge skin to courtroom testimony, from laboratory design 
and equipment to research into emerging methods for associating latent prints with exemplars. 
This group is not the first to address most of these matters; the recommendations are informed 
by and build upon the work of many practitioners and scholars of forensic science and evidence 
as well as the experience of other industries and enterprises that must deliver safe products or 
services. This concluding chapter collects and organizes the recommendations put forth on the 
following topics:
• Performing Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V)
• Reporting and testifying
• Managing the process
• Improving training and education
• Providing facilities and equipment
• Supporting research efforts.
10.1 Performing Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and  
Verification	(ACE-V)
Latent print examinations can produce very powerful evidence regarding the possible association 
between a suspect and the source of a print. The long-established practice in latent print 
examinations is to interpret the evidence in terms of the categorical conclusion that two prints 
do or do not share a common source (or to report that the information presented does not permit 
such a categorical conclusion). Traditionally, a fingerprint identification was considered an 
“individualization,” meaning that the latent print was considered identified to one finger of a 
specific individual to exclude every other potential source in the universe. However, this claim 
is needlessly strong, not yet adequately supported by fundamental research, and impossible to 
validate solely on the basis of experience. Nor does fingerprint evidence have objective standards 
or a well-validated statistical model that can provide an objective measure of its strength in a 
given instance. Therefore, examiners should not claim to be able to exclude every other finger in 
the world as a potential source. Rather, an identification decision suggests a substantial enough 
similarity that, based on the examiner’s training and experience, the examiner believes that 
the two impressions originated from a common source. Whether any other finger in the entire 
world might also be able to leave an impression with a comparable amount of similarity is not 
fully known, and the examiner’s testimony should not suggest otherwise. Regardless of the 
specific words used to describe an identification, examiners should refrain from claiming that an 
identification means that they have excluded all other individuals in the world.
Because empirical evidence and statistical reasoning do not support a source attribution to 
the exclusion of all other individuals in the world, latent print examiners should not report or 
testify, directly or by implication, to a source attribution to the exclusion of all others in the 
world. (Recommendation 3.7)
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The alternatives to the theory of universal individualization include probabilistic forms of source 
attribution (see Chapter 1), qualitative or quantitative likelihood ratios (determined subjectively 
or, in the future, with probabilistic models, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6), or a broader range 
of conclusions than the three choices of identification, exclusion, or inconclusive. Without taking 
a position on which of these approaches is best, the Working Group recommends:
The friction ridge examiner community and other experts should determine under what 
circumstances a qualified rather than an absolute conclusion is warranted. (Recommendation 
3.8)
However the conclusion of a latent print examination might be framed, the examination process 
requires the careful interpretation and comparison of friction ridge impressions. From the 
first examination of the features contained in a latent print to a final conclusion regarding an 
identification or exclusion, an examiner engages in many acts of interpretation. Current methods 
for making these interpretations are based on professional knowledge and experience rather than 
on formal decision thresholds or statistical models. The process known as ACE-V organizes the 
interpretations and decisions of an examiner into a useful and logical sequence, but descriptions 
of this process do not detail the substantive content of the various steps. Examining latent prints 
and exemplars necessitates judgment and expertise, which inevitably makes the interpretive 
process partly subjective. With this subjectivity of interpretation comes the possibility of reduced 
performance due to a wide range of human factors issues. To increase the transparency of the 
process and to insulate the examiner from extraneous influences, the Working Group makes the 
following recommendations:
A report and contemporaneous supporting notes or materials should document the 
examination to make the interpretive process as transparent as possible. Although the degree 
of detail may vary depending on the perceived complexity of the comparison, documentation 
should, at a minimum, be sufficient to permit another examiner to assess the accuracy and 
validity of the initial examiner’s assessment of the evidence. (Recommendation 3.1)
Modifications to the results of any stage of latent print analysis (e.g., feature selection, utility 
assessment, discrepancy interpretation) after seeing a known exemplar should be viewed 
with caution. Such modifications should be specifically documented as having occurred after 
comparison has begun. (Recommendation 3.2)
Procedures should be implemented to protect examiners from exposure to extraneous 
(domain-irrelevant) information in a case. (Recommendation 3.3)
Several steps in the latent print analysis process require a determination of latent print 
utility or sufficiency. The examiner must determine whether the print has enough clarity and 
quantity of information for some specified purpose. This happens both early in the process 
(e.g., determinations of whether the latent is suitable for analysis or suitable for an automated 
fingerprint identification system search) and later in the process (e.g., determinations of sufficient 
information to compare the latent and exemplar). Forensic service providers can enhance the 
transparency of their analyses and conclusions by promulgating clear guidelines that 
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assist examiners in making determinations of utility.604 Therefore, the Working Group 
recommends:
Each agency or forensic service provider should define “suitable” or “sufficient” in its 
standard operations procedures. These guidelines should be as explicit as possible about what 
is expected for sufficiency determinations at different stages of the latent print examination 
process. (Recommendation 3.4)
Information that could be incorporated in an agency’s guidelines includes, for example, number 
of minutiae and visibility of ridge flow, pores, ridge edges, and details of incipient ridges, 
creases, and scars.605 For a more detailed discussion of suitability, see Chapter 3, section 3.4.
Modern investigations often compare latent prints to exemplars from automated fingerprint 
identification system (AFIS) searches. When looking in a large database for those prints that bear 
the greatest similarity to the latent print in question, these programs could select a print from a 
non-source that is far more similar to the latent print than examiners are accustomed to seeing 
from non-matching sources. An examiner whose idea of the necessary amount of information 
for a match comes from a non-database world may not be taking into account the possibility 
of incidental similarity that a large database carries with it. Special care may be warranted in 
interpreting the evidence in such cases. Thus, the Working Group recommends:
When comparing latent prints to exemplars generated through AFIS searches, examiners 
must recognize the possibility and dangers of incidental similarity. Adjustments such as 
a higher decision threshold, stricter tolerances for differences in appearance, and explicit 
feature weighting need to be considered. Modified quality assurance practices for this 
scenario also should be considered. (Recommendation 3.6)
10.2 Reporting and Testifying
The forensic part of forensic science distinguishes it from other scientific disciplines. Outside 
the forensic arena, scientists must report their results, but they rarely do so to inform criminal 
investigators, prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts. The needs of these lay consumers of 
forensic science evidence lead to two recommendations. First:
The report of the examination should ensure that the findings and their limitations are 
intelligible to non-experts. (Recommendation 5.1)
Second, to maximize the likelihood that the evidence will be used properly, fully, and fairly at 
trial, the report of the results of an examination should:
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a. Identify the latent print examiner(s);
b. Describe the items submitted to the examiner(s);
c. List the procedures used by the examiner to develop, visualize, or enhance the friction 
ridge impressions;
d. List all comparisons conducted;
e. State all conclusions with the method used to reach them;
f. Note any important limitations to the conclusions;
g. Indicate whether a verification was made and whether there was any conflict of 
opinion among examiners prior to the reported conclusions;
h. Note (or refer to external documentation of) any information about the case that the 
examiner(s) received;
i. Note the existence of additional documentation; and
j. Define important technical terms, either explicitly or by reference to an authoritative, 
readily available source. (Recommendation 5.2)
Latent print examiners do more than analyze impressions and prepare written records of 
their work. They testify as expert witnesses who have more latitude than ordinary fact 
witnesses to provide opinions and guidance to jurors. As expert witnesses and as forensic 
science professionals, they have an obligation to their profession and to the court to maintain 
“objectivity, staying within the bounds or limits of what the science can provide, maintaining 
confidentiality, complying [with] legal demands such as disclosure, and being truthful.”606 To help 
maintain this objectivity and “to promote the understanding of examinations and findings,”607 the 
Working Group recommends:
Forensic service providers should adopt codes of ethics that require testifying in a 
nonpartisan manner; answering questions from both the prosecution and the defense directly, 
accurately, and fully; and providing appropriate scientific information before, during, and 
after trial. (Recommendation 6.2)
The importance of “staying within the bounds or limits of what the science can provide” and 
providing appropriate scientific information means that, as previously noted in section 10.1, 
“latent print examiners should not report or testify, directly or by implication, to a source 
attribution to the exclusion of all others in the world” (see Recommendation 3.7).
These goals are most likely to be realized when the expert confers with the lawyer prior to 
direct examination. At a pretrial meeting, the expert can make clear the nature and limits of the 
testimony that the evidentiary material warrants and can work with the lawyer to present this 
information fully, fairly, and clearly.
The trial preparation process should address the presentation of technical information in 
lay terms, the organization of the direct examination, possible cross-examination, and the 
possible use of visual aids. (Recommendation 6.1)
Chapter 10: Summary of Recommendations  200 
Because absolute certainty is unattainable in science, the witness must be prepared to 
acknowledge and discuss the possibility that an opinion is not correct. Therefore:
A testifying expert should be familiar with the literature related to error rates. A testifying 
expert should be prepared to describe the steps taken in the examination process to reduce 
the risk of observational and judgmental error. The expert should not state that errors are 
inherently impossible or that a method inherently has a zero error rate. (Recommendation 
6.3)
Finally, forensic service providers should maintain quality assurance mechanisms for reporting 
and testifying.
An agency that employs latent print examiners should establish requirements and guidelines 
for reporting, documentation, and testimony. The agency should review a sample of every 
examiner’s case reports, documentation, and testimony and affidavits at least annually to 
verify compliance with these requirements and guidelines. (Recommendation 6.4)
10.3 Managing the Process
Latent print examinations do not occur in isolation. Supervision of the staff members and 
management of the facilities are essential to risk reduction and quality assurance and control. 
Effective management requires good information about the incidence and sources of errors. 
Making this information available requires a culture in which both management and staff 
understand that openness about errors is not necessarily a path to punitive sanctions but rather is 
part of an effective system to detect deviations from desired practices and incorrect judgments in 
latent print casework. To achieve such a system, the Working Group recommends:
Management should foster a culture in which it is understood that some human 
error is inevitable and that openness about errors leads to improvements in practice. 
(Recommendation 9.1)
Management should employ a system to identify and track errors and their causes. 
(Recommendation 9.2)
Management should establish policies and procedures for case review and conflict resolution, 
corrective action, and preventive measures. (Recommendation 9.4)
Furthermore, adherence to appropriate standards is vital to achieving high levels of performance. 
As a result:
All forensic service providers should be accredited by a recognized accrediting body. 
(Recommendation 9.3)
The latent print community should develop and implement a comprehensive testing 
program that includes competency testing, certification testing, and proficiency testing. 
(Recommendation 9.5)
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Forensic service providers should require personnel to become certified through an 
accredited program. Certifying bodies should review current certification tests with the aid of 
professionals in test design and psychometrics. (Recommendation 8.7 in part)
Finally, to ensure that latent print examiners maintain their physical capacity to perform at high 
levels of accuracy:
Forensic service providers should institute medical surveillance for examiners with respect 
to activities specific to friction ridge examination. Corrective measures should be taken 
when appropriate and recorded. The program should include a baseline visual examination 
followed by annual vision testing to detect vision deficiencies that may affect interpretation 
of the evidence. (Recommendation 7.2 in part)
10.4 Improving Training and Education
The need to train and educate examiners on existing procedures and equipment and on emerging 
technologies is a recurring theme in this report. The Working Group’s recommendations involve 
university education, on-the-job training and mentoring, and continuing education. Specifically, 
the Working Group recommends:
Forensic service providers should require personnel to participate in continuing education. 
(Recommendation 8.7 in part)
The latent print examiner community should expand the training of examiners in elementary 
probability theory to enable examiners to properly utilize the output of probabilistic models. 
(Recommendation 4.3)
The federal government should consider funding research to determine what educational 
and cognitive abilities should be prerequisites for training a latent print examiner. Forensic 
service providers should have systematic training programs that include these abilities as well 
as education in the scientific method, reading and understanding relevant scientific literature, 
communication skills, and methods for logically developing conclusions. (Recommendation 
8.1)
Agencies should develop formal mentoring programs that define the responsibilities of the 
mentor, trainee, and supervisor. (Recommendation 8.3)
Certifying bodies should ensure that examiners have been trained to competency. Laboratory 
accrediting bodies should evaluate the effectiveness of an agency’s training program. 
(Recommendation 8.8)
Because statistical information plays a fundamental role in weighting latent print feature 
evidence, training should include the best available empirical information and should educate 
examiners about probabilistic reasoning in using that information. (Recommendation 3.5)
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The federal government should establish an expert group to develop a latent print educational 
textbook, practical exercises, and assessment tests (print and online) in consultation 
with professional organizations, senior latent print examiners, researchers with content 
knowledge, experienced trainers, and professionals experienced in curriculum development. 
(Recommendation 8.4)
The federal government should support a clearinghouse of materials from existing training 
programs as well as publications on latent print identification. (Recommendation 8.6)
Training materials should include topics beyond the technical aspects of friction ridge 
analysis, such as:
a. Documentation of work and case notes and written and oral communication;
b. Professional ethics;
c. Human factors issues such as fatigue, bias, cognitive influences, perceptual 
influences, and error;
d. Research methods; and
e. Legal and ethical aspects of expert testimony. (Recommendation 8.5)
The federal government should develop a forensic latent print examiner scholarship 
program to:
a. Fund the post-hire training program and, upon successful completion, provide tuition 
reimbursement, loan forgiveness, or other financial assistance to degreed latent 
print examiner trainees working in state, local, or private (not-for-profit) forensic 
laboratories; and
b. Reimburse the employer for a percentage of the salaries during the training period. 
(Recommendation 8.2)
10.5 Providing Facilities and Equipment
Latent print examinations take place in a physical environment with hardware and software that 
can facilitate the work of the examiners. To achieve the best results in examinations, the Working 
Group recommends:
A structured approach that involves users throughout the entire design and implementation 
process should be followed when designing technology systems and the physical work 
environment. In addition, forensic service providers should perform usability testing to 
optimize user performance and user satisfaction before deployment. (Recommendation 7.1)
10.6 Supporting Research Efforts
An increasing number of research projects are underway, but additional research should be 
undertaken in many areas. For example, the Working Group encountered many questions about 
the existing interpretive process, possible enhancements to it, and other significant matters that 
presently lack definitive answers. There is a critical need for a focused program of research into 
the interpretive process that is at the heart of ACE-V. For example, only a handful of studies 
have assessed variation in the feature selection process. Generally, the findings have shown wide 
variation among examiners during the task of feature selection. Developing methods to reduce 
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the variation of the print features selected for comparisons and the development of tools and 
technologies to assist in the identification of the most reliable features would both be useful. 
While these tools are likely to be especially important for complex comparisons, they may have 
broader benefits. Standardized methods for feature selection should result in less variation in the 
features that are selected and compared, which in turn should lead to more consistency in the 
decisions reported. However, even if decisions were more consistent, they would not necessarily 
be more accurate. Even the best interpreters of prints should be willing to compare their own 
methods to a standard protocol to decide which practice is best.
Furthermore, the link between variations in feature selection and the examiner’s ultimate 
decision is not well understood. Emerging research suggests that there is a relationship, but the 
effect may be competing with other major interpretative steps, such as interpreting discrepancy, 
feature weighting, and thresholds for reaching identification decisions. A better understanding 
of the link between feature selection and the ultimate decision would permit best practices to be 
formulated. This knowledge would also allow technology systems to select the most reliable and 
useful features on which to base decisions later in the ACE-V process.
The Working Group found no research that explicitly addresses utility or sufficiency in the 
context of latent print analysis. This is unsurprising, for a critical piece for any such research— 
the definition and validation of a metric for assessing utility—is missing. Research has been 
carried out related to the examiner decision process that implicitly involves judgments of utility 
and sufficiency, but these studies tend to focus only on the accuracy or repeatability of the 
ultimate decision. For example, the Noblis-FBI study described in Chapter 2 treats the ACE-V 
process as a “black box.” The experimenters provide the input and measure the output in various 
ways. This kind of research provides valuable information on how examiners perform relative 
to “ground truth” (accuracy) and how their results compare to one another (reliability). Opening 
the box to study the process of judgment in every phase of ACE-V would provide the empirical 
foundation from which to develop best practices for each part of the process. As a result, the 
Working Group recommends:
The federal government should support a research program that aims to:
a. Develop measures and metrics relevant to the analysis of latent prints;
b. Use such metrics to assess the reproducibility, reliability, and validity of various 
interpretive stages of latent print analysis; and
c. Identify key factors related to variations in performance of latent print examiners 
during the interpretation process. (Recommendation 3.9)
Practitioners recognize that assigning weights to latent print features and their configurations 
is a fundamental decision-making or interpretive step, either as an output of the Analysis phase 
or as part of the Evaluation phase. Pioneers such as Locard indicated that fingerprint features 
should be assessed as a function of their relative rarity (allowing also for a proper consideration 
of their clarity).608 Currently, however, the weighting of individual features is mainly based upon 
subjective, experience-based judgments of the probability associated with their occurrence. In
fact, in one study, latent print examiners did not provide consistent rankings of how frequently 
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fingerprint features occur.609 No clear consensus exists among practitioners as to the 
reproducibility and perceived contribution of Level 3 Detail features appearing in both latent 
and the exemplar print.610 Carefully collected data should be used to provide more accurate 
assessments that can inform the weighting of features in the interpretive process.
This statistical data also could be incorporated into formal probabilistic models of various 
kinds (see Chapter 4). In addition to providing both a firmer foundation for and opportunities 
to improve the judgments of examiners, such modeling can supply objective probabilities that 
would be useful to judges or juries (Chapter 6). Before that can happen, however, large datasets 
will be needed to validate the emerging models more fully. The Working Group therefore 
recommends:
To facilitate the validation of probabilistic models and other statistical research, the federal 
government should create large, anonymous databases of exemplars and latent prints. 
(Recommendation 4.2)
Visual acuity is vital to the examination process, and section 10.3 included a recommendation 
for medical monitoring. To permit the most effective monitoring, the Working Group also 
recommends: 
The federal government should support research to determine the most appropriate tests of 
visual function for friction ridge examiners. (Recommendation 7.2 in part)
As discussed in Chapter 4 and section 10.4, AFIS technology has proven to be of great value 
in efficiently locating candidate exemplars for examiners to compare to a questioned print. The 
design of these systems could be improved in several respects.
The federal government should support research programs to improve automated fingerprint 
identification systems. Such programs could address the following issues: 
a. Expanding the algorithms used to match prints to account for the fact that the 
diagnostic value of minutiae depends on the region in which they are located;
b. Making fingerprint and palm print databases interoperable among local, state, and 
federal automated identification systems; and
c. Increasing compatibility between automated identification systems and other latent 
print software tools, including digital enhancement programs, probability calculation 
programs, and automated quality assessment programs. (Recommendation 4.1)
The reference above to automated quality assessment programs relates to Recommendation 
3.9 for research into the interpretative process. In the experience of the Working Group, the 
initial quality assessment of the latent print is often the weak link in the analytical process, 
as examiners are susceptible to making one of two types of errors. In the first type of error, 
the examiner prematurely discards a print that should be deemed suitable for further analysis 
and comparison, possibly resulting in a missed identification. In the second type of error, the 
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examiner continues to evaluate a latent print that ought to be deemed unsuitable for further 
processing. This outcome results in wasted time and might even contribute to an erroneous 
identification. Although efforts to develop automated quality assessment programs have had 
limited success, a concerted effort to automate the quality assessment step, at least partially, is 
worthwhile. In addition to Recommendation 3.9(a), the Working Group proposes:
The federal government should continue funding research into automation of the initial 
quality assessment step in latent print analysis. (Recommendation 4.4)
Latent print analysis provides perhaps the single most common type of forensic science evidence. 
It is critical to the successful operation of the criminal justice system. The recommendations 
listed above do not exhaust this report’s suggestions for improving the understanding and 
management of human factors issues in this vital work. Related suggestions, explanations, and 
ideas are found in each chapter. Translating these ideas into practice will make the analysis and 
presentation of a crucial source of information even more effective and reliable.
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Appendix 10-A: List of Recommendations
Recommendation 3.1: A report and contemporaneous supporting notes or materials should 
document the examination to make the interpretive process as transparent as possible. Although 
the degree of detail may vary depending on the perceived complexity of the comparison, 
documentation should, at a minimum, be sufficient to permit another examiner to assess the 
accuracy and validity of the initial examiner’s assessment of the evidence.
Recommendation 3.2: Modifications to the results of any stage of latent print analysis (e.g., 
feature selection, utility assessment, discrepancy interpretation) after seeing a known exemplar 
should be viewed with caution. Such modifications should be specifically documented as having 
occurred after comparison had begun.
Recommendation 3.3: Procedures should be implemented to protect examiners from exposure to 
extraneous (domain-irrelevant) information in a case.
Recommendation 3.4: Each agency or forensic service provider should define “suitable” or 
“sufficient” in its standard operations procedures. These guidelines should be as explicit as 
possible about what is expected for sufficiency determinations at different stages of the latent 
print examination process.
Recommendation 3.5: Because statistical information plays a fundamental role in weighting 
latent print feature evidence, training should include the best available empirical information and 
should educate examiners about probabilistic reasoning in using that information.
Recommendation 3.6: When comparing latent prints to exemplars generated through AFIS 
searches, examiners must recognize the possibility and dangers of incidental similarity. 
Adjustments such as a higher decision threshold, stricter tolerances for differences in appearance, 
and explicit feature weighting need to be considered. Modifying quality assurance practices for 
this scenario also should be considered.
Recommendation 3.7: Because empirical evidence and statistical reasoning do not support a 
source attribution to the exclusion of all other individuals in the world, latent print examiners 
should not report or testify, directly or by implication, to a source attribution to the exclusion of 
all others in the world.
Recommendation 3.8: The friction ridge examiner community and other experts should 
determine under what circumstances a qualified rather than an absolute conclusion is warranted.
Recommendation 3.9: The federal government should support a research program that aims to:
a. Develop measures and metrics relevant to the analysis of latent prints;
b. Use such metrics to assess the reproducibility, reliability, and validity of various 
interpretive stages of latent print analysis; and
c. Identify key factors related to variations in performance of latent print examiners during 
the interpretation process.
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Recommendation 4.1: The federal government should support research programs to improve 
automated fingerprint identification systems. Such programs could address the following issues:
a. Expanding the algorithms used to match prints to account for the fact that the diagnostic 
value of minutiae depends on the region in which they are located;
b. Making fingerprint and palm print databases interoperable among local, state, and federal 
automated identification systems; and
c. Increasing compatibility between automated identification systems and other latent 
print software tools, including digital enhancement programs, probability calculation 
programs, and automated quality assessment programs.
Recommendation 4.2: To facilitate the validation of probabilistic models and other statistical 
research, the federal government should create large, anonymous databases of exemplars and 
latent prints.
Recommendation 4.3: The latent print examiner community should expand the training of 
examiners in elementary probability theory to enable examiners to properly utilize the output of 
probabilistic models.
Recommendation 4.4: The federal government should continue funding research into automation 
of the initial quality assessment step in latent print analysis.
Recommendation 5.1: The report of the examination should ensure that the findings and their 
limitations are intelligible to non-experts.
Recommendation 5.2: A report should:
a. Identify the latent print examiner(s);
b. Describe the items submitted to the examiner(s);
c. List the procedures used by the examiner to develop, visualize, or enhance the friction 
ridge impressions;
d. List all comparisons conducted;
e. State all conclusions with the method used to reach them;
f. Note any important limitations to the conclusions;
g. Indicate whether a verification was made and whether there was any conflict of opinion 
among examiners prior to the reported conclusions;
h. Note (or refer to external documentation of) any information about the case that the 
examiner(s) received;
i. Note the existence of additional documentation; and
j. Define important technical terms, either explicitly or by reference to an authoritative, 
readily available source. 
Recommendation 6.1: The trial preparation process should address the presentation of technical
information in lay terms, the organization of the direct examination, possible cross-examination,
and the possible use of visual aids.
Recommendation 6.2: Forensic service providers should adopt codes of ethics that require 
testifying in a nonpartisan manner; answering questions from both the prosecution and the 
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defense directly, accurately, and fully; and providing appropriate scientific information before,
during, and after trial.
Recommendation 6.3: A testifying expert should be familiar with the literature related to error 
rates. A testifying expert should be prepared to describe the steps taken in the examination 
process to reduce the risk of observational and judgmental error. The expert should not state that 
errors are inherently impossible or that a method inherently has a zero error rate.
Recommendation 6.4: An agency that employs latent print examiners should establish 
requirements and guidelines for reporting, documentation, and testimony. The agency should 
review a sample of every examiner’s case reports, documentation, and testimony and affidavits at 
least annually to verify compliance with these requirements and guidelines.
Recommendation 7.1: A structured approach that involves users throughout the entire design and 
implementation process should be followed when designing technology systems and the physical 
work environment. In addition, forensic service providers should perform usability testing to 
optimize user performance and user satisfaction before deployment.
Recommendation 7.2: Forensic service providers should institute medical surveillance for 
examiners with respect to activities specific to friction ridge examination. Corrective measures 
should be taken when appropriate and recorded. The program should include a baseline visual 
examination followed by annual vision testing to detect vision deficiencies that may affect 
interpretation of the evidence. The federal government should support research to determine the 
most appropriate tests of visual function for friction ridge examiners.
Recommendation 8.1: The federal government should consider funding research to determine 
what educational and cognitive abilities should be prerequisites for training a latent print 
examiner. Forensic service providers should have systematic training programs that include 
these abilities as well as education in the scientific method, reading and understanding relevant 
scientific literature, communication skills, and methods for logically developing conclusions.
Recommendation 8.2: The federal government should develop a forensic latent print examiner 
scholarship program to:
a. Fund the post-hire training program and, upon successful completion, provide tuition 
reimbursement, loan forgiveness, or other financial assistance to degreed latent print 
examiner trainees working in state, local, or private (not-for-profit) forensic laboratories; 
and
b. Reimburse the employer for a percentage of the salaries during the training period. 
Recommendation 8.3: Agencies should establish formal mentoring programs that define the 
responsibilities of the mentor, trainee, and supervisor.
Recommendation 8.4: The federal government should establish an expert group to develop a 
latent print educational textbook, practical exercises, and assessment tests (print and online) 
in consultation with professional organizations, senior latent print examiners, researchers 
with content knowledge, experienced trainers, and professionals experienced in curriculum 
development.
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Recommendation 8.5: Training materials should include topics beyond the technical aspects of 
friction ridge analysis, such as:
a. Documentation of work and case notes and written and oral communication;
b. Professional ethics;
c. Human factors issues such as fatigue, bias, cognitive influences, perceptual influences, 
and error;
d. Research methods; and
e. Legal and ethical aspects of expert testimony.
Recommendation 8.6: The federal government should support a clearinghouse of materials from 
existing training programs as well as publications on latent print identification.
Recommendation 8.7: Forensic service providers should require personnel to participate 
in continuing education and to become certified through an accredited program. Certifying 
bodies should review current certification tests with the aid of professionals in test design and 
psychometrics.
Recommendation 8.8: Certifying bodies should ensure that examiners have been trained to 
competency. Laboratory accrediting bodies should evaluate the effectiveness of an agency’s 
training program.
Recommendation 9.1: Management should foster a culture in which it is understood that some 
human error is inevitable and that openness about errors leads to improvements in practice.
Recommendation 9.2: Management should employ a system to identify and track errors and their 
causes.
Recommendation 9.3: All forensic service providers should be accredited by a recognized 
accrediting body.
Recommendation 9.4: Management should establish policies and procedures for case review and 
conflict resolution, corrective action, and preventive measures.
Recommendation 9.5: The latent print community should develop and implement a 
comprehensive testing program that includes competency testing, certification testing, and 
proficiency testing.
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